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ABSTRACT 
 
VOLKER GRZIMEK: Demand for Statutory Health Insurance in Germany  
1996 to 2002 following the Deregulation in the 1990s 
(Under the direction of John Akin and Helen Tauchen) 
 
 
In this dissertation I identify the source(s) of price setting power in the German 
statutory health insurance system. To accomplish this I construct a self compiled firm 
level data set with detailed information on membership, price and non-price attributes. 
For each of the three potential sources of price setting power, search costs, switching 
costs and product heterogeneity, I develop an empirical model that is designed to evaluate 
each potential source individually.  
I then estimate these models separately using ordinary least squares, fixed effects 
and dynamic panel data methods while controlling for endogeneity, heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation. The individual results suggest that both switching and search costs 
are potential sources of price setting powering this market, while non-price attributes are 
found to have no significant impact on sickness fund size.  
Finally a joint estimation of the models confirms that product heterogeneity can 
be rejected as potential source. The results also strongly support the hypothesis that 
switching costs are the major source without ruling out that search costs play a secondary 
role. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This research focuses on the effects of the 1996 deregulation of the German statutory 
health insurance market on the demand for health insurance. Even though the insured are 
allowed to choose their sickness funds (insurer) freely within their market and contribution 
rate (price) heterogeneity across funds proves to be very persistent, only about 3 % of the 
insured switch every year, despite large potential savings of up to several hundred Euros per 
year. This research seeks to identify the source of contribution rate setting power that 
explains the low rate of switching. Different estimation approaches allow testing product 
heterogeneity, switching costs and search costs as potential sources of contribution rate 
setting power1 when estimating sickness fund membership.  
This research uses a self-compiled data set of individual sickness fund data for 1996 
to 2002 that is richer in scale and scope than any of the data used in earlier research on 
demand for sickness funds. This data set is the first to include extensive information on each 
fund’s market of operation, competitors’ prices and non-price attributes. The latter are added 
to the data set by merging the self-compiled data set with published surveys of funds’ non-
price attributes, which allows the removal of potential omitted variable bias. The estimation 
techniques used in the data analysis control for heteroskedasticity, serial autocorrelation and 
endogeneity. 
                                                 
1
 Limitation on entry and exit would be a fourth potential source of contribution rate setting power, but is not 
relevant in the German sickness fund sector.  
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This research is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, the German health insurance 
sector, its history, the actors and the reforms of the 1990s are described. In Chapter 3, the 
relevant literature on health insurance demand is reviewed. In Chapter 4, a model of 
insurance demand that fits the characteristics of the German health insurance system is 
developed and its components discussed, followed by a discussion of the different sources of 
contribution rate setting power in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the data set is described, and 
Chapter 7 details the statistical analysis and discusses the findings. Finally in Chapter 8, the 
most important results of this research are summarized, and the implications of this study and 
the need for future research will be discussed. 
 
  
 
 
2 The Health Insurance System in Germany 
 
2.1 History of the German Health Insurance System 
Germany became the first country worldwide to codify existing voluntary structures 
of health insurance into a mandatory state-supervised system in 1883.2 A network of 
voluntary sickness funds existed before 1883, which was mostly organized around guilds, 
communities or companies3, whose recorded origins reach back to the fourteenth century.4 
The main purpose of these early forms of insurance was to prevent the extreme poverty that 
often resulted from sickness and disability. Early companies also set up funds as a fringe 
benefit to retain qualified workers. As workers became eligible for coverage only after a 
certain amount of employment seniority and lost coverage when they were switching 
employers, these funds helped to keep turnover low.5 
The “Gesetz betreffend der Krankenversicherung der Arbeiter” (law concerning the 
health insurance of the workers) of June 15th, 1883, was the first law to codify mandatory 
health insurance and is usually associated with Chancellor Otto von Bismarck who actually 
favored a system were the insurance provider would have been public entity.6 The resulting 
system was a compromise between supporters and opponents of public intervention and 
defined the four major elements of the current system: 
                                                 
2
 Saltman and Dubios (2004) 
3
 Riesberg and Busse (2003) 
4
 IKK (2003) 
5
 BKK Baden-Württemberg (2002) 
6
 BKK Baden-Württemberg (2002) 
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• mandatory membership 
• mandated coverage catalogue 
• liability of the employer for payment of the premium, which is a certain 
percentage of the income (contribution rate) paid via payroll deduction 
•  self-governance of the funds.7  
The new system followed the principle of social insurance (the only criterion for 
participation in the system being insurance-eligible employment), subsidiarity (expressed 
through the system’s self-governance) and solidarity (premiums depend on income instead 
on actuarial risk and family members are covered free of charge) that still characterize the 
system today.8 
Initially the new law covered the industrial workforce, which was only a small share 
of the population. In 1885, 10% of the population was covered by one of 18776 sickness 
funds, as compared to 5% before the reforms took place.9 The share of the insured population 
increased steadily in subsequent decades to 51% in 1925 and to between 80% and 90% since 
World War II.10 The steady increase was caused by the gradual inclusion of a number of 
trades and subgroups of the population. Most notably were the inclusion of the unemployed 
in 1917/1918, retirees in 1941, farmers in 1972 and students in 1975. The last groups to be 
included were artists and publicists in 1981.11 The number of funds kept increasing until the 
1910s when about 22000 funds operated in Germany and declined ever since to 253 on 
January 2006. 
                                                 
7
 IKK (2003) 
8
 Amelung, Glied and Topan (2003) 
9
 Bärnighausen and Sauerborn (2002) 
10
 Riesberg and Busse (2003) 
11
 See Bärnighausen and Sauerborn (2002) for a comprehensive timeline of the expansion of the German 
statutory health insurance system.  
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Monetary benefits like wage replacement and death benefits that dominated the 
benefit structure in early years became of lesser importance over time. Non-monetary 
benefits like payment for health care provider services now constitute the major part of the 
sickness funds’ expenditures. In 1885 the ratio of monetary benefits to non-monetary benefits 
was 1.7 to 1. In 1960 this ratio had already fallen to 1 to 4 and in 2000 it reached to 1 to 13.12 
Two more pillars of social protection were instituted in Germany in the decade 
following the implementation of the health insurance system. Insurance against labor related 
accidents and invalidity and the public pension system were introduced in 1884 and 1889 
respectively. The fourth pillar followed during the Weimar Republic (unemployment 
insurance in 1927). The fifth and as of yet final pillar, the mandatory nursing care insurance 
(which is carried out by the providers of statutory health insurance) was legislated much later 
in 1994.13 
Before the Third Reich, several reforms took place that shaped today’s mandatory 
health insurance system. The Berlin Treaty of 1913 granted the physicians more rights to 
influence the accreditation and compensation of licensed physicians. Initially the individual 
funds had contracted a provider network of ambulatory and stationary care as well as even 
individual pharmacies. New regulations in 1931 and 1932 established the free choice of 
health care provider that is still in existence today. These reforms also led to the formation of 
physician’s organizations, which are still a major player in today’s system.14 
The National Socialist government considered centralizing the fragmented structure 
of the sickness fund system with its tens of thousands of players in 1934, but finally decided 
against it. However, the Nazi regime undermined the principle of self-governance by 
                                                 
12
 Riesberg and Busse (2003) 
13
 Riesberg and Busse (2003) 
14
 BKK Baden-Württemberg (2002) 
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appointing sickness fund leaders who were loyal to the regime. Among the other reforms 
they implemented was a greater financial oversight through the regional social insurance 
authority, which is still in place today.15 
The decade following the war saw a restoration of most of the pre-Nazi system of 
fund independence and self-governance. Health care costs (and thus contribution rates) rose 
during the 60’s and 70’s, due to more extensive use of technology, more comprehensive 
coverage and rising personnel costs.16 Following the first oil price shock in 1975, the German 
Parliament passed the Health Insurance Cost Containment Act of 1977 that required the 
insurance and health care providers to pursue the goal of stabilizing the contribution rates. 
The contribution rate stabilization has been the target of cost containment ever since.17 
Further legislation, indented to contain costs, followed in 1979, 1981 and 1984.  
The “Gesundheitsreformgesetz” (Health Care Reform Act) of 1988 aimed at further 
cost containment and improved preventive care.18 The 1988 reform expanded co-payments 
for pharmaceuticals, transportation and statutory care, excluded comfort drugs from coverage 
and increased efficiency audits. Other features of the reform were the implementation and 
expansion of preventive measures, early diagnosis and health promotion. The reform of 1988 
helped to reduce health care expenditures significantly in the following two years, allowing 
the contribution rates to decline. However, the reform’s cost saving impact faded in the early 
1990s when the expenditures started to rise faster than the average income, causing the 
contribution rates to increase again.  
                                                 
15
 BKK Baden-Württemberg (2002) 
16
 One reason for the rising personnel costs was the secularization of many hospitals. 
17
 European Observatory (2000) 
18
 The 1988 and following reforms are described in more detail in BMFG (2002-1). 
   
  7
This increase prompted the German Parliament to pass the 
“Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz” (Health Reform Act) of 1992. Here, the only features of the act 
presented are those that are not related to increased insurance choice or the implementation 
of the risk structure adjustment scheme, both of which will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapters. To prevent further increase of the contribution rates, the percentage 
increase of expenditures was limited to the percentage increase of the incomes that were 
subject to contribution rate payments for the period from 1993 to 1995. Hospital financing 
underwent major reforms and the system switched from a full-cost to a performance-related 
reimbursement system. Hospitals were now also allowed to perform pre- and post-stationary 
treatments and ambulatory surgery. Reimbursement for dental care was capped and free 
dental treatment for the young became limited to include only basic procedures. Volume 
limits for prescriptions and further co-payments were implemented. The requirement 
planning and licensure of sickness fund-accredited physicians underwent major changes to 
optimize supply. The reform of 1992 achieved major cost savings that led to lower 
contribution rates over the next years, but by 1996 the increase in medical care costs started 
to outpace the income growth again and thus the contribution rates started to rise again.  
Therefore in 1996 the German parliament passed the “Beitragsentlastungsgesetz” 
(Contribution Rate Reduction Act), which increased all co-payments. For the first time the 
lawmakers directly interfered with the fund’s right to set the contribution rates by ordering all 
funds to decrease the contribution rates by 0.4 percentage points in January 1997.19 All future 
contribution rate increases by a fund were also to trigger an automatic increase in the co-
                                                 
19
 Apparently not all funds complied with this law for unknown reasons. Also many funds increased the 
contribution rate in December 1996 by exactly this 0.4 percentage points. 
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payments for that fund’s members as well. In 1999, the new government20 abolished these 
dynamic co-payment rules and some of the dental care rationing. Further reforms that aimed 
at cost containment followed in 2000, 2002 and 2004, but since they have no impact on the 
timeframe of this research, they are not discussed here in further detail. 
 
2.2  The Supply Side of Health Insurance 
The German health insurance system rests on two pillars – the private and the 
statutory sickness fund systems. While the private sector, consisting of some 20 different 
insurance companies, includes many of the features found in the U.S. insurance system, 
systems similar to the statutory system are only found in a few other countries like 
Switzerland and the Netherlands. 
The statutory sickness fund sector as a whole is a major player in the German 
economy. The total contribution rate revenue accounts for 6.4% of the German GNP.21 The 
sickness funds are organized as statutory non-profit organizations. They are characterized by 
a large degree of self-governance, but supervised by state and federal authorities. Their 
supervisory boards are composed of representatives elected by its members or, for some 
types of funds, by representatives elected by both the firms that are backing the funds and the 
members. The legal framework for the funds as well for the other players in the system is set 
in the Social Code Book V.22 The Social Code Book V defines the scope of the benefits 
package (chapter 3), the organizational structure of the sickness funds (chapters 6 and 7) and 
                                                 
20
 A coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party replaced the coalition of the Christian 
Democratic Party and Liberal Democratic Party in 1998. 
21
 Berié and Fink (2003) 
22
 The full inclusion of the laws regulating the statutory health insurance system into the Social Code Book was 
part of the reforms of 1988. 
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the fund’s financing mechanism (chapter 8). The Social Code however defines only the goals 
and scope of the interaction of funds and health care providers (chapter 4) and leaves it to the 
players within the system to negotiate the specifics.23 Often, however, the lawmaker reserves 
the right of further regulations, in case the funds and health care providers fail to fulfill the 
legally mandated goals.24 
The funds’ non-profit status places limits on the amount of debt and reserves that the 
sickness funds can hold.25 If a fund’s reserves exceed or fall short of the legal limits, the fund 
has to adjust the contribution rate accordingly. Funds set the contribution rate as a percentage 
of income26, up to a legally mandated compulsory insurance contribution ceiling. The funds 
set three different contribution rates, one (general) for members with the regular sick pay 
arrangement (employer pays sick pay for the first six weeks and the fund thereafter), one for 
those without the need for sick pay (reduced rate) and one for those members without 
employer paid sick pay for the first 6 weeks (increased rate). The employed members (and 
retirees) pay half of this contribution rate by payroll deduction and the employers (and public 
pension funds) pay the other half. The self-employed are responsible to pay the premium 
themselves and the labor office pays for the unemployed. Students pay a fixed monthly 
premium that is uniform across funds. 
The compulsory insurance contribution ceiling is set annually by the federal 
government and increases at the growth rate of average income. The responsible federal or 
                                                 
23
 European Observatory (2000) 
24
 This provision was included in the 1992 reforms when the lawmakers learned from past experience that they 
need a mechanism to interfere quickly if the actors within the system of self-governance fail to agree on 
procedures that give the desired results. BMFG (2002-1) 
25
 The reserves have to be between 25% and 100% of the monthly expenditures. (SGB 5 § 261) 
26
 The exact definition of “income” is not necessarily the same as for taxation purposes. A discussion of the 
exact rules and regulations would be too extensive here. Generally the financial ability is the guidance for the 
computation of the relevant “income”. The individual funds have a certain leeway in the definition of “income” 
of their voluntary members (SGB 5 § 240). 
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regional social insurance authority has to approve every change in the contribution rate. Until 
2001 the funds set the contribution rates individually in the old and new states, and operated 
in each part of Germany as a different accounting entity.27 Ever since 2001, the funds operate 
as one accounting entity nationwide and charge the same rate in both parts of Germany. 
There is some discussion in allowing funds to differentiate their contribution rates by region. 
Some regions (e.g. the city states of Hamburg, Berlin and Bremen) have higher average 
health care costs than more rural regions. Therefore the mix of markets in which a fund 
operates impacts the fund’s required contribution rate and therefore competitiveness.28 To a 
limited degree funds were allowed to experiment with premium refunds, deductibles and co-
payments.29 
The funds cannot reject any applicant who is lawfully eligible to become a sickness 
fund member. The coverage package that funds are required to offer is 95% to 98% 
homogenous30 and includes comprehensive ambulatory and stationary care, prescription 
drugs (with a small co-payment), most dental and eye care, and sick pay.  
For traditional reasons, the funds are distinguished by type (see Table 1 for an 
overview of the number of each type by year). Even today the distinction matters somewhat, 
because the type determines the composition of the supervisory board, and whether the fund 
has the choice to be an open fund, which means that the fund has to accept any applicant 
                                                 
27
 The former East Berlin, now part of the State of Berlin became part of the “new States” category in 1995.  
28
 Esbsen et.al. (2003), Wasem, Jacobs and Reschke (1998) and Jacobs, Reschke and Wasem (1998). 
29
 There exists very limited information about the scale and scope of these projects. Therefore it is believed that 
these programs were sufficiently small and unimportant and that their omission does not to influence the results 
of this research. Finanztest (1998) lists four funds that offered deductibles or co-insurance schemes and two that 
offered a premium refunds. Focus (2000) reports of nine funds that offered refunds for participants in provider 
panels. 
30
 Different sources report these slightly different numbers. No source reports how they derived the exact 
number, which is therefore assumed to be arbitrary, and to mean “almost completely”. 
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living or working in a defined geographic, or a closed fund, which allows the fund only to 
accept members working in one of the companies that are backing the fund. 
Table 1: Number of Sickness Funds from 1970 to 2004 by Type of Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The AOKs traditionally insured most blue-collar workers that were not forced to be a 
member in a BKK or IKK. The AOKs are amongst the largest funds in Germany. They 
operate in one region (state) only and each AOK usually has the largest market share of any 
fund in its respective market. 17 AOKs exist today, 15 in states with one AOK each and two 
in North Rhine-Westphalia, each covering about half the state. The geographic area in which 
an AOK operates defines the market for which the IKKs and BKKs have to decide whether 
to be open.31 The 1992 reform mandated every AOK to be open in its region in 1996. The 
AOKs are usually the funds in each market with one of the highest contribution rates. 
                                                 
31
 For example before the two AOKs in Saxony-Anhalt merged to one state-wide AOK, IKKs and BKKs could 
either compete openly in one of the two regions within Saxony-Anhalt or in both. 
Year 
 
 
All  
Funds 
 
AOK 
Regional 
Funds 
BKK 
Company 
Funds 
IKK 
Guild  
Funds 
EK 
Substitute 
Funds 
Other 
 
 
1970 1815 399 1119 178 14 105 
1980 1319 272 855 157 14 21 
1990 1147 267 692 152 14 22 
1995 960 92 690 140 14 24 
1996 642 20 532 53 14 23 
1997 554 18 457 43 14 22 
1998 482 18 386 43 13 22 
1999 455 17 361 42 13 22 
2000 420 17 337 32 12 22 
2001 396 17 318 28 12 21 
2002 355 17 287 24 12 15 
2003 330 17 267 22 12 12 
2004 298 17 238 21 10 12 
Source: VdAK (2004) 
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The BKKs were set up by one or several companies and previously insured only the 
employees of these companies. Since 1996 every BKK has the choice to remain closed to 
outsiders or to open itself for any (AOK defined) market in which the backing company (or 
companies) maintain a branch. By now, the majority of BKKs have opted for the open status. 
The decision for the open status is irrevocable.32 The BKKs are the largest group of funds 
(see Table 1). The size of the BKKs ranges from very small one-firm funds (usually closed) 
with about 1000 members to open BKKs that are set up by large firms or multiple firms that 
operate in the whole country and have over 1 million members. Since the number of mergers 
has exceeded the number of new foundations of BKKs during the last couple of years, the 
number of BKKs is decreasing rapidly. 
The IKKs (guild funds) were founded by the guilds. Originally these funds insured all 
employees of firms that were organized in a guild. The reform of 1992 gave the IKKs the 
same rights and imposed the same rules as on the BKKs. The number of IKKs declined over 
the last several years as they first started to merge across professions and later across regions. 
By 2002 most of them covered an entire state and some operated in several states, often even 
competing with each other. 
The EKs (substitute funds) used to be either the alternative choice for some white-
collar workers (EKAng) or, to a more limited degree, blue-collar workers (EKArb). Some of 
them are among the largest funds in Germany, but their market share (measured in the market 
of operation) is usually lower than the share for the AOKs, since most EKs operate in the 
whole country while the AOKs are focused on one market only. As of 1996 all EKs have to 
be open and there have been relatively few mergers between EKs. 
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A few other funds exist for miners, farmers and seamen. These are regulated 
differently and don’t compete with the other funds. Employees in these professions still 
cannot choose their funds freely and are mandatory members of the fund covering their 
profession. 
The number of funds decreased from 642 in 1996 to 253 in 2006. Most of the 
decrease was caused by smaller funds either merging with larger funds or merging with 
several other small funds to form a larger new fund. Closures are also possible, but happened 
very rarely as a financially distressed fund’s federal or state association is responsible for 
helping its membership funds.33 Funds that were threatened by bankruptcy usually merged 
with a larger fund. 
Table 2: Membership by Type of Fund from 1996 to 2002 
Type of 
Fund 1.1.1996 1.1.2002  Total Change 
Percentage 
Change 
AOK 22,146,745 19,182,242 -2,964,503 -13.39% 
BKK 5,218,475 8,916,736 3,698,261 70.87% 
IKK 3,000,151 3,139,261 139,110 4.64% 
EK 21,276,569 17,954,015 -3,322,554 -15.62% 
Other 1,887,027 1,770,578 -116,449 -6.17% 
ALL Funds 50,828,967 50,962,832 133,865 0.26% 
Source: Official Statistic KM1 of the Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 
 
The period of interest for this research saw major changes in the distribution of 
members across funds. Between 1996 and 2002 the BKKs’ membership increased by 71.9% 
and the usually more expensive AOKs and EKs lost 13.4% and 15.6% of their membership 
respectively (see Table 2). 
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 For example the AOK Berlin received transfer payments from all other AOKs for several years. 
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The Health Reform Act implemented a risk structure adjustment (RSA) across funds 
starting in 1994.34 The objective was to decrease the large variation in contribution rates 
across funds that was caused by the unfavorable risk structure of some BKKs and most of the 
AOKs that insured an disproportionately large percentage of elderly and sick. The RSA 
determines a “fictional contribution rate” that would have to be charged to cover the 
mandatory coverage expenditures of all sickness fund members in Germany given the total 
income that is subject to contribution payments of all members. The expected medical 
expenditure is then computed for all insured controlling for age, gender and disability status35 
and for each fund the financial requirement given the composition of the fund’s members is 
computed. The financial requirement is finally compared to the “fictional revenue” that the 
fund would receive if it charged the “fictional contribution rate”. If this “fictional revenue” is 
larger than the financial requirement, the fund has to contribute the difference to the RSA, if 
it is lower, it will receive the difference from the RSA. The RSA does not free the funds from 
the financial risk of providing insurance, because the actual expenditure does not impact a 
fund’s position within the RSA. Even though initially the RSA was supposed to potentially 
phase out at some point in the future, the persistence of a heterogeneous risk structure across 
funds requires the RSA to remain in place for the foreseeable future. Reforming the RSA is a 
hotly debated and deeply researched topic, because the RSA is redistributing billions of 
Euros annually.36 The main debate circles around the appropriate way to compute the 
financial requirement.37 The RSA has undergone three reforms since its implementation. In 
                                                 
34
 See Ramm (Unknown) for an excellent overview of the functioning of the RSA and the reforms that will be 
implemented over the next years. 
35
 Which results for every insured to belong to one of 732 different “risk cells”. 
36
 For reform proposals and further discussion of the “optimal” RSA see Breyer and Kifmann (2001), 
Lauterbach and Wille (2001) and Jacobs, Reschke, Cassel and Wasem (2001). 
37
 For example whether to include a switcher component since switchers seem to incur lower health expenditure 
than non-switchers. Alternative models ask for the inclusion of morbidity based indicators. 
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1995 retirees were included in the RSA. In 2001 the RSA for the new and the old states 
merged to one all-German RSA. The latest reform in 2002 refined the RSA by adding a high-
risk pool and special redistribution rules for expenditures for chronically ill, thus removing 
some of the insurance risk from the individual funds. 
 
2.3 The Demand Side of Health Insurance 
In 1999, the sickness funds insured about 88.4% and the private sector about 8.9% of 
the population. About 2.4% of the population had some other form of coverage and only 
0.2% of the population had no coverage at all.38 Coverage in the sickness fund system is 
mandatory for all employees with an income below an income threshold for compulsory 
insurance, which is adjusted annually according to the average income growth.39 
If a member’s40 income exceeds this threshold, he can remain a voluntary sickness 
fund member or leave the sickness fund system and seek coverage in the private sector or 
remain uninsured. Anyone insured in the private sector can generally not switch back to the 
sickness fund system, unless his income falls below the aforementioned threshold. Even in 
this case sickness fund membership is often only temporary. To obtain the right to remain in 
the sickness fund system as a voluntary member after an income drop and a subsequent 
increase back above the threshold for mandatory membership, the income has to be below 
the threshold for a certain amount of time.41 Some subgroups of the population (mainly civil 
                                                 
38
 BMFG (2002) 
39
 3375 Euro in 2002. Until 2003 both the compulsory insurance contribution ceiling and the income threshold 
for compulsory insurance were identical. Now the latter is somewhat higher widen the basis of high-income 
members in the sickness fund system and to further lower the outflow of members to the private sector.  
40
 “Members” of sickness funds are the primary policyholders and “insured” are the members plus their 
dependents that are covered free of charge. 
41
 This way the lawmaker tries to avoid that privately insured can abuse the system by switching back by 
intentionally dropping their income below the threshold for a short period of time. The exact rules changed 
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servants and self-employed) must choose their system once and cannot switch systems 
thereafter. Therefore only a relatively small number of people can even switch between the 
two systems.42 About 4.5 million sickness fund members also purchase supplementary 
private insurance coverage, which is provided only by private insurance companies.43 
Dependants of members of a sickness fund are covered free of charge as long as they 
are not employed and therefore mandatory members themselves. Students have the option to 
join a fund or to seek private coverage. All unemployed become mandatory members. 
In 2002 (see Table 3), 13% of all members were non-retiree voluntary members and 
57% non-retiree mandatory members. 30% of all members were retirees. 28% of all insured 
were dependents. 85% of all members were paying the “normal” contribution rate. 
The early 1990s saw the need for reform of the health insurance system for several 
reasons. The main factor that led to the introduction of the free choice of health insurance 
providers in 1996 was that the discrimination between blue-collar and white-collar workers 
did not seem seasonable anymore. The efficiency benefits of increased competition were 
only a secondary reason for the reform.44 
Before the 1996 reform, fund choice was extremely limited.45 Blue-collar workers 
had to be insured in either a primary fund which was either their company’s BKK or a guild 
based IKK. If there was no such fund, they had to be a member of the local fund (AOK). 
Only about 20 % of the blue-collar workers had a choice to be insured in one of the eight 
                                                                                                                                                       
several times over the last years. The Health Care Reform Act of 2000 explicitly removed the right for anyone 
55 years and older to permanently return into the sickness fund system. 
42
 About 300,000 persons previously insured in a sickness fund switch annually to the private sector and about 
half that many switch in the opposite direction. 
43
 Supplementary coverage often includes full coverage for glasses, being treated by the head physician of a 
hospital, single hospital room, full dental coverage, etc. 
44
 See Schut, et al. (2002) and Reiners (1993) 
45
 There is limited information about the exact switching and choice rules prior to the reform available  
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blue-collar EKs, which were available only in certain regions or trades.46 White-collar 
workers faced the same rules regarding their primary funds, but often had several EKs to 
choose from. 68% of the employees that were classified as “white-collar” (which were about 
half of the work force) were members of an EK. The popularity of the EKs was usually 
explained by the perception that the substitute funds offered better service and were more 
lenient in approving certain treatments (like stays in health spas). Another explanation for the 
substitute fund’s popularity is the fact that by being in a white-collar substitute fund displays 
one’s higher status in society. 
Table 3: Enrollment in Sickness Funds by Type of Fund 2002 
Type of Member 
 
AOK BKK IKK EK Other All Funds 
Percent of 
Total 
Members 
Percent of  
Total Insured 
Mandatory Members 10,129,444 5,636,919 2,278,131 10,504,674 455,229 29,004,397 40.96% 56.91% 
Voluntary Members 1,310,871 1,317,632 288,889 3,632,557 84,319 6,634,268 9.37% 13.02% 
Sum without Retirees 11,440,315 6,954,551 2,567,020 14,137,231 539,548 35,638,665 50.33% 69.93% 
Retirees 7,741,927 1,962,185 572,241 3,816,784 1,231,030 15,324,167 21.64% 30.07% 
Sum all Members 19,182,242 8,916,736 3,139,261 17,954,015 1,770,578 50,962,832 71.97% 100.00% 
Covered Family Members 6,899,886 3,740,115 1,327,080 7,208,340 676,318 19,851,739 28.03%   
Sum all Insured 26,082,128 12,656,851 4,466,341 25,162,355 2,446,896 70,814,571 100.00%   
Normal Contribution rate  14.28% 12.96% 14.18% 14.30% 13.11% 14.00%  
Increased Contribution rate 17.47% 15.43% 15.76% 15.66% 14.60% 16.03%  
Reduced Contribution rate 12.96% 12.25% 12.63% 13.37% 11.18% 13.04% 
% of Total 
Members 
w/o 
Retirees  
Non-retiree Members 
paying “normal” 
contribution rate 
9,938,630 6,403,617 2,289,311 11,647,499 148,043 30,427,100 85.38%  
Market Share (all Members) 37.64% 17.50% 6.16% 35.23% 3.47% 100.00%     
Market Share (all Insured) 36.83% 17.87% 6.31% 35.53% 3.46% 100.00%     
Source: BMFG KM1 January 2002 
 
Starting in 1996 any member of a sickness fund could choose among several sickness 
funds. The new rule allows each person to choose any one of the following options: a) the 
AOK in the region of residence or employment, b) any “open” IKK or BKK that operates in 
                                                 
46
 Thus the choice was often only between their primary fund and one of the EKs. 
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the region of residence or employment, c) any EK, d) the IKK or BKK of one’s employer, e) 
the spouse’s fund or f) to remain in the current fund even if none of a) to e) applies anymore.  
The new switching rules allow every sickness fund member to cancel the membership 
with his sickness fund by October 1st of any year and to join a new fund by the following 
January 1st.47 Additionally, if a fund decides to raise its contribution rate, any member of that 
fund can cancel the membership within two months and join another fund. Voluntary 
members are not bound by the October deadline and can cancel their fund membership 
anytime with two months notice. Beginning in 1996, retirees had the same switching rights as 
everyone else, but less incentive to do so. Until mid-1997 the contribution rate for retirees 
were equal across funds. Since then retirees face the same contribution rate as the other 
sickness fund members, but for the retires the contribution rates set January 1st is frozen for 
the remainder of the year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 As of last year the rules are modified since, according to the government, there is some excessive switching. 
Now a switcher is tied to his new fund for 18 month after which he can switch again with three-month notice. 
The switching rules for members of funds that increased their contribution rate remain in effect. This if of no 
consequence for this research as the changes to the rules occurred after the end date of the used data set. 
  
 
 
3 Existing Literature 
 
Estimating health insurance demand started to become a topic of interest in the 
United States in the 1980s. Europe followed with this during the 1990s when more and more 
countries restructured their health insurance markets towards more competition and more 
insurance provider choice for the insured.48 This chapter provides an overview of the 
literature that estimates demand for health insurance plans or providers. The objectives are 
three-fold. First, to present the body of research that reported health insurance demand 
elasticities, which can serve as a benchmark for the results in this research. Second, to 
identify theoretical insights into modeling or estimating health insurance demand. Third, to 
present the entire body of research of health insurance demand in Germany. In Chapter 3.1, 
the literature not pertaining to Germany is presented in geographical order and in Chapter 3.2 
the German body of literature is presented, ordered by the level of data-aggregation.  
 
3.1 Literature for other Countries 
The vast majority of empirical health insurance demand studies outside of Germany 
were conducted in the United States49, or in countries where, like Germany, insurance 
provider choice became available recently (e.g. The Netherlands and Switzerland). Results 
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 The Netherlands undertook such reforms in 1992 and Switzerland and Germany followed in 1996. 
49
 Some of the likely candidates for empirical economic research (e.g. Canada or the U.K.) have nationalized 
insurance systems. 
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from other countries must be treated carefully when comparing with results from Germany, 
because the institutional framework that they are conducted in potentially varies greatly from 
that of Germany. Therefore the applied models could be inappropriate and the results perhaps 
only moderately helpful as benchmarks when compared to the results obtained in this 
research. This subchapter also gives a brief outline of the insurance system and major 
reforms for those countries that had similar reforms to Germany during the 1990s. 
 
3.1.1 The United States 
The U.S. insurance market varies greatly from the German market in many respects: 
Health insurance in the United States is provided through the employer for roughly 90% of 
all insured population outside of government programs.50 The average American employee 
has fewer health insurance providers to choose from but has more choices among different 
coverage packages and cost-sharing schemes. In the U.S., in the absence of fixed insurance 
cost sharing rules, an increasing number of employers pay a fixed amount towards the 
premium and the insured pays the marginal cost of choosing more generous and higher 
premium plan. Unlike in Germany, in the chosen plan often defines the provider panel in the 
U.S., which is the set of physicians that one can chose from. Americans also reenroll 
annually with the plan of their choice while Germans need to actively cancel their 
membership and enroll in another fund, whereas else they remain in their old fund by 
default.51 
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 Abramson, Buchmueller and Currim (1998) 
51
 This list of differences between the German and American health insurance system is by no means 
comprehensive, but it includes the major differences that are relevant in this research. 
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The interest in insurance demand in the United States increased greatly in the 1980s when 
employees increasingly had a choice between several insurance providers, data became more 
easily available and the increased power of computers enabled the researchers to carry out 
the empirical analysis. Unlike this (and most German or Dutch) research, most U.S. research 
is based on individual level data. Exceptions to this are Welch (1986) and Dowd and 
Feldman (1994). This overview generally abstains from discussing any author’s findings with 
respect to individual characteristics like income, health status, seniority, etc. because the unit 
of observation in this research is the insurance provider level. All premium elasticities 
presented here are from the perspective of the insured52 unless otherwise mentioned. The key 
findings of the American literature are also summarized in Table 4. 
Early research at the individual level faced the problem of potential premium homogeneity 
across individuals, which would have made it impossible to estimate the parameters on 
premium in cross-sectional analysis. McGuire (1981) uses a sample of about 900 Yale 
University employees in 1974 who had the choice between a PGP (Prepaid Group Practice) 
plan53 and a Blue Cross plan. While the employee’s premium for the PGP was identical for 
all employees, the premium for the Blue Cross plan depended on the employment status. This 
premium heterogeneity allowed for an estimation of a two-stage model. In the first stage, 
McGuire estimated the decision to enroll in any plan, and in the second stage they estimated 
the decision between the two insurance options. He estimates both a linear and logit 
specification and concludes that the linear one provides the better fit, even when tested 
against a control sample.54 He finds that a one dollar increase in the premium for the Blue 
                                                 
52
 The “perspective of the insured” means that the price in the price elasticity of demand equation is the price 
the insured pays and the change in price is the insured’s marginal premium change. 
53
 The PGP had characteristics similar to that of an HMO. 
54
 Even though they acknowledge that the logit specification would be the more appropriate one. 
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Cross plan leads to an increase in the likelihood of enrolling in the PGP by about 4 
percentage points. The corresponding cross price elasticity of demand is 0.55.55 
Holmer (1984) first estimates the family income and the corresponding marginal tax 
rate to avoid the problem of missing premium heterogeneity in the data. He argues that the 
alternative use of money is consumption, which, unlike insurance coverage, is purchased 
with after tax income. The author uses a 1982 sample of several thousand employees of the 
Department of Health and Human Services with over 20 choices of insurers56. Estimating 
insurance choice with a multinomial logit model yields price elasticities of -0.06 to -0.39, 
depending on the income level.57 The average elasticity is -0.16. Furthermore, he reports the 
supplementary price elasticity for demand for which he considers only the choice between 
the three fee-for-service options to be -0.51. 
Welch (1986) is the first to use a panel data set. He analyzes the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) annual survey of employee benefits plans, which were frozen from 1981 to 
1982. Unlike the individual data used in most other U.S. research presented here, Welch’s 
unit of observation is the occupational group within a firm. He estimates a logistic 
transformation of generalized least squares. To allow for adjustment over time, Welch 
estimates a partial adjustment model. His dependent variable is the log-ratio of HMO 
enrollment. He reports the price elasticity of demand to be -0.20 in the short and -0.62 in the 
long run. The cross price elasticities are 0.16 and 0.49. According to Welch about one third 
of the adjustment to new prices happens within a year. 
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 Own computation at average potential HMO premium and reported market share for the PGP. 
56
 Holmer condenses the choice set to four types of plans - low, medium and high premium fee-for-service plans 
and HMOs – since most plans within each of the four categories are very similar to each other. 
57
 Higher income results in less elastic demand. 
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Short and Taylor (1989) use individual 1977 data from the National Medical Care 
Expenditure Survey. By contacting each individual’s employer or union, they obtain a data 
set that contains every individual’s complete insurance choice set as well as detailed benefit 
information on every potentially chosen plan. Short and Taylor propose a sequential model of 
health plan choice with four steps. The first step is the decision to insure, the second whether 
to insure the family or individually, the third whether to insure through a traditional plan or 
through an HMO and the last step is the choice of plan within the chosen type. They find a 
price elasticity of -0.14 for the choice between traditional plans using binomial logit 
estimation by always comparing a plan to the next more expensive one. They find a price 
elasticity of -0.13 between types of plans.58 
Feldman et al.59 also estimate a nested logit model using a data set of 17 Minneapolis 
firms with 3000 individual observations. They define the nests by the level of freedom of 
provider choice, thus including independent practice associations (IPAs) and fee for service 
(FFS) plans in one nest and HMOs in the other. Unfortunately they do not report elasticity 
estimates, but assuming two nests with two plans each (thus on average 25% market share for 
each plan) and average out-of-pocket premiums result in a price elasticity of -0.60. 
Alternatively they estimate the model without nests. For three to five plans the resulting 
elasticity is approximately -0.30. 
Ellis (1989) develops a new specification of health plan choice using a nonparametric 
functional form for the loss function. Using data for insurance choice and out-of pocket 
expenditures for the employees of one firm that switched from offering one to offering three 
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 They only report that a $100 price advantage of an HMO increases the likelihood of being chosen by 2% to 
3%. The elasticity is self-computation using the reported parameter estimate and variable means. 
59
 Feldman, Finch, Dowd and Cassou (1989) 
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traditional plans during 1982 and 198360, Ellis finds that the insured put more weight on 
uncertain expected out-of-pocket expenditures than on certain premium payments and that 
the insured under estimate low probability/high cost outcomes relative to high 
probability/low cost ones. Additionally, he finds evidence of status quo bias. Despite the 
employers attempt to encourage all employees to actively choose a plan, 14.4% of the 
employed do not do so and default to the lowest deductible plan. Out-of-pocket expenditures 
in the previous year were not a significant predictor for default behavior. Ellis does not report 
a demand elasticity estimate, but at the average market share and premium, his estimates 
result in price elasticities of –1.36 to –1.44. 
Barringer and Mitchell (1994) use a one company, four branches and one-year (1989) 
data set of employee health choice among four plans. Their data include premium 
heterogeneity since the premiums for the same plan differ across branches. They estimate a 
multinomial logit model in various specifications, including plan, individual, branch and 
regional variables. This results in price elasticities between –0.10 and –0.20.61 
Dowd and Feldman (1994) use an aggregated version of the same data set as in their 
previous study62 to estimate a logistic full fixed-effects model, with dummy variables 
representing the year, the firm, the health plan and the type of coverage. They report only the 
total premium elasticity of –7.9. Using their reported average out of pocket premium results 
in a price elasticity of –1.00 from the perspective of the insured. 
Marquis’ and Long’s (1995) study differs from the others because they look into the 
demand for health insurance of workers who have no employment-based coverage. They 
merge 1987 and 1988 data from the CPS (Current Population Survey) and the SIPP (Survey 
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 These plans differed only with respect to their financial terms. 
61
 Royalty and Solomon (1999) report -0.01 to -0.02 for this study referring to communication with the authors. 
62
 Feldman, Finch, Dowd and Cassou (1989) 
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of Income and Program Participation) with standard insurance product premium data for 
different geographic markets to estimate a probit model of health insurance coverage. They 
find a price elasticity of health insurance coverage of –0.27 to –0.40, depending on the 
income level and the data sample they use. Furthermore they report an income elasticity of 
demand of 0.15 for either sample. 
Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) use an individual level data set of employees of the 
University of California, which drastically changed (and increased) the employer’s premium 
contribution in 1994, thus creating a large degree of intertemporal premium heterogeneity. 
They find that 5% to 6% of those employees facing a premium increase switch plans, while 
30% to 50% of those facing a premium increase switch plans. They estimate a probit model 
with “switching plans” as the dependent variable. They include three premium variables in 
their estimation: a dummy for any premium increase, the total premium increase and the total 
premium increase squared. They don’t report an elasticity estimate, probably due to the 
threefold inclusion of premium in the estimation and resulting difficulty for computing the 
elasticity. They find that even small premium increases cause a large increase in the 
likelihood of switching. While the likelihood of switching with an unchanged premium is 
5.2%, a moderate increase of the premium by $10 increases the chance of switching to 
26.4%. They note that a major reason for the observed premium sensitivity is probably that 
the benefit structure of the University of California health plans is very homogenous, thus 
eliminating one factor of competition. Compared to plans with identical provider panels, they 
find the price sensitivity even higher than reported for the overall data set. 
Abramson, Buchmueller and Currim (1998) compare different models common in 
either (health) economic or marketing research. Their focus is on the different treatment of 
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consumer heterogeneity of plan provider quality assessment. Using parts of the 
aforementioned University of California data set, they estimate several models.63 For the 
estimation with the data for which the insurance choice of the prior year is unknown, they 
find the model with random coefficients of plans to be the best fit. If the plan choice of the 
previous year is known, the model with interaction of consumer characteristics and plan and 
premium variables offers the best fit. They estimate the own- and cross price elasticity of 
demand separately for households that did and that did not switch plans between 1993 and 
1994. For non-switchers (switchers) the own price elasticity is –0.46 (–0.63) and the cross 
price elasticity is 0.06 (0.59). 
Chernew and Scanlon’s paper (1998) is one of the first of a newer branch of research 
that looks into the impact of quality report cards on insurance choice. They use 1995 data 
from a major U.S. firm with branches in 44 different markets that implemented report cards. 
They estimate four different specifications of their model: weighted and unweighted share 
regressions at the branch level and conditional and nested logit with individual level data. For 
either share regression (but not for the logistic specifications) the authors fail to reject the 
hypothesis that the premium has no impact on plan choice. They do not report the premium 
elasticity of demand explicitly, but at the average values for market share and employee’s 
out-of-pocket premium it is -1.91 for the nested logit (within each nest). This elasticity is 
considerably more elastic than the one found in previous studies, possibly because of the 
report cards and the company’s requirement for all managed care plans to offer a standard 
coverage package. 
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 They estimate a conventional logit model, two random coefficient models, three models where consumer 
characteristics are interacted with premium and/or plans and two latent class models. 
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Cutler and Reber (1998) develop a model to compare benefits of increased 
competition among health insurance providers with the costs of adverse selection. They 
utilize an individual level data set from Harvard University. Harvard moved from plan 
specific partial employer contributions to fixed employer contributions with zero marginal 
cost sharing in the middle of the 1990s. The fact that the reform applied to the unionized 
employees a year later than for the non-unionized employees created a natural experiment 
that the authors exploit in their research. They estimate a latent demand model for PPO 
demand. They find the out-of-pocket premium elasticity of demand to be -0.30 and -0.60 for 
the first and second year of the reform respectively. They estimate different forms of their 
model, including a linear probability model, to test the sensitivity of their results and find the 
price coefficient significant throughout all specifications and the resulting elasticities to be 
between -0.20 and -0.40. 
Royalty and Solomon (1999) estimate the premium sensitivity in a managed 
competition setting where benefits are standardized and employees pay the premium at the 
margin. They use data from all Stanford University employees which they supplement with a 
survey of a random sample of the employed to get additional information on health plan 
choices through the employee’s spouse, health status and other. They estimate a standard 
conditional multinomial logit model with four possible plan choices. Unlike other papers, 
they report own price elaticities for the different plan choices as well as for different 
specifications and data samples. They report elasticities that range between -0.20 and -0.76. 
They also test whether using a nested logit model would be the more appropriate approach, 
but fail to find reason to reject the unnested multinomial logit model. In the last step they 
estimate a fixed effects logit model. The resulting price elasticities are -0.97 to -1.75, 
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depending on the plan. The authors acknowledge that the estimated effects could be year 
effects capturing unmeasured yearly changes other than the premium, but report that there 
were neither major changes in coverage nor market shocks during the period in question. 
Beaulieu (2002) finds a small but significant effect of plan quality information on 
health plan choice using a conditional logit model with Harvard University data from 1994 to 
1997. She finds uncharacteristically large premium effects that result in a premium elasticity 
of –1.95 to –4.76, depending on age and family status. She does not offer an explanation for 
this finding, but notes that the results are not robust across specifications. 
Strombom, Buchmueller and Feldstein (2002) focus on individual price sensitivity 
towards health plan premiums and switching costs across individual characteristics. They 
find that those presumed to have the lowest switching costs (the healthy young with little job 
tenure) are four times as price sensitive as those with the highest switching costs. Their work 
builds on the research of Royalty and Solomon (1999), but their University of California 
system data set is larger, includes an objective health status measure (hospitalization and 
cancer diagnosis), and due to more years of observation and more locations also includes 
more price variation. Comparing enrollment numbers for recent versus tenured employees 
they find those plans with premium increases in the past year to enroll a greater than 
proportional share of tenured employees, thus indicating the prevalence of switching costs. 
Unfortunately they only report the resulting demand elasticities for the insurer perspective 
premium (on average -2.5) and do not report the average out-of-pocket premium, thus 
making it impossible to compute the resulting out-of-pocket demand elasticity with the 
published information. When they focus on plans that are close substitutes (by excluding the 
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only indemnity plan), the insurer perspective demand elasticity becomes more elastic (on 
average –5.3) 
Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002) find evidence that report cards increase price sensitivity 
using a 1995 and 1996 data set of federal employees. The Office of Personnel Management 
distributed report cards to only to some of the employees during the 1995 open enrollment 
period and to all employees in 1996. They estimate a multinomial logit model after finding 
insufficient evidence that would support a nested logit approach. For the 1995 sample they 
find a negative impact of report card quality, which the authors explain with potential 
negative correlation of report plan quality and more visible plan attributes like marketing 
effort. For 1995 they find a small but significant negative premium effect. The estimated 
premium elasticity is –0.02 for existing and –0.14 for new employees. For 1996, when report 
cards were widely they cards had the presumed positive enrollment effect. The premium 
sensitivity increased significantly and the resulting premium elasticity of demand range is       
–0.13 for existing employees and –1.04 for new hires. 
Goldman, Leibowitz and Robalino (2004) look into the employee’s health insurance 
choice when they face increasing health plan premiums. The authors have data for some 
12000 employees of a big U.S. firm for three years (1989 to 1991) during which health plan 
premiums rose faster than the general price level. The company offered three FFS plans and 
43 different HMO plans. The authors estimate a multinomial logit model, which, unlike the 
other research presented here, explicitly included the option to drop health insurance 
coverage. Unfortunately they report neither explicit demand elasticities, or the mean market 
share nor the average out-of-pocket premium. The authors simulate the effects of relative 
premium increases and find that employees are in fact responsive to price. For single 
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employees, the likelihood of dropping coverage increases from 7.6% (no relative premium 
increase) to 12.6%, 20% and 29.6% for relative premium increases of 10%, 20% and 30%. 
The likelihood to switch increases from 13% to 14.9%, 16.3% and 17% respectively. 
Employees purchasing family coverage have smaller but still positive marginal propensities 
to drop coverage, but a higher marginal propensity to switch plans. 
Overall, the U.S. literature finds mostly inelastic insurance demand patterns. The 
closer the choice set resembles the structure proposed by Enthoven’s managed competition 
model64, the more standardized the coverage packages are and the better informed the 
consumers are, the more price sensitive the consumer are found to be. Most researchers 
employed McFadden style multinomial logit models65, either in the nested or unnested 
version, depending on the exact structure of the individual choice process. Several papers 
allowed for and subsequently found inertia in health insurance choice. 
 
3.1.2 The Netherlands 
3.1.2.1 The Dutch Health Insurance System 
The Netherlands underwent a major reform in 1992 to create a more competitive 
environment in their mandatory health insurance market. The Dutch system closely 
resembles the German one, partly due to the German occupying forces imposing the German 
structure in the Netherlands during the Second World War and the Dutch keeping the system 
for the most part after the war ended.66 In the late 1980s the old system was seen as  
                                                 
64
 Enthoven (1988) 
65
 McFadden (1978) 
66
 See Greß et al. (2001) for a historical overview of the Dutch health insurance system. 
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Table 4: Overview of the U.S. Literature 
Author Abramson, 
Buchmueller 
and Currim 
Barringer and 
Mitchell 
Beaulieu Buchmueller 
and Feldstein 
Chernew 
and Scanlon 
Cutler and 
Reber 
Dowd and 
Feldman 
Ellis Feldman, 
Finch, Dowd 
and Casssou 
Year 1998 1994 2002 1997 1998 1998 1994 1989 1989 
Data Employees of 
four University 
of California 
Bay Area 
campuses in 
1993 and 1994 
Individual 
employee data 
of one firm 
with 4 
branches for 
1989 
11500 Harvard 
University 
employees 
from 1994 to 
1997 
11 University 
of California 
branches with 
75,000 insured 
between 1993 
and 1994 
Sample of 
5795 non-
union 
employees 
of one large 
U.S. firm 
9000 Harvard 
University 
employees in 
1994 to 1996 
Employees 
from five Twin 
Cities firms for 
three to four 
years between 
1988 and 1993 
About 5000 
employees of 
one firm from 
1982 to 1983 
that selected 
single 
coverage 
5161 
employees of 
17 Twin City 
firms in 1984 
Observation 
unit 
Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Health plan 
level 
Individual Individual 
Method Logit, random 
coefficient on 
plan or on 
premium), 
latent class 
models 
Multinomial 
logit 
Multinomial 
logit 
Probit (switch 
vs. non-
switch) 
Multinomial 
logit 
Linear 
probability for 
PPO (Preferred 
Provider 
Organization) 
enrollment 
Full fixed 
effects logit 
model with 
dummies for 
firm, year, plan 
and type of 
coverage 
Generalized 
logit 
Nested 
multinomial 
logit 
Elasticity  The own price 
elasticity is -
0.46 for the 
general 
population and 
-0.63 for 
switchers.  
 -0.1 to -0.2 
(Royalty and 
Solomon 
(1999) report -
0.01 to -0.02 
for this study 
referring to 
communicatio
n with the 
authors) 
 -1.95 to -4.76 Not reported  -1.91 (own 
computation
) in logistic 
non-nested 
specificatio
n at average 
market 
share and 
price. 
-0.2  -7.9 from the 
insurers 
perspective.                                     
-1.00 from 
insured 
perspective at 
mean out-of-
pocket 
premium and 
market share 
(own 
computation) 
Not reported. 
Own 
computation 
with average 
market share 
and out-of-
pocket 
premium 
results in 
elasticities of  
-1.36 to -1.44 
 -0.596 (own 
computation 
assuming two 
plans and two 
nests at 25% 
market share 
and average 
out-of-pocket 
premium. ~-
0.30 for point 
estimate using 
non-nested 
logit 
specification 
and 20 to 33% 
market share. 
Choice Set 7 health plans 
(5 included in 
analysis) 
4 health plan 
choices 
6 to 8 out of 10 
health plans 
several health 
plan choices 
3.57 health 
plan choices 
on average 
with a 
minimum of 
2 and a 
maximum 
of 7. 
Eleven plans 3 to 5 health 
plan choices 
3 health plans 
in 1983 
(several HMO 
choices 
neglected) 
At least one 
HMO and one 
"traditional" 
plan. Exact 
numbers not 
reported. 
Other Key 
Results 
Switchers are 
more price 
sensitive than 
non-switchers. 
Cross price 
elasticity is 
0.06 for non-
switcher and 
.59 for 
switchers. 
  
Younger 
individuals and 
single 
policyholders 
are more price 
sensitive than 
older 
individuals and 
family policy 
holders. 
Reported 
quality ratings 
have the 
expected 
impact on plan 
choice. 
$10 out-of-
pocket 
premium 
increase 
increases 
switching 
probability 
from 5.2% ($0 
increase) to 
26.4% ($10) to 
29.6% ($20) to 
32.9% ($30) 
Impact of 
report cards 
on 
insurance 
choice is 
less than 
expected 
Adverse 
selection is a 
serious 
concern, but 
increased 
competition 
leads also to 
significantly 
lower 
premiums. 
  
Insured attach 
significantly 
more weight 
to uncertain 
out-of-pocket 
expenses than 
to premiums 
and 
underweight 
high loss/low 
probability 
outcomes. 
Significant 
own price 
sensitivity 
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Table 4: Overview of the U.S. Literature (continued) 
Author Goldman, 
Leibowitz and 
Robalino 
Holmer Marquis 
and Long 
McGuire Royalty and 
Solomon 
Short and 
Taylor 
Strombom, 
Buchmueller 
and Feldstein 
Wedig and Tai-
Seale 
Welch 
Year 2004 1984 1995 1981 1999 1989 2002 2002 1986 
Data Individual 
employee data 
for one firm 
(14000 
observations) 
from 1989 to 
1991 
5287 
individual 
sample of 
Department of 
Health and 
Human 
Services in 
1982 
CPS, SIPP 
and insurers 
price lists 
900 Yale 
employees in 
1974 
Stanford 
University 
employees 1993 
to 1995 
About 500 
employees 
surveyed in the 
1977 National 
Medical Care 
Expenditure 
Survey 
11 University 
of California 
branches with 
over 100,000 
distinct 
employees 
between 1993 
and 1997 
Sample of 
federal 
employees 
BLS annual 
survey of 
employee 
benefit plans 
from 1981 to 
1982. 
Observation 
unit 
Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Occupational 
group at firm 
establishment 
level 
Method Multinomial 
logit 
Estimate 
household 
income and 
marginal tax 
rate with OLS 
using CPS  
data and 
multinomial 
logit for plan 
category 
choice 
Probit Two-stage 
Linear and 
logistic model 
- first stage 
decision to 
insure, second 
stage which 
insurer 
Multinomial 
logit (with and 
without fixed 
effects) 
Multinomial 
logit 
Multinomial 
logit 
Nested 
multinomial 
logit 
Logit with 
partial 
adjustment 
Elasticity Not reported  -0.16 for price 
elaticity and 
+0.01 for 
income 
elasticity of 
demand 
 -0.27 to -
0.4 
0.55 (own 
computation) 
cross-rice 
elasticity for 
enrollment in 
the prepaid 
group 
insurance with 
respect to the 
HMO price at 
average 
hypothetical 
HMO out-of 
pocket 
premium and 
YHE market 
share. 
Without FE: -
0.204 to -0.760 
with FE: -0.966 
to -1.753 
Between 
traditional 
plans: -0.14 
(reported) and -
0.129 (own 
computation)                                            
between HMO 
and traditional 
plan: not 
reported 
Insurers 
Perspective.   
All Plans: -2.5 
(average),  -0.8 
to -5.2 (range). 
Only HMOs: -
5.3 and -2.3 to -
6.6  
 -0.02 to -0.13 
1995 (without 
report cards) 
and -0.13 to -
1.04 in 1996 
(with report 
cards) 
-0.2 (short run)                               
-0.62 (long run) 
Choice Set Three FFS and 
several HMOs 
23 plans 
aggregated into 
4 plan 
categories 
Insurance 
vs. no 
insurance 
Two health 
plans or no 
coverage 
3 plans in 1993 
and 4 in 1994-
1995 
Either one 
HMO and one 
traditional plan 
or two or more 
traditional plans 
4 to 7 health 
plan choices 
maximum of 
five HMOs 
One PGP 
(HMO) and one 
conventional 
insurance 
Other Key 
Results 
10% out of 
pocket 
increases 
likelihood to 
un-enroll from 
plan (drop 
coverage or 
switch insurer) 
from 20.7% 
(0% increase) 
to 27.7% 
(10%) to 
36.5% (20%) 
to 46.8% 
(30%) 
"Supplementar
y" price 
elasticity 
between the 
three fee-for-
service nests is 
-0.51 
Greater 
price 
sensitivity 
for poorer 
families 
  
Younger and 
healthier 
insured are 
more price 
sensitive. 
Price sensitivity 
between 
traditional plans 
twice as high as 
between HMOs 
and traditional 
plans. 
Younger 
employees and 
newly hired are 
more price 
sensitive. No 
clear 
connection 
between risk 
group and price 
sensitivity. 
Report cards 
greatly increase 
consumer price 
sensitivity. 
1/3 of 
adjustment 
occurs in any 
year 
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inefficient, which led to the reforms of 1992. The Dutch reforms have been based on 
Enthoven’s (1988, 1993) model of managed competition.67 
Starting in 1992, all sickness fund members became able to choose their fund freely. 
As in Germany, everyone below a certain income threshold is mandatorily insured through a 
sickness fund. Unlike in Germany, those with an income above the threshold cannot maintain 
voluntary membership in the sickness fund system and have to insure privately.68 The 
premium structure has two parts. One part is a fixed percentage of the insured’s income, 
which is legally mandated and equal for all funds. The employer and the insured employee 
each pay half of this income-related premium. In addition each fund charges a flat-rate per 
capita premium, which varies across funds69 and encourages funds to compete on price. The 
funds receive about 10% to 15% of their revenue from the per capita premium.70 Until 1995, 
the flat-rate premium was almost uniform across funds71, but starting in 1996 the variation 
increased. Having no former experience with optimal premium setting under competitive 
conditions, the funds faced considerable uncertainty with respect to the optimal price. This 
could be the reason for the ever-increasing premium spread and standard deviation of the 
premiums.72 The coverage package is highly standardized so that price and service are in 
essence the only parameters on which funds can compete. 
There are relatively few sickness funds operating in the Netherlands. In 1992, 27 
previously regional funds started competing nationwide and since barriers to entry were 
                                                 
67
 For an in-depth comparison of the Dutch system and the managed competition model see Greß, Okma and 
Hessel (2001). 
68
 Therefore “only” 62% of the population is covered through sickness funds in the Netherlands compared to 
about 90% in Germany. Nevertheless all but about 0.1% of the Dutch population has health insurance.  
69
 This feature is new since 1992. Before 1992 all contributions to the funds were made through payroll 
deduction. 
70
 Schut, Greß and Wasem (2003) 
71
 Greß et al. (2002) report that only one fund charged a flat-rate premium that differed from the others: 192 
NGL for the one fund vs. 198 NGL for all others. 
72
 Schut and Hassink (2002) 
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removed during the reform, nine more funds entered the market between 1992 and 2000.73 
Compulsory sickness funds can also offer supplementary insurance coverage, which about 
97% of the sickness fund members purchase. Since one can only purchase supplementary 
insurance coverage from the same fund that is one’s provider of compulsory coverage, the 
premium for supplementary insurance coverage is a further parameter for competition. Often 
the compulsory funds align themselves with private insurers operating under the same brand 
name. 
One of the key features of the 1992 reforms is the transition from retrospective to 
risk-adjusted payments to the funds. The fund’s financial risk has steadily increased over the 
years.74 Unlike in Germany, since 1992 funds have been able to engage in selective 
contracting and managed care schemes, but few have done so during the 1990s. 
 
3.1.2.2 Dutch Literature 
Greß et al.75 correlate membership gains and losses between 1995 and 1999 with flat 
rate premium levels. They find only a small negative correlation of –0.21 between these two 
variables. One reason might be that the premium spread is still relatively narrow. The 
difference between the most and least expensive fund is only about 90 NLG per year, while 
all but two funds fall within a range of about 40 NLG. The authors also obtain data from the 
Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel, which asked about 1100 mandatorily insured individuals 
about their perception of fund heterogeneity. For none of the eleven premium, service or 
benefit related categories that were asked in the survey, does the share of respondents who 
                                                 
73
 Schut and Hassink (2002) 
74
 Schut and Hassink (2002) provide a good overview over the gradual expansion of the risk sharing and 
adjusting scheme. 
75
 Greß et al. (2001) and Greß et al. (2002). The German part of that paper is discussed in length in Chapter 3.2. 
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think that there are large or very large differences between funds exceed 30%. This lack of 
perception of large premium differences might explain the low responsiveness to premium 
levels.  
Schut and Hassink (2002) are the first to report demand elasticities for the 
Netherlands. They use 1995 to 1999 fund level enrollment and premium data for 
supplementary and compulsory insurance coverage. They regress the log market shares of the 
funds on the premiums for compulsory and supplementary coverage (and combined premium 
levels in another specification), fund specific dummies and a dummy for new entries. They 
estimate the elasticity of demand to be -0.28 with respect to the premium for compulsory 
coverage and -0.84 with respect to the premium for supplementary coverage. If the two 
premiums are aggregated the joint elasticity is -0.40. 
The authors argue that for price competition to be effective, the premium level of a 
fund has to be explainable by factors beyond the fund’s control, in their case the initial 
financial reserves and the uncompensated medical expenditures. They find a significant level 
of unobserved premium heterogeneity across funds, which leads to the conclusion that funds 
have considerable latitude in setting premiums. 
Schut, Greß and Wasem conduct a study of consumer price sensitivity comparing the 
Netherlands and Germany.76 For the Netherlands, they are able to obtain a complete fund 
level data set for the years 1996 to 2000 containing all 25 funds that existed in 1996.77 They 
obtain enrollment and out-of-pocket premiums for mandatory as well as supplementary 
coverage. They derive a utility maximization model following McFadden (1974) and 
estimate a fixed effects linear transformation of the model following Scanlon et al. (2002). 
                                                 
76
 Schut, Greß and Wasem (2003). The German part and a critique of this paper is in length in Chapter 3.2.2. 
77
 They exclude four funds that entered the market after 1996. 
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They find only low, though with one exception, non-significant price effects. The resulting 
elasticities range from –0.14 to –0.41 for the entire population for the premiums of 
compulsory premiums and 0.02 to –0.37 for supplementary premiums. By tendency, the 
elasticity seems to decline over time. Breaking down the enrollment numbers into pensioners 
and non-pensioners they find pensioners to be slightly less price sensitive. 
 
3.1.3 Switzerland  
3.1.3.1 The Swiss Health Insurance System 
Switzerland underwent a statutory health insurance reform similar to the one in 
Germany.78 Since 1996 the insured have a choice among all compulsory insurance 
providers.79 The Swiss have two open enrollment periods per year80 and every resident of 
Switzerland in forced to enroll for compulsory insurance. The insurers are forced to accept 
any applicant regardless of health risk. The insurers are non-profit organizations of various 
juridical or institutional forms. They operate either locally, on the canton (or across several 
canton) level or nationwide.  
The insurers set a flat community rated premium for children, young adults and older 
adults. Unlike in the German system, in Switzerland every family member has to be insured 
individually. Each insurer offers five plans that differ only with respect to the deductible. The 
limits are equal for all insurers (230 Sfr, 400 Sfr, 600 Sfr, 1200 Sfr and 1500 Sfr) and 
thereafter everyone has a co-payment of 10% for any health care costs of up to 6000 Sfr 
                                                 
78
 For a comprehensive overview see European Observatory (2000-2), Colombo (2001) and Gerlinger (2003). A 
good description of the historic origins is provided by Theurl (1999) 
79
 There were 109 insurance providers in 1999, down from 148 in 1996. About 60 to 70% of the funds are very 
small, insuring under 10000 persons. Colombo (2001) 
80
 June 30th and December 31st. 
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beyond the deductible.81 Furthermore some insurance companies offer “bonus insurance” 
contracts, which lead to reduced future premiums if the insured does not incur health care 
costs. Other insurance providers offer those insured that agree to participate in a managed 
care program with a limited provider panel, a further premium reduction of up to 20%.82 
Even though the premium is set independent of income, the law mandates that no one should 
spend more than 10% of his income on health insurance. The cantons regulate the process of 
subsidizing the health insurance costs for low-income receivers.  
In addition to the mandatory compulsory insurance coverage, which is mandated to 
offer a standardized coverage package, the Swiss have the option to purchase supplementary 
insurance coverage for better hospital accommodation, treatment by the head physician and 
other treatments not covered under the standard compulsory benefit plan. About half of the 
compulsory insurance providers, as well as other private insurance providers, offer 
supplementary coverage, and any insured is free to pick any supplementary insurance 
provider. The premiums for the supplementary insurance coverage are risk based. 
Furthermore, a voluntary daily cash benefit insurance scheme exists that replaces income lost 
to sickness. Employers often purchase supplementary insurance as a fringe benefit in the 
form of group insurance for their employees. 
 
3.1.3.2 Swiss Literature 
Colombo (2001) focuses her research on characterizing insurance switchers. Using 
individual survey data, she finds that 84.4% of those surveyed never switched their insurer 
                                                 
81
 Choosing the 1500 Sfr deductible causes a premium reduction of up to 40% over the base premium with 230 
Sfr deductible. About 55% of the insured choose ordinary plan with the lowest possible deductible. Colombo 
(2001) 
82
 Only 8.62% of the insured choose the limited provider model and only 0.16% the bonus insurance plan 
model. Colombo (2001) 
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and, of those, 88.2% do not have the intention to ever switch. During the first two years of 
the new system about 5% of the sampled population switched in either year, and in 1999 and 
2000 the share of switchers shrank to 2.7% and 2.1%. The healthier are more likely to switch 
than those with a poor health status, and those in the age range from 26 to 40 are most likely 
to switch. She identifies several categories of non-switchers. “Passive non-switchers” are 
those who would never consider switching unless some major performance or price shock 
occurs, because of their aversion to change, insensitivity to insurer performance or because 
they a priori consider the costs of switching as too high when compared to the benefits of 
switching. She estimates this group to consist of about 30% of the non-switchers. A second 
category consists of the “informed or non-informed non-switchers”. Colombo estimates that 
more than half of the non-switchers belong to this category. The “informed non-switchers” 
are those who compare costs and benefits, but find it beneficial to remain with the current 
provider. The “uninformed non-switchers” do not find worthwhile to compare funds because 
they are either happy with their current fund or find the search cost too high. The last and 
smallest category are the those who think that they cannot switch because they are either 
unaware of the changes in the system, have experienced illegal cream skimming or 
wrongfully think that pre-existing conditions prevent them from being eligible to switch.  
Switching amongst different plans within one’s fund is actually much more prevalent 
than switching between funds. More people make an insurance choice by changing the 
deductible or moving in or and of a managed care plan or the “bonus insurance” contract 
while staying with their insurer than switch insurers. 
Switching seems to be predominantly motivated by premiums. About 26% cite rising 
premiums as the main reason to switch, while 17% cite better premiums elsewhere. Further, 
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7% cite an insufficient premium/benefit ratio (which is somewhat surprising given that the 
benefits are standardized and only service can be heterogeneous). About 25% give a reason 
other than price and another 25% give no reason or “other reasons”. These data suggest that 
approximately two thirds of those responding with a reason for switching mention the 
premium as the trigger for switching.  
One of the goals of increased consumer choice is efficiency gain. Colombo states that 
having huge numbers of switchers is not necessary for the achievement of efficiency gains. 
Even small numbers of switchers can discipline providers by signaling that the market is 
contestable. On the other hand, too much switching can be inefficient because the process of 
switching itself causes administrative costs.  
There has been no research in Switzerland to date that measures the price 
responsiveness of the insured. Therefore no benchmark estimates are available for 
comparison with this research. 
 
3.2 Germany 
The German research on health insurance focuses on two major questions. How did 
the consumers react to the choice of fund that the 1996 reform offers to them and whether the 
risk structure adjustment (RSA) is working as intended? The research that seeks to answer 
the first question is presented here, which includes the literature that looks into switching 
patterns and motives.83 
  
                                                 
83
 Understanding the motives will help interpreting the results of this research. 
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3.2.1 German Literature using Aggregated Data  
Müller and Schneider (1997, 1998, 1999) published a series of annual papers that 
describes the state of the health insurance market and the impact of the right to choose one’s 
fund on enrollment. In Müller and Schneider (1997), the authors provide a first insight into 
the effects Health Reform Act using the KM1 statistic provided by the Ministry of Health, 
which contains enrollment and contribution rate information aggregated by type of fund and 
state. They find that the AOKs in states where their contribution rate exceeds the average 
contribution rate the most lost the largest share of their members. They further find a similar 
effect for the BKKs and the IKKs at the state aggregation level, particularly in the western 
states. The substitute funds, which mostly operate at the national level, also show a clear 
negative correlation between contribution rate and enrollment change. 
In their second paper, Müller and Schneider (1998) confirm the trends they found in 
their previous work despite not undertaking any kind of statistical estimation but merely 
tabulating membership changes and average contribution rates at the state level. The type of 
funds that charged a particularly low (high) contribution rate saw their membership increase 
(decrease) more than the average.  
They also look into the relative importance of the right to switch funds during the two 
month following a contribution rate increase. They find no clear evidence that this additional 
switching window triggers sizable membership movements, particularly in relation to the 
switching during the regular end-of-year open enrollment period. In their third paper, Müller 
and Schneider (1999) confirm the trend that they observed in their previous papers. 
Greß et al. (2002) compare the results of competition in the Netherlands and Germany 
since both countries adopted competitive features for their social health insurance systems at 
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approximately the same time.84 For Germany, they correlate the absolute member 
gains/losses against the average contribution rate by type of fund for the period from 1995 to 
2001. They find a high correlation of -.99 for the old states and -.82 for the new states. They 
have data for the individual AOKs and find a correlation of -.87 in the old states. Using the 
German Socio-Economic Panel’s questions about switching motivation, they report that 59% 
of those who switched cited lower contribution rates as their main incentive for switching. 
This number was even higher for those leaving the (on average more expensive) AOKs and 
EKs and much lower for those leaving one of the BKKs that on average have lower 
contribution rates. 
 
3.2.2 German Literature using Fund Level Data 
Two papers used German sickness fund level data for analyzing demand for sickness 
fund coverage. Böcking et al. (2002) use fund level data from 1996 to 1998 and manage to 
disaggregate it into 39 groups of similar funds without specifying how they do it. Using 
ordinary least squares, they regress the absolute change in enrollment against the level and 
change of the contribution rate and various other fund characteristics including claims, 
personnel costs and distribution network expenses per insured as well as the share of non 
mandatory insured and the market share. 
This approach has several problems. First, estimating the absolute change may be 
inappropriate for a market where the fund size varies from a few thousand to several million 
members. This problem will be addressed in more depth in this research. Second, they use 
the market share of a fund as an explanatory variable, which is certainly correlated with the 
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 See Chapter 3.1.2.2 for a discussion of the part of the paper investigating the Netherlands. 
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error term since a positive error term causes a higher market share directly.85 Third, they 
posit that the change in the contribution rate has no impact on the change in enrollment. They 
come to that conclusion by normalizing the estimated coefficients. The estimated (not 
normalized) coefficient is 0.286 (t-value 4.872, it remains unclear what 0.286 means 
(probably change in thousand members per percentage point change of the contribution rate) 
and the average change is 0.16 percentage points. Thus normalizing the parameter to a 
change of 1 (=100 %) gives a normalized factor of 0.000 (probably rounded), which is not 
intuitively appealing since a change of the estimated parameter by 1 % of its average value 
would be a change by 1/6000 percentage points. Thus the price change is a significant 
explanatory variable, but one with an unexpected positive sign that the authors fail to discuss 
further. 
 Thus the main conclusion of their paper, that the level of the contribution rate has a 
significant negative impact on enrollment while a change in the contribution rate itself has no 
effect, is not supported by their own results. They offer two explanations for the relative 
importance of the premium level. First, people might respond to premium changes with a 
time lag. A reason for the lagged response could be information deficits on the side of the 
consumer. Second, they observe that premiums tend to move in the same direction across 
funds, which they argue could soften the impact of price changes on demand. 
Schut, Greß and Wasem (2003) look into the price sensitivity of insurer choice in 
both Germany and The Netherlands.86 They use a random utility model to estimate the price 
effect on a fund’s market share. For Germany they have data for 44 individual funds, 
including all the AOKs and EKs, but only for a few guild and company based funds. 
                                                 
85
 Unless the authors used last year’s market share. They fail to indicate precisely which one they used. 
86
 A discussion of the results for the Netherlands is found in Chapter 3.1.2.2. 
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Therefore they construct residual funds for both the guild and the company-based funds. 
From a typical utility maximizing model they derive a log linear equation that they estimate 
for different time periods and subgroups of the insured. 
Converting their parameters of the price effect into elasticities at the average 
contribution rate, they find the elasticity to be -3.45 and to be significant at the 95% 
confidence interval. They also estimate the price impact on enrollment by type of fund and 
find the elasticities between -1.39 and -4.31, depending on the time frame chosen. The 
demand seems to be more elastic in later years. For the 1997 to 2000 time frame, the only 
one for which they were able to compute and receive significant results with either method, 
they find the elasticity to be larger for the individual fund than for the type of fund. This 
seems intuitive given that the type-of-fund approach does not capture within-type switching. 
Their approach however has one major flaw. They estimate the following fixed-
effects equation:  
( ) ( ) ( ) jtT
t
ttfjftjtftjt TXXSS υτγγβ +×+−+−′≈ ∑
=1
ln    (1) 
Sjt denotes fund j’s market share in period t, Xjt the fund’s observable and time-variant 
characteristics (contribution rate), γj denotes the fund’s time invariant and unobservable 
characteristics, Tt are time dummies for each year and υjt is the error term. Subscript f denotes 
an arbitrarily picked fund87. 
The problem with their approach is that it implies the assumption that the different 
levels of enrollment are explainable solely by people’s current preferences and they do not 
allow for inertia which could be caused by switching or search cost. Testing their 
                                                 
87
 The inclusion of the arbitrary fund is necessary to cancel out the denominator that is found in a typical logit 
equation. 
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specification against the data used in this research yields results are neither significant nor do 
they have the right sign for most years. 
 
3.2.3 German Literature using Individual Person Level Data 
While the U.S. literature focuses mostly on individual-level data, there are relatively 
few publications using this type of data in Germany. This is caused by the limited availability 
of individual level data. Andersen und Schwarze (1999) analyze the characteristics of those 
sickness fund members who did switch or thought about switching in 1997 and 1998. They 
use the GSOEP, which included several questions about switching intention and motives 
during the early years after the reform. The switchers in 1997 named lower contribution rates 
as the main reason to switch while better coverage, service or image were only secondary 
reasons. Those who thought of switching and subsequently did in 1998 however chose more 
likely better coverage slightly ahead of lower contribution rates. Better service was a distant 
third while the funds’ image became almost completely unimportant as a motive for 
switching. There are several possible explanations for this pattern. One could be that funds 
were initially only able to distinguish themselves by their contribution rate and it took a 
while for the funds to communicate other differences to the consumer. Second, around 1998 
funds briefly competed by offering a variety of courses that had only nominally roles in the 
promotion of basic health activity or prevention88. Third, it is possible that most of the 
consumers’ sorting into the optimal fund (with premium being the main determinant) took 
place in the first year of choice and thereafter other factors didn’t gain absolute, but only 
relative importance compared to the contribution rate. Fourth, the initial importance of the 
                                                 
88
 Some fund even offered snowboard courses, certainly not a health enhancing activity relative to other choices 
of physical activity, but definitely a good marketing tool to attract young and healthy members. 
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reputation of the EKs and the sharp drop of it thereafter can be explained with the pre-1996 
system, when those who had to insure through the AOK funds perceived the EKs as 
something better since the EKs could only be chosen by white collar workers. Initially the 
EK funds gained members despite their relatively high contribution rate, but soon they were 
perceived like any other fund. The authors also estimate a probit model of switching using 
several socio-economic explanatory variables. However, comparing the results for 1997 and 
1998 offers more confusing and non-significant results than further insights of importance. 
In their follow-up work Schwarze and Andersen (2001) are the only ones to date who 
have utilized the GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) individual level data with the 
additional information on the exact choice of fund89. Matching premium information with the 
GSOEP data, they find that while switchers paid a slightly higher premium in 1999 than non-
switchers90 (13.78% vs. 13.60%), in 2000 the 1999 switchers paid substantially less than 
non-switchers (12.61% vs. 13.66%). This indicates that in fact the insured move towards the 
lower premium funds. They find that on average switchers are younger, more likely 
employed, have a better health status, lower health care utilization and are more likely single 
or heads of smaller (three person) families. Income and education have no clear correlation 
with switching behavior. However their research focuses on the fourth year of possible 
switching behavior so it is possible that people with higher income and education have 
already switched in the first three years and sorted themselves into the best fitting fund. 
Estimating a binomial probit model of fund switching they find a strong positive 
impact of the contribution rate on switching. They find that an increase of the contribution 
                                                 
89
 Since 1999 the GSOEP includes a question about the exact name of one’s fund. This variable is not available 
in the public use version of the GSOEP. 
90
 Switchers are those who switch between 1999 and 2000, non-switchers are those who remained in their 1999 
fund. 
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rate by 1 percentage point translates into a 4.2% increase in the likelihood to switch funds. 
Given an average contribution and switching rates of 13.60% and 4.7% this translates into a 
contribution rate elasticity to switch of 11.8.91 They also find that membership of a BKK 
increases the likelihood of switching, likely because the BKKs accepted most of the early 
switchers before 1999 and therefore have a membership base which is more price sensitive 
than the one of the other types of funds which have a larger share of those member which 
have never switched so far. 
Lauterbach and Wille (2001) use the GSOEP to estimate the movement between 
types of funds from 1996 to 1999. Their findings support the image hypothesis of Andersen 
and Schwarze (1999) that the relative initial importance of image as a motive for switching 
was caused by the EK’s positive image, which lost its importance quickly. The authors report 
that while BKKs, IKs and EKs all gained members in 1996, the EKs gained them 
predominantly from the AOKs (a trend that even on a lower level continued in 1997 and 
1998), while starting in 1997 a massive outflow of EK members to the BKKs took place. 
When they look into the socio-economic characteristics of switchers versus non-switchers, 
they basically confirm the finding by other authors. 
Jacobs et al. (2001) merge data from different governmental and fund sources and 
find that between 1995 and 1999 about 20% of all funds with about 70% of all insured lost 
members (on average 10%) while the other 80% of the funds gained members. The 30 fastest 
growing funds with a combined market share of 1.2% in 1999 were all BKKs and the eight 
fastest growing funds saw an average membership increase of 7200%!  
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 Note that this is not to be compared with the contribution rate elasticity of demand. A 1 % increase of the 
contribution rate leads to an 11.8 % increase in the likelihood to switch. For example if the premium increases 
from 13.6 to 14.6% (1 percentage point increase from the mean is equal to a 7.4% increase in the contribution 
rate), the likelihood to switch increases from 4.7% (average) to 8.8% (87% increase). 
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Zok (2003) looks into the fund members’ perceptions and knowledge of their fund’s 
contribution rate and their willingness to consider switching. Only 13.8% of the interviewed 
were able to name the exact contribution rate. 61.7% claimed a lower contribution rate than 
the actual one and only 24.5% overestimated the rate they paid. More than half of those 
interviewed reported a contribution rate that deviated more than 0.5 percentage points from 
the one they pay. Zok finds that, with the exception of those who pay the lowest contribution 
rate, the contribution rate and the likelihood to have thought about switching is positively 
correlated. Also the better informed (those who where able to name their contribution rate 
plus/minus 0.5 percentage points) have thought about switching significantly more than those 
with less knowledge of their contribution rate or who didn’t know the contribution rate at all. 
Overall 23.4% of the interviewed claimed to have thought of switching.  
 
3.3 Literature Review – Summary 
The U.S. research provides a range of demand elasticity estimates. Deriving a 
benchmark for Germany using the U.S. results is difficult given the vast differences between 
the two systems. Standard economic theory would suggest that the greater diversity of plan 
characteristics in the U.S. as well as the smaller number of plans to choose from results in 
less premium elastic demand for health insurance in the United States compared to Germany.  
The fact that in Germany switching sickness funds requires action by the insured, while in 
the United States the insured have to sign up with the insurer of their choice set on an annual 
basis would make one expect health insurance demand to be more elastic in the U.S. 
Therefore the total effect of the different systems is somewhat ambiguous. 
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The German literature is still sparse on providing good benchmark estimates for price 
elasticities. The few papers that attempted an estimation showed major flaws in their design. 
Therefore the resulting elasticities cannot be used for comparison. Most papers, however, 
have found that premium levels or changes have an impact on fund choice and in the 
descriptive research contribution rate levels are constantly mentioned as a major factor 
influencing insurance choice. Some of the European research found evidence of inertia, due 
to switching or search costs that have to be taken into account in this research. 
  
 
 
4 The Model 
 
This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part a general model for sickness fund 
membership is developed. In the second part potential endogeneity issues are identified and 
discussed.  
 
4.1 The Theoretical Model 
An individual receives utility from consumption, his health status and leisure.92 His 
hours worked and thus his income are assumed to be exogenous. Differences among sickness 
funds include the contribution rate, certain non-mandated coverage and general features like 
accessibility. The individual chooses his sickness fund j and consumes the residual net 
income (Cijt) in order to maximize his expected utility given the distribution of health 
conditions and the impact of the sickness fund’s coverage and service characteristics on his 
health status and his budget constraint 
 
( ) ( )titjtititijt YYpYC ,min1 ×−×−= τ       (1) 
The average income tax rate is denoted as τit, the contribution rate of fund j as pjt, the 
individual’s income as Yit, and the maximum income subject to fund contribution payments 
as tY .  
                                                 
92
 Leisure time is defined as the initial time endowment minus exogenous work time minus time needed to deal 
with the sickness fund. 
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In the context of this research it is beneficial to express the person’s utility as an 
expected indirect utility function of all the exogenous parameters that influence his choice. 
An individual’s expected indirect utility from plan j in period t thus depends on the fund’s 
characteristics (Xjt) the switching costs (λjt), which depend on the individual’s fund in the 
previous period HIit-1 and the exogenous variables in the budget constraint. Thus individual’s 
i expected indirect utility from fund j in period t is 
( )1,,,,, −itijtittitjtjtit HIYYpXV λτ       (2) 
The individual is limited in his choice to those funds that are open to him.93 The set of 
all existing funds in period t is Jt and the set of all eligible funds for the individual  
is denoted tit JK ∈ . Thus the optimization problem of individual Ii ∈  is 
( )1,,,,,max −
∈
itijtittitjtjtitKj
HIYYpXV
it
λτ .      (3) 
Let HIit = j if individual i chooses fund j in period t. Then the probability of the individual 
choosing fund itKj ∈ in period t is 
( )
it
ktittitktktitjtittitjtjtit
Kkjk
YYpXVYYpXVprob
∈≠∀
>
,
),,,,,(),,,,,( λτλτ
   (4) 
Let Ijt be the population for which itKj ∈ . Adding the choice probabilities across all Ij yields 
the expected membership for fund j in period t 
∑ ==
jtI
it
D
jt jHIprobM )(        (5) 
Many funds compete in several geographic markets and face a different set of competitors in 
each market. The set of fund j’s competitors is 
                                                 
93
 One could argue that not everyone has a full information set and thus the model needs to incorporate some 
kind of search process. Since any search effort depends on the unknown current information set and also 
unknown expectations of what to learn from searching, the search effort is not modeled.  
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U
jtIi
itjt jKC
∈
∧=          (6) 
Fund j’s demand can therefore be written as  
( )uujtuojtuCjtujtjtjtDjtoCjtojtCjtjtjtDjt ,XX,I,SMXXppDM εε ,,,,,, 1−= .  (7) 
The non-mandated benefits and services that are observed by the researcher are denoted ojtX  
and those that are unobserved are denoted ujtX . The vector of all non-price fund attributes 
is ( )ujtojtjt XXX ,= . The vector ( )uCjtoCjtCjt XXX ,=  for all other funds is defined analogously. 
The error term ( )uujtuojtujt εεε ,=  includes factors that are observed by the market participants 
but not by the researcher ( )uojtε  and factors that are unobserved by the researcher and 
unknown to the fund managers at the time they make their decisions ( )uujtε . The vector Sjt 
denotes socio-economic variables that impact demand and are observed by both the fund and 
the researcher. Whereas all Xjt are the choice of the fund (and XCjt the choice of all other 
funds), the ujtε  are not.  
The cost function TC of fund j in period t is 
( )jtujtojtujtojtjtjtjt WWXXMcTC γ,,,,,=      (8) 
The cost factors ( )ujtojtjt WWW ,=  are exogenous as well as fund and time specific. The 
researcher as well as the fund managers observe ojtW , while 
u
jtW  are observed only by the 
fund managers. Initially neither observes the error term γjt. 
The fund forms expectations about its competitors’ contribution rates pCjt and all 
other fund characteristic choice variables XCjt. For simplicity it is assumed that all funds 
know each other’s fund choice variables XCjt with certainty and form expectations about the 
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rates of all other funds with jPf denoting the density function of the distribution of these 
contribution rates. 
Since funds are non-profit firms, their objective is unknown to the researcher. 
However the likely objectives are either to maximize membership, to provide generous 
coverage, to charge a low premium or any combination of these. Here it is assumed that the 
fund maximizes the expected membership and that any knowledge that fund j possesses is 
also knowledge of all its competitors Cj. Thus 
( ) ( )uujtuojtuCjtuCjtjtjtjtoCjtojtCjtjtjtεPjt
,X,XP
ε,ε,X,X,I,S,M,X,X,ppDEME uu
jtCjtu
it
o
itit
1max −=  (9) 
subject to the zero-profit constraint 
( ) ( ){
( )}jtujtojtujtojtjtjt
uu
jt
uo
jt
u
Cjt
u
jtjtjtjt
o
Cjt
o
jtCjtjt
j
tjtPjt
WWXXMc
XXISMXXppDpEE
jtjtCjt
γ
εεpi γε
,,,,,
,,,,,,,,,, 1
−
=
− (10) 
The optimal choice variables depend on the parameters of the model and can be 
written as 
( )γεε jjjPujtojtuojtuCjtjtjtjtoCjtjtjt fffWWXISMXpp ,,,,,,,,,, 1−=    (11) 
( )γεε jjjPujtojtuojtuCjtjtjtjtoCjtojtojt fffWWXISMXxX ,,,,,,,,,, 1−=    (12) 
( )γεε jjjPujtojtuojtuCjtjtjtjtoCjtujtujt fffWWXISMXxX ,,,,,,,,,, 1−=    (13) 
where fjε and fjy  denote the density functions of εuu and γ . 
 
4.2 Endogeneity Issues 
Based on the above model, estimation of the demand equation poses several 
endogeneity (or omitted variable) problems, caused by correlation between 
a) the error term and the firm’s choice variables in the demand function,  
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b) the error term and lagged quantity variables in the demand function, 
c) the error term and the competitors’ choice variables in the demand function.  
 
4.2.1 Correlation between the Error Term and the Firm’s Choice 
Variables 
The error term has three components.  
• 
oo
jtε , which is unobserved by the fund as well as the researcher and thus does not lead 
directly to endogeneity problems. However, if oojtε is correlated
oo
jt 1−ε , it is also correlated 
with lagged demand DjtM . 
• 
uo
jtε , which is observed by the firm and thus impacts its decision making and could thus 
cause an endogeneity bias. 
•  
u
jtX , which causes an omitted variable bias if
u
jtX  is correlated with any of the right hand 
side variables.  
Using instrumental variables can address this problem. The problem is to find 
instruments that are correlated with the contribution rate or the non-price attributes but not 
with the error term. Potential instruments are variables that impact the cost or revenue side of 
a fund but not demand (see the in depth discussion in Chapter 6.8.1).  
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4.2.2 Correlation between the Error Term and Lagged Demand 
 
Serial correlation of the error terms can cause endogeneity. In the presence of any 
type of inertia (e.g. switching or search costs), a fund’s membership in period t depends on 
the membership in the previous period t-1, 
( )uujtuojtuCjtujtjtjtjtoCjtojtCjtjtjtDjt XXISMXXppDM εε ,,,,,,,,, 1−=   (7) 
and thus, since Mt-1 depends on Mt-2, 
( )uujtuojtuCjtujtjtjtjtoCjtojtCjtjtjtDjt XXISMXXppDM 1111112111111 ,,,,,,,,,, −−−−−−−−−−−−− = εε  (14) 
Therefore all the unobserved variables that affect any DjsM  are also determinants of 
D
jtM  for s<t. Hence, if there is any intertemporal correlation between 
u
jt
u
jt XX 1and − , 
u
Cjt
u
Cjt XX 1and − , 
uo
jt
uo
jt 1and −εε or
uu
jt
uu
jt 1and −εε , the parameter on 1−jtM would be biased. 
Fortunately, the data include the fund membership for January 1st, 1996, the last 
possible observation before the deregulation took effect. Therefore 1996M  can be assumed to 
be exogenous and can be used as an instrument for the 1−jtM  of all subsequent years. 
An alternative solution would be differencing. If the entire error term 
( ) jjtuCjtujtoujituujtjt XX ηξεευυ +== ,,,       (15) 
consists of a time-variant jtξ and a time invariant component jη , then, under the assumption 
that the demand equation is linear, 
( )jtitjtjtoCjtojtCjtjtdjtDjtDjtDjt ISMXXppDMMM ξ∆∆∆∆∆∆∆∆=−=∆ −− ,,,,,,, 11 (16) 
which eliminates the time-invariant error term. Thus estimating the change in demand 
reduces the endogeneity bias if part of it was caused by the time-invariant component of the 
error term. If the error terms ξjt were not serially correlated, Mjt-2 or ∆Mjt-2 would be valid 
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instruments for Mjt-1 or ∆Mjt-1. If the error term is serially correlated of order 1, Mjt-2 or ∆Mjt-2 
would be correlated with ξjt-1 and thus ∆ξjt, which renders it unsuitable as an instrument. In 
this case Mjt-3 or ∆Mjt-3 unless the error terms are serially correlated of order two in which 
case an even deeper lag is needed. 
 
4.2.3 Correlation between the Error Term and the Competitor’s 
Choice Variables 
Because each fund takes every competing fund’s (Cjt) expected premium and non-
mandated coverage into account when deciding on its own choice variables (see equations 
(11) to (13)), the equilibrium in the whole market with N funds is the outcome of a system of 
3*N interdependent equations.94 Solving this system of equations for gives for each fund j 
( )NNNtuNtoNtuoNtNtNtjtjt ffIWWSMpp γεε ,,,,,,, 11 −−=     (17) 
( )NNNtuNtoNtuoNtNtNtojtojt ffIWWSMxX γεε ,,,,,,, 11 −−=     (18) 
( )NNNtuNtoNtuoNtNtNtujtujt ffIWWSMxX γεε ,,,,,,, 11 −−=      (19) 
Let the vectors ( )112111 ,...,, −−−− = JtttNt MMMM  and ( )γγγγ JN ffff ,...,, 21= . All other 
right hand side variables are defined accordingly. Therefore in the demand function of firm j, 
Cjt
o
Cjt pX and are also potentially endogenous, because tJt NC ∈ and thus they depend on 
Nt
uu
Nt
u
Nt
uo
Nt W γεε and,, , which contain jtuujtujtuojt W γεε and,, . Potentially the omission of 
Njt
o
Njt pX and  for those jtt CN ∉  (the not directly competing funds) can cause an omitted 
variable bias as well. 
                                                 
94
 Even though any individual fund j directly competes only with tjt NC ∈ , all the non-competing funds 
jtt CN ∉  still indirectly impact the optimal choice of fund j. 
   
  56
The same variables that could serve as instruments, as described in subchapter 4.2.1, 
can be utilized as instruments for the competitors. If the effect of the own error terms and 
unobserved cost factors on a fund’s choice variables clearly dominates the joint effect of 
those of all other funds, the endogeneity bias due to the interdependence within the market 
might be negligible. 
 
 
  
 
 
5 The Sources of Contribution Rate Setting Power  
 
The persistent contribution rate heterogeneity95 indicates that funds experience 
contribution rate setting power. Possible sources of contribution rate setting power are 
product heterogeneity, switching costs or search costs. In this chapter, each of the three 
sources of contribution rate setting power are presented and discussed.  
 
5.1 Product Heterogeneity 
If fund characteristics like non-mandatory coverage and other non-contribution rate 
attributes have an impact on sickness fund choice and if they are the only source of 
contribution rate setting power, the market functions like the standard textbook model of 
monopolistic competition. The membership of any fund depends only on its contribution rate 
level, the level of all other relevant fund characteristics, the market size and the number of 
competitors, but not on the membership in the previous period. 
 
 
5.2 Switching Costs 
Switching costs consist of the time and monetary costs of the act of switching and the 
expected costs (or inconvenience) of getting used to the new fund, if switching has taken 
                                                 
95
 The standard deviation of the normal contribution rate in the data set declined only slightly from 0.951 in 
1996 to 0.866 in 2002. 
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place.96 In the context of the German sickness fund market, switching costs can be 
heterogeneous across time, individuals, and funds of origin or destination, or of any 
combination of these. 
 
• Heterogeneity across time: Average switching costs are likely to decline over time. The 
advance of the Internet made the provision of contact information and forms to join 
another fund easier, thus reducing the time cost of switching. People have also learned 
from others who have switched funds previously, that the ways different funds operate 
are quite similar, and therefore the expected cost of getting used to a new fund has 
probably declined as well. Time invariant switching costs would cause switching to 
take place only (after the initial adjustment in the first year following the deregulation) 
if the relative contribution rate between funds changes. Declining switching costs 
would result in switching from more expensive to less expensive funds even if the 
relative prices remain constant over time. A widening of the contribution rate spread 
would accelerate switching, while a narrowing of the spread could either reduce 
switching or even prevent it altogether. 
• Heterogeneity across individuals: If switching costs were homogenous across 
homogenous individuals, all members of a fund with the same choice set would react 
the same – remain in their current fund, or switch to the same fund. This is not 
observed, however. Moreover, given the people’s different abilities to process 
information, incomes (and thus potential savings from switching), valuation of the time 
costs of switching, and to complete the required tasks for switching, it is reasonable to 
assume that switching costs are heterogeneous across people. 
                                                 
96
 This part of the switching costs has to be expected as it incurs only after the switching has taken place. 
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• Heterogeneity across funds of origin: As the process of leaving a fund is rather simple 
and standardized, it is reasonable to assume that the switching costs are homogenous 
across funds of origin.  
• Heterogeneity across funds of destination: Switching costs are most likely 
heterogeneous across funds of destination, because funds attempt, with varying success, 
to make switching to them easy and thus reduce the costs of switching. For example 
some post the membership forms on-line and some send out targeted mail. Thus the 
fund with the lowest contribution rate is not necessarily also the only or even most 
popular switching destination.  
 
In reality switching costs are likely heterogeneous across people and funds of 
destination that decline on average over time, but are homogenous across funds of origin. 
Given the heterogeneous distribution of branches and population97, it is further reasonable to 
assume that for two individuals g and h that are currently members of fund j, two potential 
destination funds k and l and switching costs λ, hkgk λλ > and hlgl λλ < . Thus the order of 
funds with respect to switching costs is not identical for all individuals. 
The same applies for the interaction of time and individuals98 or time and fund of 
destination.99 Thus the switching costs can be written as  
JT
jt
IT
it
IJ
ij
T
t
J
j
I
iijt λλλλλλλλ ++++++=      (20) 
                                                 
97
 This is not restricted to the pure geographic distribution, but has to be understood in a broader sense. For 
example some individuals are “closer” to one fund than another, because they know members or employees of 
that fund or for some reason they feel more comfortable about switching to one fund than to others. 
98
 For example people that experienced deteriorating health might, against the trend, have increasing switching 
costs. 
99
 For example, if a fund goes on-line, the switching costs for switching to this fund decrease faster than for 
other funds. 
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with λ being the average switching costs and the other terms are the individual, fund of 
destination and time variant deviations from the average as well as the deviation of their  
interactions.100 
 
5.3 Search Costs 
It is possible that not every person has complete information about all funds’ 
characteristics at all times, and that acquiring information about funds requires time and/or 
monetary effort. If so, the individual might either make decisions with incomplete 
information about the funds that he considers101 or choose only within a subset of the legally 
available choice set. If search costs are the only source of contribution rate setting power, 
every insured person strictly joins the fund with the lowest contribution rate that he is aware 
of and which is in his choice set.102 Thus fund membership is a function of the fund’s relative 
contribution rate rank and the fund’s lagged membership103 among all competitors, if the 
chance of an insured knowing a fund’s contribution rate is independent of any fund 
characteristic. Realistically, however, certain fund characteristics may increase the likelihood 
of being in someone’s aware set. The larger a fund is, the more likely it is that someone will 
hear about the fund through social interaction or the media. Funds with particularly low 
contribution rates are likely mentioned in the periodically published contribution rate surveys 
                                                 
100
 
IJT
ijtλ is omitted, because the other terms are sufficient to identify every individual’s switching cost to any 
fund at any time. 
101
 This applies if there is more than one fund parameter to know, for example in a mixed form of search costs 
and product heterogeneity. 
102
 The subset of the choice set is called “aware set” for the remainder of this research. 
103
 This is because every insured knows at least his own fund’s contribution rate or if he does not know any 
fund’s rate (not even his own), the likely default is that he remains in his current fund. Zok (2003) reports that a 
surprisingly large number of insured did not know their current fund’s contribution rate. 
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that often list only the lowest rate funds for a market, and funds that change their contribution 
rate against the trend will also might also experience more media coverage than other funds.  
  
 
 
6 The Data 
 
The data set used in this research is a self compiled fund-level data set that contains 
membership data, contribution rates, markets of operation, mergers, and non-mandatory 
coverage information. This chapter contains an overview of the data collection procedure and 
the descriptive statistics of the various components of the data set. It concludes with a 
discussion of the potential instrumental variables and a first test of their validity. The 
statistics presented here include all available data points and not just the final data set that is 
used in the empirical work, because the size of the data set used depends on the specification 
and on the included variables. 
 
6.1  Data Collection Procedure 
The first goal was to obtain a data set frame that contains all funds that existed at 
some point between 1996 and 2002. The membership data are collected for the January 1st of 
each year, thus 1996 was the last year before the 1994 reform impacted fund membership. 
The year 2002 was the chosen as the last year, because the main part of the data collection 
took place in 2002 and early 2003. Subsequent attempts to collect data for 2003 and beyond 
yielded unsatisfying results and therefore 2002 remains the end year for this analysis. The 
data collection ended in early 2005. 
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Initial information sources to compile the data set frame were on-line surveys and 
lists obtained from the web pages of the national associations of the different types of 
funds.104 Unfortunately, public (governmental) sources could not provide comprehensive lists 
of funds. Many funds did not exist at both the initial and final date. For these funds it was 
required to find the founding date and/or the merge date and destination. Several web sources 
delivered most of the necessary information.105  
In the next step, every individual fund for which an email address existed was 
contacted by sending a questionnaire106 to the public relations or the controlling department 
of the bigger funds and the CEOs of smaller BKKs. If no individual email addresses were 
available, the “info@” (or comparable) address was used. The questionnaire asked for 
January 1st enrollment numbers107 and a complete history of contribution rates and markets of 
operation from 1996 to 2002. Initially an attempt was made to gather data on all three types 
of contribution rates for the entire time period with all dates of change. It became clear that 
historical data for the increased and reduced rate were not as readily available and 
consequently the focus shifted towards the “normal” rate only. For the markets of operation 
the funds were asked to identify the operational status for each of the 17 markets in all years. 
Furthermore each fund was asked whether other funds had merged with that fund, and if so, 
about the same data for all the former funds.  
Since funds could set different contribution rates in the new and the old states until 
January 1st 2001, the data were collected separately for these two parts of Germany. If the 
contribution rate differed, only fund data that were reported separately for both the eastern 
                                                 
104
 See Appendix A 
105
 The web sources were fund’s web pages, newsletters, newspaper articles, commercial registries, and surveys 
that listed mergers. 
106
 See Appendix B 
107
 The enrollment numbers were asked for several subcategories that will be discussed in Chapter 5.3. 
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and the western states of Germany were used by entering the data as two observations. If the 
contribution rate was the same and data were only available for both parts of Germany 
combined, the data were entered as one observation. 
Funds that did not respond to the initial email received several follow up emails over 
the next year, which were usually sent to alternating recipients within the fund to increase the 
likelihood of a positive response. The final response rate was about 15% to 20%. The 
majority of funds that did not provide any data simply didn’t reply. Those that did reply but 
did not provide data cited heavy workload, no interest, no availability, or confidentiality 
reasons108 for their negative response. 
At the same time, all the statewide and federal organizations of the different types of 
funds were contacted as well, asking for the data for all of their member funds. The BKK 
state association of one western state (Lower Saxony) and the association that heads four of 
the five eastern states provided the contribution rates and enrollment data for all funds 
headquartered in their respective states. The IKK national association provided the same 
data, as well as information on the markets of operation for all of the IKKs. The BKK state 
association for North Rhine-Westphalia provided the contribution rate data for all BKKs 
from its state.109  
Other major sources were contribution rate surveys that various sources published on 
the Internet or in print110, some of which included further information such as the regions that 
the funds operated in and occasionally membership numbers. These web sources enabled the 
                                                 
108
 Some funds provided data after receiving a confidentially statement that their data would not be shared with 
third parties. 
109
 Their data proved to be only almost complete. 
110
 See Appendix A 
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creation of a reasonably comprehensive data set for contribution rates, particularly for the 
open funds. 
After the initial follow-up period, the open funds were contacted again and asked for 
at least contribution rate and regions of operation data, because these variables are needed to 
construct the market environment for the funds for which membership data are available. A 
number of funds that would not provide membership data answered to this request. 
The last step of the data collection was to contact those funds for which some data 
were available, but some crucial information was missing (e.g. for some funds from Lower 
Saxony the head association provided enrollment and contribution rate data, but not the 
regions of operation). About 50-60 funds were contacted by phone, with a success rate of 
about 60%. 
 The second part of the data set contains information on the non-mandated 
coverage and other service related data like accessibility, which were obtained from various 
consumer reports111 and one Internet source.112 These surveys compared the non-contribution 
rate attributes of between 81 and 188 of the open funds. Contacting individual funds that 
were left out of the surveys to obtain additional data did not seem feasible, because the likely 
reason for their omission in those surveys was their refusal to reply to the surveys’ requests 
for information. 
 
6.2 Number of Funds 
The data set accounts for slightly more funds than the officially reported number. The 
second and third columns in Table 5 show the number of funds according to the official 
                                                 
111
 Finanztest (4/1998, 9/1999, 9/2000, 1/2002) and DMEuro (1/2002)  
112
 www.billigekrankenkassen.de (2002) 
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numbers, and the number of unique funds in the data set. The fifth column shows the number 
of possible data points in the data set, taking into account that many funds have data points 
for both the old and new states.  
Table 5: Number of Funds113 
 Year Official (unique) 
Data Set 
(unique) Difference 
Data Set 
(Data Points) 
1996 619 648 29 716 
1997 532 550 18 618 
1998 460 472 12 540 
1999 433 444 11 512 
2000 398 411 13 480 
2001 375 384 9 452 
2002 340 348 8 413 
Source: VdAK (2004) and own computations 
 
The official number of funds and the numbers of funds in the data set differ 
systematically. The number of funds in the data set is larger in every year, with a declining 
tendency (see the fourth column). There are three possible reasons for that over count.  
First, funds that existed at some point between 1996 and 2002 and for which no 
information is obtainable on whether or not they existed in 1996, are assumed to have existed 
in 1996. This potential over count will make the data set look less complete, but since no data 
exist for the over counted funds, the over count does not create any bias.  
Second, it is possible that the official numbers are annual averages and not January 1st 
numbers. Since the number of funds declined over time, the annual averages would be less 
than the January 1st numbers in the data set.114 Comparing the number of funds of the data 
set, broken down by type of fund (see Table 6), with the official numbers (not shown) 
                                                 
113
 These numbers exclude the non-competing funds (see Chapter 2.2). 
114
 The official numbers are quoted several times, but it was not possible to obtain the original publication from 
the Ministry of Health. Usually the numbers are quoted as beginning of the year numbers. Since the exact 
number is of no real importance in any of the publications, it is possible that the authors did not double check 
and even quoted from each other.  
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supports the assumption of moderate over counting of the BKKs since all but seven 
miscounts happened to be over counted BKKs. Therefore annual averages versus January 1st 
numbers would explain why even in 2001 and 2002, years for which the data set should be 
very accurate, an over count, albeit smaller than in previous years, exists.  
A third reason explaining the over count could be a reporting error of the official 
numbers. A small undercount exists for the IKKs in 1999 to 2002. Because the IKK’s 
national association provided the complete numbers for its members, the difference from the 
official numbers might simply be a reporting error of the public source.  
Table 6: Number of Funds in the Data Set by Type of Fund 
Year AOK BKK IKK EK All 
1996 20 559 54 15 648 
1997 18 475 43 14 550 
1998 18 398 43 13 472 
1999 17 372 42 13 444 
2000 17 352 30 12 411 
2001 17 329 26 12 384 
2002 17 296 23 12 348 
 
Table 6 breaks down the number of funds in the data set by type. Between 1996 and 
2002 the number of funds declined by 46.3%. The number of AOKs that merged mostly 
before 1996 and the number of the EKs declined by less than the average rate, while the 
number of IKKs declined by more than the average rate (57.4%). 
 
6.3 Membership and Enrollment Data 
The questionnaire asked for enrollment data for January 1st of all years between 1996 
and 2002, broken down by type of the insured. All the data that were asked for was easily 
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available from the monthly report sheets (K1) that all funds are required to file with the 
supervising authorities. 
The funds were asked for mandatory members (as well as unemployed and students 
as subgroups of the mandatory insured), voluntary members, all non-pensioner members (the 
sum of all voluntary and mandatory members), pensioners, all members (the sum of 
pensioners an non-pensioners), insured family members and all insured (the sum of all 
members and insured family members). The reason for collecting students and unemployed 
separately from the other mandatory members is that neither students nor unemployed are 
subject to contribution rate related premium payments. Mandatory and voluntary members 
were asked for separately, because voluntary members have more relaxed switching rules 
and these groups differ systematically with respect of their average income. The data for 
retirees was requested separately, because they faced a different premium until 1998 and are 
not subject to contribution rate changes during the year since 1998.  
Table 7 shows the number of data points that were collected for each subcategory and 
year. The “all members” data are between 30% and 44% complete (between 157 and 217 
observations) and for all other membership categories except students and unemployed 
between 26% and 38% of the potential data were collected. The share of available data for 
students and unemployed is likely lower (20% to 29%), because some responding funds did 
not consult the officially filed forms but some other record that did not include these data. 
The share of data for insured family members is very low for 1996 and 1997, because the 
official report sheets did not include this information until 1998 and several funds reported 
that they simply no longer have these numbers on record. The  
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Table 7: Sample Statistics of Membership Data 
Category Year Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max. 
Total Insured 
Captured in 
Data Set 
Total 
Insured in 
Population 
Share  of 
Population 
Captured 
Share of 
Funds 
Captured 
Mandatory Members 1996 206 80,348.11 303,925.00 0 3,106,489 16,551,710 29,233,644 56.62% 28.77% 
Mandatory Members 1997 180 89,501.63 324,088.80 2 3,164,568 16,110,293 29,049,072 55.46% 29.13% 
Mandatory Members 1998 169 127,194.10 459,318.20 3 4,078,287 21,495,802 28,764,224 74.73% 31.30% 
Mandatory Members 1999 166 123,629.90 418,952.90 4 3,909,063 20,522,563 28,863,647 71.10% 32.42% 
Mandatory Members 2000 161 127,102.40 409,775.50 6 3,619,369 20,463,486 28,752,347 71.17% 33.54% 
Mandatory Members 2001 123 131,195.50 328,908.20 8 2,028,942 16,137,046 28,580,066 56.46% 27.21% 
Mandatory Members 2002 106 129,318.70 311,942.70 13 1,964,604 13,707,782 28,367,491 48.32% 25.67% 
Students 1996 147 1,928.69 4,306.47 0 30,874 283,518   20.53% 
Students 1997 123 2,717.86 5,305.14 0 34,713 334,297   19.90% 
Students 1998 112 3,291.46 5,854.04 0 35,618 368,642   20.74% 
Students 1999 107 3,731.75 6,355.06 0 35,006 399,297   20.90% 
Students 2000 98 3,988.49 7,289.57 0 35,397 390,872   20.42% 
Students 2001 96 4,124.34 7,720.99 0 43,269 395,937   21.24% 
Students 2002 79 5,428.58 10,001.83 0 47,195 428,857   19.13% 
Unemployed 1996 152 11,053.63 35,869.99 0 206,686 1,680,151   21.23% 
Unemployed 1997 125 13,748.17 43,723.21 0 235,557 1,718,521   20.23% 
Unemployed 1998 152 11,053.74 38,918.50 0 243,249 1,680,168   28.15% 
Unemployed 1999 148 10,867.25 36,344.25 0 206,513 1,608,353   28.91% 
Unemployed 2000 138 11,482.78 36,579.67 0 213,185 1,584,623   28.75% 
Unemployed 2001 101 14,091.53 37,899.74 1 192,508 1,423,244   22.35% 
Unemployed 2002 94 14,914.89 40,463.41 1 200,349 1,401,999   22.76% 
Voluntary Members 1996 206 10,847.68 61,107.69 0 812,231 2,234,622 5,905,804 37.84% 28.77% 
Voluntary Members 1997 180 13,016.57 67,651.99 0 839,116 2,342,982 6,034,828 38.82% 29.13% 
Voluntary Members 1998 169 26,600.24 132,170.90 1 1,178,496 4,495,440 6,122,586 73.42% 31.30% 
Voluntary Members 1999 166 25,167.22 119,369.90 2 1,198,947 4,177,758 6,247,044 66.88% 32.42% 
Voluntary Members 2000 161 26,362.65 121,184.00 3 1,229,324 4,244,386 6,448,422 65.82% 33.54% 
Voluntary Members 2001 123 27,898.26 120,431.00 3 1,254,010 3,431,485 6,556,029 52.34% 27.21% 
Voluntary Members 2002 105 29,487.04 128,931.50 4 1,266,486 3,096,139 5,833,181 53.08% 25.42% 
Members excl. Retirees 1996 206 92,315.58 360,792.70 13 3,918,720 19,017,009 35,139,448 54.12% 28.77% 
Members excl. Retirees 1997 203 92,610.52 366,282.90 12 4,003,684 18,799,935 35,083,900 53.59% 32.85% 
Members excl. Retirees 1998 197 133,784.80 536,152.20 13 4,986,010 26,355,605 34,886,810 75.55% 36.48% 
Members excl. Retirees 1999 193 128,570.50 485,085.40 11 4,768,654 24,814,106 35,110,691 70.67% 37.70% 
Members excl. Retirees 2000 184 134,891.80 482,092.30 15 4,434,250 24,820,091 35,200,769 70.51% 38.33% 
Members excl. Retirees 2001 152 130,804.00 386,454.40 16 2,979,582 19,882,208 35,136,095 56.59% 33.63% 
Members excl. Retirees 2002 134 126,624.30 375,085.70 20 3,022,986 16,967,656 34,200,672 49.61% 32.45% 
Retirees 1996 206 40,389.93 143,382.2 0 1,089,540 8,320,325 13,787,400 60.35% 28.77% 
Retirees 1997 207 40,981.11 151,269.1 0 1,093,437 8,483,089 13,894,708 61.05% 33.50% 
Retirees 1998 199 52,391.56 191,218.3 0 1,625,718 10,425,920 13,956,626 74.70% 36.85% 
Retirees 1999 195 52,691.96 191,899.5 0 1,681,006 10274,932 14,010,477 73.34% 38.09% 
Retirees 2000 188 55,285.82 197,191.7 0 1,731,597 10,393,734 14,058,081 73.93% 39.17% 
Retirees 2001 153 56,086.41 168,777.9 0 1,103,341 8,581,220 14,075,271 60.97% 33.85% 
Retirees 2002 140 49,309.04 153,648.2 0 1,099,576 6,903,265 14,998,736 46.03% 33.90% 
All Members 1996 217 126,430.20 484,243.90 13 4,984,015 27,435,353 48,926,848 56.07% 30.31% 
All Members 1997 221 124,553.70 488,244.00 12 5,090,902 27,526,367 48,978,608 56.20% 35.76% 
All Members 1998 215 172,666.70 684,996.40 13 6,611,728 37,123,340 48,843,436 76.00% 39.81% 
All Members 1999 212 195,150.40 712,723.20 11 6,449,660 41,371,884 49,121,168 84.22% 41.41% 
All Members 2000 209 199,258.70 701,584.00 15 6,165,847 41,645,068 49,258,850 84.54% 43.54% 
All Members 2001 175 200,743.90 600,919.20 16 4,521,588 35,130,182 49,211,366 71.39% 38.72% 
All Members 2002 157 160,958.30 471,110.10 20 3,363,476 25,270,453 49,199,408 51.36% 38.01% 
Insured Family 1996 77 43,288.13 138,897.70 23 868,147 3,333,186 20,297,741 16.42% 10.75% 
Insured Family 1997 115 61,398.30 190,420.00 0 1,390,949 7,060,804 19,993,346 35.32% 18.61% 
Insured Family 1998 205 61,603.00 252,295.40 4 2,370,421 12,628,615 19,813,942 63.74% 37.96% 
Insured Family 1999 205 80,599.80 291,265.00 5 2,286,530 16,522,959 19,660,055 84.04% 40.04% 
Insured Family 2000 199 82,447.20 287,553.90 6 2,157,486 16,406,992 19,506,307 84.11% 41.46% 
Insured Family 2001 166 84,108.47 260,788.30 4 1,950,869 13,962,006 19,307,614 72.31% 36.73% 
Insured Family 2002 146 70,571.96 223,942.30 5 1,949,876 10,303,506 19,148,459 53.81% 35.35% 
All Insured 1996 84 142,953.20 448,998.60 98 2,675,779 12,008,068 69,224,589 17.35% 11.73% 
All Insured 1997 119 213,921.20 649,968.60 25 4,905,819 25,456,622 68,971,954 36.91% 19.26% 
All Insured 1998 209 209,717.00 850,333.70 17 8,982,149 43,830,853 68,657,378 63.84% 38.70% 
All Insured 1999 207 279,688.00 1,005,680.00 16 8,736,190 57,895,416 68,781,223 84.17% 40.43% 
All Insured 2000 204 289,125.60 989,989.10 21 8,323,333 58,981,622 68,765,157 85.77% 42.50% 
All Insured 2001 170 289,464.30 861,230.40 20 6,154,191 49,208,931 68,518,980 71.82% 37.61% 
All Insured 2002 181 243,316.30 870,684.70 25 8,150,979 44,040,250 68,347,867 64.44% 43.83% 
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share of funds covered in the data set peaks in 2000, because one data source provided data 
for a number of funds for the years up to 2000. Because of the aforementioned possible over 
count the share of data known is likely to be larger than reported here.  
Since there are data for most of the AOKs and EKs, which comprise most of the 
biggest sickness funds, the share of the number of members and insured in the data set is 
larger than the share of funds covered. Usually between about 40% and 85% of the insured in 
each category are captured in the data set. Unfortunately some of the largest funds didn’t 
provide data for 2001 and 2002, which explains the dramatic drop of the share for the last 
two years. 
 
6.4 Premium Data 
Initially, an attempt was made to create a data set containing all three possible contribution 
rates, but for four reasons it seemed beneficial to focus on the “normal” rate that applies to 
those members that receive sick pay from their employer for the first six weeks and from 
their sickness fund thereafter. The first reason is data availability. Many of the surveys 
contained data only for the normal contribution rate. Also for funds that either didn’t respond 
or ceased to exist, normal rates were more easily obtainable than the other rates. Second, over 
85% of insured are subject to the normal rate and thus the normal rate should have the major 
impact on fund choice. Third, the three rates are highly correlated. Table 8 shows the 
correlation between the three different rates for the years 1996 to 2002. The correlation 
between the normal and the low rate is between 0.86 and 0.91 and between the normal and 
the high rate between 0.66 and 0.80. Therefore including the other two contribution rates 
should not add much, if any, explanatory power. The fourth reason is that adding two more 
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explanatory variables that are highly correlated will cause an unnecessary loss of degrees of 
freedom.  
Table 8: Correlation Coefficient between Contribution Rate Types 
Contribution Rate 1 Normal Normal Low 
Contribution Rate 2 Low High High 
1996 0.906 0.803 0.694 
1997 0.867 0.737 0.592 
1998 0.873 0.659 0.498 
1999 0.866 0.687 0.554 
2000 0.859 0.689 0.537 
2001 0.861 0.690 0.556 
2002 0.911 0.738 0.637 
 
A variety of sources were used to collect the contribution rate data, including the 
sources mentioned above in Chapter 6.1 to collect membership data. Furthermore there were 
numerous other on-line sources like newspaper articles, lists provided by companies for their 
employees, reports in consumer forums, lists provided by charitable organizations, etc.115 All 
these data sources were utilized wherever the premium was given with a specific date. There 
were very few instances where two sources gave conflicting information. In these cases the 
fund was contacted for clarification. As the premium data are open knowledge and the funds 
have an interest in publishing this information, it was possible to obtain an almost complete 
dataset for at least the open funds. Table 9 shows the descriptive data of the contribution 
rates for the funds in the data set.116 The average contribution rate increased from 12.44% to 
12.80% over the first two years and declined slightly to 12.74% in 2001. In 2002 it increased 
again to 13.09%. 
                                                 
115
 See Appendix A 
116
 The averages here are unweighted and thus not comparable to the official statistic, which reposts the average 
weighted by fund size. 
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Table 9: Normal Contribution Rates – Descriptive Statistics 
Year Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Share of Funds known 
Share of Open 
Funds known 
1996 363 12.44 0.951  9.5 14.9 50.70% 92.31% 
1997 336 12.57 0.924  9.1 15.3 54.37% 88.13% 
1998 333 12.80 0.834 10.5 15.3 61.67% 91.30% 
1999 338 12.78 0.842 10.2 15.3 66.02% 92.61% 
2000 351 12.77 0.836 10.2 14.9 73.13% 95.45% 
2001 424 12.74 0.823  8.5 15.3 93.81% 98.11% 
2002 413 13.09 0.866  8.0 14.9 100.00% 100.00% 
 
The completeness of the data set increases from just below 50% in 1996 to 100% in 
2002. The jump in 2001 is caused by the availability of data for virtually all BKKs for the 
last two years in the sample period. The degree of completeness is even higher for the open 
funds as it hovers around 90% for the first five years and reaches near completeness in 2001 
and completeness in 2002. 
 
6.5  Markets of Operation 
A fund can take one of three operational states in a market: “open”, “closed” or “not 
active”. “Open” means that a fund is obliged to accept the application of any resident or 
employee, who has the legal right to be a sickness fund member. “Closed” means that only 
employees, their spouses and former employees of the firms backing the fund can be 
members of the closed fund. ”Not active” means that a fund is not actively operating in that 
market.117 
                                                 
117
 Actually “not active” is not necessarily an option, but merely an estimate. A fund that is not active in a 
region can still have members living in that market, For example former employees that moved to another 
market or employees commuting to work across market borders. This might be a problem if a company close to 
the border of a market is employing many residents of the neighboring market. Since there is no information 
available for this effect this possibility is ignored altogether. 
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The questionnaire asked for the operational status of the fund in each of the 17 
markets for January 1st of each year and the month of any switch from being closed or not 
active to open in the middle of the calendar year.118 
The number of open funds increased rapidly over the years as can be seen in Table 
10. Only in 2002 the number of open funds remained almost constant as the foundation of 
new open funds and the switching of existing funds to an open status barely outpaced 
mergers of open funds. The share of open funds increased continuously from about 17% in 
1996 to 62.6% in 2002. 
In the early years a sizeable number of funds have an unknown status, mostly because 
they merged with an open fund and it was no longer possible to obtain information about the 
former status of these funds. Since open funds have more media coverage and were likely to 
appear in premium comparison overviews, it is assumed that most of the unknown status 
funds were in fact closed. It is also possible that most of these unidentified funds did not exist 
in the early years and that they make up the bulk of the over counted funds, which were 
discussed above. To obtain a most complete data set some of the open status data were 
imputed, using the best guess possible. 
For example, if fund ABC is backed by a small company from Bavaria and merged in 
1999 with fund XYZ from Bavaria and fund XYZ opened itself to Bavaria only in 2001, we 
can conclude that fund ABC must have been a closed fund operating only in Bavaria. The 
open status of a fund was never imputed without reliable information of the open status. 
 
 
                                                 
118
 The data set includes 447 middle-of-the-year openings. Most of the opening took place at the beginning of 
the quarters (April, July and October) 
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Table 10: Open and Closed Funds by Type 
 
Of all parts of the data set, the operational status part is the most complete one (see 
Table 11). The share of all funds for which there is complete information for all regions 
increases from 93.0% in 1996 to 100% in 2002. The share of data points for all funds 
increases from 96.2% in 1996 to 100% in 2002. For the funds that are known to be open the 
share of funds with complete data increases from 97.7% in 1996 to 100% in both 2001 and 
2002. The share of known data points for these funds ranges from 99.4 to 99.7% in 1996 to 
2000 and is 100% in both 2001 and 2002. 
Table 11: Open Status Data Completeness 
 All Funds Open Funds 
Year Share Complete Share Data Share Complete Share Data 
1996 93.03% 96.19% 97.69% 99.55% 
1997 93.54% 96.86% 98.13% 99.63% 
1998 94.09% 96.99% 98.37% 99.65% 
1999 94.34% 97.25% 98.52% 99.68% 
2000 95.21% 97.65% 98.35% 99.42% 
2001 99.78% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00% 
2002 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
To create variables for the competitive environment in which each fund operates, it is 
important to know the number of open funds in each market. Table 12 summarizes the 
number of open funds in each market for January 1st of each year. On average about 41 open 
funds competed for members in each market in 1996 whereas by 2002 the number increased 
to over 100 funds per market. This increase of about 150% is larger than the increase in the 
Year BKK (open) 
BKK 
(closed) 
BKK 
(unknown) 
IKK 
(open) 
IKK 
(closed) 
All    
Open 
All 
Closed All 
1996 68 451 40 6 48 109 499 648 
1997 87 354 34 10 33 129 387 550 
1998 106 268 24 11 32 148 300 472 
1999 120 225 27 11 31 161 256 444 
2000 151 182 19 14 16 194 198 411 
2001 168 160 1 17 9 214 169 384 
2002 169 127 0 20 3 218 130 348 
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number of open funds, because in addition to opening itself, many funds merged with funds 
operating in different markets so that the average number of markets per open fund increased 
from 6.4 in 1996 to 7.9 in 2002. There is a clear correlation between population size of the 
markets and the number of open funds available to its population. Only the six markets with 
the largest population also have more than 100 open funds each since the year 2000. 
Table 12: Open Funds by State 
State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 51 61 72 88 106 116 121 
Bavaria 54 73 82 98 112 123 127 
Berlin 41 54 59 70 84 91 98 
Brandenburg 36 47 51 60 70 75 80 
Bremen 33 46 50 62 70 75 82 
Hamburg 38 53 59 73 83 90 96 
Hesse 52 66 73 86 103 116 118 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 32 43 47 57 68 72 79 
Lower-Saxony 48 66 72 88 109 120 129 
Rhineland 44 60 70 84 102 112 117 
Westphalia-Lippe 46 60 72 88 105 116 125 
Rhineland-Palatinate 38 51 57 69 82 92 97 
Saarland 28 38 41 51 60 69 72 
Saxony 41 52 59 72 86 93 99 
Saxony-Anhalt 44 53 56 68 82 89 95 
Schleswig-Holstein 30 43 47 58 68 77 85 
Thuringia 38 52 55 66 80 91 96 
Average 40.8 54.0 60.1 72.8 86.5 95.1 100.9 
 
 
6.6 Non-Mandatory Coverage 
Table 13 presents an overview of the scale and scope of the surveys that covered non-
mandatory coverage. The focus of the survey questions differs between survey sources. 
While the financial consumer magazine Finanztest focused on accessibility issues as well as 
cost sharing schemes for certain treatments, the other financial magazine DMEuro and the 
web site www.billige-krankenkassen.de (thereafter bkk.de) reports predominantly listed all 
the non-mandatory model treatments that funds offer. Since some funds are entered 
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separately for the new and old states, the number of data points is larger then the number of 
funds that participated in the surveys.  
Table 13: Overview of the Surveys of Non-mandatory Coverage 
Source Date 
Number of 
participating 
Funds 
Observation 
Points Survey Content 
Finanztest 4-1998 81 106 
Number of branches  
Accessibility  
Spa visits 
Domestic sick care and household help 
Model projects  
Finanztest 9-1999 115 144 
Accessibility  
Spa visits  
Domestic sick care and household help 
Finanztest 9-2000 188 241 Model projects 
Finanztest 10-2002 167 
Number of branches  
Accessibility 
Spa visits 
Domestic sick care and household help 
Model projects  
DMEuro 1-2002 113 Model projects  
bkk.de 1-2002 134 
206 
Model projects 
 
The non-mandatory survey data are too multidimensional to capture all details 
without having to create too many variables and thus losing too many degrees of freedom, 
when estimating fund membership. Therefore a number of variables were created to capture 
as much information as possible. These variables are119: 
• Access on Saturdays by phone (1998, 1999, 2002) 
• Access on Sundays by phone (1998, 1999, 2002) 
• Access via the Internet (1999) 
• Share of cost for mother and child or mother recovery curative spa visits (1998, 1999, 
2002) 
• Homesick care entitlement (1998, 1999, 2002) 
• Number of maximum weeks of homesick care per case (1998, 1999, 2002) 
                                                 
119
 The years for which these variables could be constructed are in paraphrases.  
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• Domestic help entitlement when sick (1998, 1999, 2002) 
• Domestic help entitlement when sick and children present (1998, 1999, 2002) 
• Model project participation index. (The index measure the percentage of total model 
project offered in which the fund participates in relation to the average surveyed 
funds. 1998, 2000, 2002) 
 
6.7 Macro Data 
The macro data needed to compute market size and market shares was mostly 
obtained from the Ministry of Health’s publications and web page.120 Unfortunately, the 
availability of consistent data over time is very limited. For example the market size 
information is reported in some years as annual average, in some years for beginning of a 
month, but not consistently for the same month. Hence the states’ population numbers for 
January 1st of each year are used to estimate for each type of fund the enrollment in each state 
using the ratios (or the trend of the ratios) of the years for which there is comparable 
information. 
 
6.8 The Instruments 
Instruments are needed for the membership of funds, the contribution rates and any 
included non-rate fund attributes that are decided upon by the individual fund. An instrument 
has to fulfill the following criteria: 
1) It must be correlated with the instrumented variable. 
2) It must be uncorrelated with error term. 
                                                 
120
 See Appendix A    
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3) It must be available at a sufficiently disaggregated level so the instrument is 
heterogeneous across funds. 
4) At least some instruments must be time variant. 
 
6.8.1 Outside Instruments for Contribution Rate and Non-Rate 
Attributes 
Likely candidates for the instruments for the contribution rate or non-rate attributes 
are variables that are either directly or indirectly related to the cost or revenue side of the 
individual funds and the health status or economic well being of the population. The fact that 
the risk structure adjustment negates most of the revenue per insured variation, makes it 
harder to find revenue related variables, but not necessarily impossible. 
A major problem is point 3) above, because fund specific cost data exist only for a 
very limited number of funds and this cost data are hard to interpret, because of the risk 
structure adjustment.121 Therefore all cost related instruments have to be indirectly related to 
a fund’s cost, thus come from other (non-fund) sources and are therefore aggregated at a 
higher geographic level122 than the individual fund. 
 
6.8.1.1 The Cost Structure of the Funds 
The cost of funds is comprised of 
                                                 
121
 For a limited number of funds annual reports, which often include cost data broken down into several 
categories, are available, but an attempt in 2003/2004 to compile a sufficiently extensive database of the costs 
data failed due to the reluctance of too many funds to provide these reports. 
122
 The geographic aggregation levels are city, county, district (usually five to 20 counties, some states are 
comprised of one district only), region (applies only in North Rhine-Westphalia, which is the only state in 
which a fund can operate only in one half of the state) and state. 
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• Administrative costs (about 5% of total) that incur predominantly at the site of the 
fund’s headquarters, but for funds with an extensive branch level also wherever the 
branches are located. 
• Ambulatory care costs (about 26% of total) are negotiated between each fund and the 
physician’s organization at the district level of the headquarters. It is basically a 
capitation fee that each fund negotiates for its members.  
• Stationary care costs (about 35% of total): Hospitals charge the funds a mix of per 
diem and case-based lump sums. Major investments (construction, etc.) are usually 
financed with public funds at the state level while the sickness funds generally pay for 
the operating costs of the hospitals. Each hospital negotiates the different 
reimbursement rates with the head organizations of the sickness funds. Therefore 
geographic variation exists on the cost side. 
• Other costs include pharmaceuticals, sick pay and other. Sick pay is a percentage of 
the income and should thus be correlated with the wage level of the location of the 
member. Prices for pharmaceuticals are uniform across Germany.  
 
6.8.1.2 The Selected Instruments 
The data for the instruments come from a number of sources. The population and area 
of the cities where a fund is headquartered were derived from the German Wikipedia site.123 
All socio-economic district and state data as well as hospital statistics were obtained from the 
                                                 
123
 See Appendix A. Municipal population numbers were only collected for 2004/2005, because no data source 
was available for complete annual population numbers from 1996 to 2002. 
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Statistische Bundesamt or Eurostat.124 The smoking habits and body-mass-index numbers are 
part of the 2003 Mikrozensus.125 
Per capita GDP is available at the county level for all years. It can be interpreted as a 
rough measure of per capita income, which should be correlated with pay roll cost for the 
funds’ employees and possibly with the capitation fee for ambulatory care. Therefore per 
capita GDP should be positively correlated with cost and also the contribution rate. The 
problem with per capita GDP is that it greatly overstates the per capita income in the bigger 
cities that employ a lot of commuters and understates the per capita income of the 
surrounding counties. Unfortunately GNP is not available at the disaggregated levels. 
Fortunately very few sickness funds seem to be headquartered in suburbs – the vast majority 
are headquartered either in the big cities or in smaller centers so any bias is at least in the 
same direction for most funds. Per capita disposable income should be a superior measure, 
but is only available at the district level for all years. Also these indicators of the population’s 
economic well being should be positively correlated with the fund’s non-price attributes. 
One problem with all of these variables is that they are also positively correlated with 
the fund’s revenue side and thus negatively correlated with the contribution rate, because the 
RSA negates only 92% of the inter fund variation of the financial base from which funds 
receive their revenue. Whether the two effects are canceling each other or one dominates the 
other is a priori not clear. 
Population and population density for the headquarters are available at the city and 
county level for 2005 only. There is likely a correlation between wage level and city 
population, especially because in Germany the suburbs are more likely incorporated than in 
                                                 
124
 See Appendix A 
125
 See Appendix A 
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the U.S. Furthermore the population density of the city is likely correlated with the real estate 
prices which need to be paid for the headquarter unless it is owned by the fund. The problem 
with population numbers is that more populated cities tend to also have a higher population 
density and at the same time represent more potential members close to the fund headquarter, 
which in most cases also serves as a branch. Thus there could be a correlation between the 
instrument and the membership. Data for whether a county consisted of a single city are also 
available, which would give the county a higher population density by not including the 
surrounding less populated areas. 
Hospital beds per capita and hospital admission rates are available at the district level 
for all years. The funds within a region finance the variable cost of the hospitals and thus 
either one of these variables should be positively correlated with hospital care cost and thus 
the contribution rate.  
Smoking rates and BMI (body mass index) data exist at the state level for 2003. 
These variables are positively correlated with morbidity rates, and thus also with health care 
cost and thus the contribution rate. Also these instruments should be correlated with the non-
price attributes, because members with a lower health status are more likely to demand 
broader services. 
The cost and revenue side of a fund is obviously determined not only by the cost and 
revenue structure in the city/county/region/state where the fund is headquartered but in the 
entire geographic market of its operation. Therefore markets of operation-based instruments 
are constructed from variables that are available at the state level. The state’s population 
serves as weights when computing the averages.126  
                                                 
126
 The desirable weights would be the share of each fund’s members that is located in each market or state, but 
these data are not available. 
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An additional benefit of these markets of operation-based instruments is that using 
them adds variation to the predicted funds’ contribution rates. If the location of the 
headquarters were the only determinant of the instruments, all funds that are headquartered in 
the same city would have the same predicted contribution rate. Table 14 shows all 
instruments, broken down by geographic aggregation level and whether they are computed 
for the region of the fund’s headquarters or the entire market of operation. 
 
6.8.2 Inside Instruments for Contribution Rates and Lagged 
Membership 
If lagged membership is included in a specification, instruments are needed for these 
lags (see Chapter 4.2.2). One feasible instrument for membership levels is the 1996 
membership level. Until 1996, most of the insured were members of an assigned fund and it 
can thus be assumed that fund membership in January 1st 1996 is exogenous.  It is also 
possible to use sufficiently lagged changes in membership as instruments, depending on the 
presence and order of serial correlation of the error terms. If the 1996 membership is 
exogenous, so are the 1996 contribution rate levels and competitors’ contribution rates and 
thus they could be used as instruments as well.  
The major problems when using 1996 values for later years are potential mergers. 
Therefore two 1996 level instruments are created for the membership variable. One that takes 
the 1996 value for every fund for which that data are available, regardless of future mergers 
and one that takes the 1996 value until a merger happens. For the own contribution rate the 
1996 rate was used as an instrument regardless of mergers, because a merger itself does not 
lift the rate to new level like it does with membership. The competitors’ contribution rate 
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instrument is constructed by computing the average contribution rate of the currently open 
markets using the 1996 competitors’ contribution rate. 
Table 14: Available Instruments and their Geographical Aggregation Breakdown 
Aggregation level Headquarters Market of Operation 
Fund  
Membership (1996)* 
Contribution Rate (1996)* 
Competitor’s Contribution Rate 
(1996)* 
City Population
* 
Dummy for county free city  
County 
GDP per capita 
Population* 
Population density* 
 
District 
Disposable Income per capita 
Hospital beds per capita 
Hospital admissions per capita 
 
Market  
(State or Region) 
Casual smokers (share)* 
Regular smokers (share)* 
Strong smokers (share)* 
Former smokers (share)* 
Average BMI* 
BMI over 30 (share)* 
GDP per capita 
Disposable income per capita 
Hospital beds per capita 
Hospital admissions per capita 
Casual smokers (share)* 
Regular smokers (share)* 
Strong smokers (share)* 
Former smokers (share)* 
Average BMI* 
BMI over 30 (share)* 
GDP per capita 
Disposable income per capita 
Hospital beds per capita 
Hospital admissions per capita 
The instruments marked with “*” are available for one year only. 
 
6.8.3 Validity of the Instruments 
Instruments need to fulfill several conditions to be valid instruments.127 First they 
need to be able to explain the instrumented variable as a whole. Second, each instrument 
needs to be correlated with at least one of the instrumented variables. Third, they need to be 
uncorrelated with the error term. Here only the first condition can be tested. The other 
conditions are tested following the different specifications in Chapter 0. 
 
 
                                                 
127
 Baum et al. (2003) 
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Table 15: R-Squared for Regression of all Instrumented Variables 
 Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Own Contribution Rate 0.871 0.937 0.884 0.846 0.860 0.723 
Competitor's Average Contribution Rate 0.961 0.994 0.991 0.988 0.971 0.975 
Lagged Membership 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.996 
Own Access on Sundays   0.609 0.704     0.568 
Own Access on Saturdays    0.710 0.605     0.689 
Own Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children    0.731 0.702     0.574 
Own Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children    0.731 0.702     0.555 
Own Homesick Care Entitlement   0.737 0.719     0.680 
Own Homesick Care Max. Weeks                                0.895 0.754     0.656 
Own Web Presence     0.688       
Own Special Programs BKV           0.661 
Own Special Programs FT   0.794   0.698   0.796 
Own Special Programs DMEuro           0.678 
Own Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits    0.756 0.700     0.513 
Competitors' Access on Sundays    0.952 0.970     0.910 
Competitors' Access on Saturdays    0.991 0.976     0.990 
Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children    0.980 0.973     0.972 
Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children    0.980 0.973     0.955 
Competitors' Homesick Care Entitlement    0.973 0.980     0.919 
Competitors' Homesick Care Max. Weeks                               0.985 0.996     0.937 
Competitors' Web Presence    0.977       
Competitors' Special Programs BKV         0.962 
Competitors' Special Programs   0.976   0.845   0.967 
Competitors' Special Programs DMEuro           0.951 
Competitors' Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits   0.990 0.970     0.926 
 
All variables that are potentially endogenous and thus have to be instrumented are 
regressed against exluded instruments128 (see results in Table 15). For all variables the R2 is 
very high, which is likely caused by the large number of instruments and the relatively small 
number of observations (typically between 50 and 60). In 17 of the 77 year/instrument 
combinations (all 17 are own non-price fund attributes), the F-test rejects the set of 
instruments at the 90% confidence interval. Therefore, even though the set of instruments as 
a whole appears valid for most potentially endogenous variables, for some the instruments it 
might fail to have sufficient explanatory power. 
                                                 
128
 Excluded instruments are instruments, which are not used as regressors. 
  
 
 
7 Estimation 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. For each of the three sources of contribution rate 
setting power, the implications on the actual estimation procedure are discussed and the decision 
made which variables to include in the estimation of sickness fund membership and the 
appropriate construction of the dependent and explanatory variables. Then the general 
membership without retirees (AKV) is estimated for each source of contribution rate setting 
power, controlling for heteroskedasticity, serial autocorrelation and endogeneity, and the results 
are interpreted. To conclude the chapter, the three models are “merged” to allow for joint sources 
of rate setting power and to test if one of the sources dominates the others. 
 
7.1 Product Differentiation as the Source of Contribution Rate 
Setting Power 
 
If product differentiation is the only source of contribution rate setting power, the 
individual’s sickness fund choice problem could be seen as if every person is choosing next 
year’s fund solely based on the price and non-price attributes of all available funds without even 
remembering which fund they had joined in the previous year. Thus a fund’s membership is a 
function of its own and all competitors’ contribution rate levels and the levels of all other fund 
attributes that are valued by at least some potential members, but is not a function of the past 
year’s membership. 
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With M being the membership level, P the contribution rate and X representing all non-
price attributes, and the subscripts denoting the fund j, the period t and J denoting all other funds 
that fund j competes with, fund membership can be expressed as 
jtJtjtJtjtjt XXPPM εβββββ +++++= 43210      (21) 
 
Ideally every fund’s price and all other attributes would enter each fund’s demand 
equation, but then the number of regressors would exceed the number of observations. Therefore 
PJt and XJt have to be condensed in a meaningful way. 
If all the funds operated in one market (instead of any combination of 17 distinct markets 
and therefore 131,071 possible permutations of markets) and given the large number of funds, 
each fund’s competitors would be almost identical in terms of their average characteristics. The 
resulting lack of variation in competitors’ contribution rates and non-rate attributes would render 
these variables irrelevant and the above equations could be reduced to only include the fund’s 
own characteristics and not the competitors’. However, the fact that there exist 17 different 
markets with different average contribution rates and non-rate fund attributes allows the 
inclusion of the competitors’ characteristics (PJt and XJt). Table 16 shows the range of the 
competitors average and minimum contribution rates. While the average contribution rate is 
within a narrow (0.27 percentage point) range129 for all years since 1997, the competitors’ 
minimum contribution rate has a larger range of 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points since 1997.130 Thus 
for the competitors’ contribution rate two sets of explanatory variables are constructed: First, the 
                                                 
129
 A 0.27 percentage point range is, however, equivalent to a 2.1% (and 5.4% in the extreme case) difference in 
average competitors’ prices.  
130
 One outlier in 1996 caused a 2.30 percentage point spread. 
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average average and second, the average lowest competitors’ contribution rate.131 The size of the 
markets are used as weights. 
Table 16: Competitors' Contribution Rates 
Average Competitors' Contribution Rate (Open Funds) 
Year Observations Mean Minimum Maximum Range 
1996 147 12.72 12.49 13.16 0.68 
1997 179 12.63 12.56 12.75 0.19 
1998 194 12.84 12.75 12.99 0.23 
1999 211 12.80 12.73 12.94 0.22 
2000 246 12.82 12.73 12.95 0.23 
2001 288 12.83 12.71 12.98 0.27 
2002 276 13.26 13.16 13.38 0.22 
Minimum Competitors' Contribution Rate (Open Funds) 
Year Observations Mean Minimum Maximum Range 
1996 147 9.99 9.50 11.80 2.30 
1997 179 10.97 10.60 11.40 0.80 
1998 194 11.47 11.30 11.80 0.50 
1999 211 11.31 11.00 11.80 0.80 
2000 246 11.22 11.00 11.80 0.80 
2001 288 11.37 11.20 11.80 0.60 
2002 276 11.57 11.20 11.90 0.70 
 
 
7.1.1 Alternative Dependent Variables 
One problem is the difference in market size and number of competitors across funds. 
This is relevant information that would be lost if the average or most competitive competitors’ 
attributes are used to describe PJ and XJ without including the market size or number of 
competitors either in the dependent variable or including additional explanatory variables. Here 
the first option is chosen and market size and the number of competitors is included in the 
dependent variable. Using market shares as an alternative measure for the dependent variable 
would incorporate the market size, but not the number of competitors. Thus two relative market 
                                                 
131
 For better readability the first “average is dropped thereafter and it is understood that now the average 
competitors’ rate is the average across all markets of the averages within each market and the lowest competitor’s 
rate is the average across the markets of the lowest competitors’ rate within the markets.  
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share variables are used instead, which set the actual market share in relation to the market share 
that an average fund would have, given the number of competitors. Let  



=
nmarketinopennotisjfundif
nmarketinopenisjfundif
I jn 0
1
      (22) 
and there are On132 open funds as well as TMn members in market n.133 Then the average funds’ 
average market share in all markets that fund j is open in, weighted by the size of the market 
(AMSj) is 
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and fund j’s overall market share in all open markets (FAMSj) is  
 
∑
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Then the relative average market share (RAMSj), which is the ratio of the own market 
share and the market share of the average fund, is 
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       (25) 
In the absence of any bias in the number of open funds, if the data were complete and if 
there were only open funds, the average RAMS should be close to 1. Larger values indicate larger 
funds and the minimum would be 0 for an existing fund without members. 
                                                 
132
 Throughout the remainder of this research, On is denoting the number of open known funds while Jn is the 
number of open funds with known contribution rate. 
133
 For simplicity the subscript t is omitted throughout the development of the dependent variables. 
   
  89  
Alternatively the difference between the fund’s average market share and the market 
share of an average fund (DAMSj) is 
 
∑
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     (26) 
Under the same conditions as above the average DAMS should be close to 0. Values below 0 
indicate smaller than expected average funds and values larger than 0 indicate funds that are 
larger than expected average fund. The summary statistics for both constructed dependent 
variables is shown in Table 17. The mean value for RAMS is much larger than the average for all 
funds would be expected to be, because larger funds are over represented in the data.134 
Table 17: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables of Product Differentiation 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RAMS 648 3.574 9.250 0.000206 61.384 
DAMS 648 0.0359 0.122 -0.0300 0.768 
 
 The major problem of both RAMS and DAMS is the measurement error in the number of 
firms On and the existence of closed funds. In detail these problems are: 
• The existence of closed funds. TMj is the total market size of all funds and thus the 
existence of closed funds causes a bias in the AMSj, which does not take the closed funds 
into account.  
• The fact that the number of open funds is self-computed. As can be seen in Table 11, the 
open/closed status is the most complete variable in the data set so that the undercount is 
unlikely to distort the results significantly. 
                                                 
134
 The share of members known is larger than the share of funds for which the membership is known. See Table 7. 
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• The data set’s completeness increased over time and thus there could be a systematic 
undercount of the number of open funds in earlier years. 
 
Since the measurement error is causing an undercount of the number of open funds, the 
AMS is biased upward. In the absence of a more precise measure, it is better to use this measure 
than to exclude the number of competitor’s altogether, especially since the number of open funds 
varies greatly across states (see Table 12). 
 
7.1.2 Non-Price Attributes 
As described in more detail in Chapter 6.6, the non-mandatory coverage and other fund 
attributes other than the contribution rate are too numerous to all be included and thus need to be 
condensed without losing some information due to compression. Besides these non-price 
attributes a dummy that indicates “no survey participation” is also included. This dummy allows 
the inclusion of those funds that are not participating in the survey and the estimation parameter 
on the dummy can be interpreted as the average non-price attribute effect of the funds that are 
not captured in the survey.135 
 
7.1.3 Estimations of the Product Heterogeneity Model 
 
The results of the OLS regression with RAMS as the dependent variable for the full 
specification from equation (21) are shown in Table 18. The Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity rejects homoskedasticity at the 99.9% confidence level in all years except for 
1996 and at the 94% confidence level in 1996. Thus the robust standard errors are used. 
                                                 
135
 These non-participants have a 0 and not a missing value recorded for the non-price attributes. 
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While the average R2 is quite high (0.43), the highly significant parameter on the own 
price is unexpectedly positive in all sub samples, which is an indication that the initially large 
and expensive funds remain large and expensive. The parameter on cross prices is either positive 
or negative, depending on the sample, but rarely significant. The non-rate attributes are rarely 
significant factors in determining demand, with the exception of the special programs in 2000 
and 2002, which shows the expected signs for both, own- and cross-effects and the home sick 
care entitlement, which displays a significant parameter with the wrong sign in all years. The 
results for the other potential dependent variables (total membership and DAMS) show 
essentially the same pattern. The coefficients on the own price and the R2 for these dependent 
variables are presented in Table 19. 
  
7.1.3.1 Parallel Own- and Cross-Effects 
Usually own effects are found to be larger than cross effects, because the market demand 
is not perfectly inelastic. The total demand for German sickness fund coverage, however, is very, 
if not almost perfectly inelastic136 and thus the total market demand would not change (much) if 
all funds increase their contribution rates by the same amount. Therefore it is possible that own 
and cross effects are exact opposites. Then, if the scalar P and the vector X that represent the 
equivalent variables for fund j and its competitors J have the same dimension, relative 
differences in prices and other attributes can be used. Thus equation (21) can be reduced to  
jtJtjtJtjtjt XXPPM εβββ +−+−+= )()( 34120      (27) 
                                                 
136
 This should hold true for a reasonable contribution rate range, because the vast majority of the members are 
mandatory members of a fund. Of the voluntary members, many could not find private insurance coverage, because 
of pre-existing conditions. If all sickness funds would increase their contribution rates within the normal framework, 
many others would never consider switching to the private sector, because of high age or too many dependents that 
would all need individual coverage in the private sector. 
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As can be seen in Table 18, the own and cross effects of any variable, including the 
contribution rates, have rarely if ever opposite coefficients of similar magnitude, and a parameter 
test for the H0 that 21 ˆˆ ββ −≠ can be rejected in about half the sampled years. Estimating a simple 
specification with the relative price (own contribution rate minus the competitors’ average 
contribution rate) delivers usually significant coefficients, but for all years and all dependent 
variables the sign is positive (results not shown). 
 
7.1.3.2 Different Cross-Price Variables  
The lowest competitors’ contribution rate could be an alternative explanatory variable for 
the cross price, either instead of or in addition to the average competitors’ contribution rate. 
Including the lowest competitors’ contribution rate together with either only the own 
contribution rate and with both the own and average competitors’ contribution rate yields 
parameters of either sign, but insignificant ones for all years (results not shown). The two cross 
rate variables are moderately correlated (0.55 for all years) and thus the inclusion of the lowest 
competitors’ rate further diminishes the significance of the parameter on the average 
competitors’ rate. 
7.1.4 Fixed and Random Effects 
There could be unobserved fund specific attributes that are not observed by the researcher 
but known and valued by the potential members. This suggests using a random or fixed effects 
model. If these unobserved attributes are correlated across time they would require the use of 
either fixed or random effects.137 Then the correct equation to be estimated would be 
 
 
                                                 
137
 For example the location and density of the fund’s branch system. 
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Table 18: Full Specification – OLS – RAMS  
Survey FinanzTest FinanzTest FinanzTest FinanzTest DMEuro BKV 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2002 2002 2002 
3.74 3.62 3.99 2.32 4.18 3.72 Contribution Rate (1.46)** (1.02)*** (1.15)*** (1.18)** (1.64)** (1.48)** 
-27.12 -22.55 -18.1 -8.74 14.8 15.57 Average competitors' contribution rate (59.04) (33.79) (24.84) (45.13) (60.44) (59.95) 
-0.773 8.13  6.03 1.32 2.52 Access on Saturdays (3.92) (3.72)**   (3.97) (3.25) (3.04) 
-5.03 -11.75  -6.05 -0.516 -1.6 Access on Sundays (4.17) (3.51)***   (4.30) (3.97) (3.84) 
0.0214 0.382  -0.234 0.0623 0.0507 Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits (0.0583) (0.113)***   (0.223) (0.0515) (0.0483) 
 1.86     Web Presence 
  (1.48)         
-6.22 -2.69  -10.36 -11.64 -11.5 Homesick Care Entitlement (3.05)** (1.3)**   (3.27)*** (3.84)*** (3.78)*** 
-0.165 0.0906  0.0905 0.094 0.087 Homesick Care Max. Weeks (0.105) (0.0268)***   (0.0537)* (0.048)* (0.0451)* 
8.69 -0.283  -0.956 -1.86 -1.23 Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children (6.00) (3.14)   (5.12) (6.34) (5.85) 
   1.71 3.43 3.89 Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children 
      (3.18) (3.94) (3.64) 
-87.77 -345.22  11.37 -61.02 -38.08 Competitors' Access on Saturdays (138.48) (153.4)**   (211.7) (251.36) (271.42) 
64.76 342.97  205.13 219.13 245.65 Competitors' Access on Sundays (144.79) (160.66)**   (255.76) (385.34) (329.64) 
-0.191 -0.572  -0.587 -1.94 -0.681 Competitors' Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits (1.12) (2.23)   (4.67) (9.47) (6.73) 
 -113.92     Competitors' Web Presence 
  (95.03)         
2.02 262.32  260.48 233.23 249.27 Competitors' Homesick Care Entitlement (92.51) (184.52)   (241.58) (291.44) (245.6) 
1.84 1.8  0.423 -0.745 -0.966 Competitors' Homesick Care Max. Weeks (5.53) (1.18)   (3.93) (3.62) (3.92) 
-53.97 -5.09  -44.29 429.91 656.76 Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children (109.55) (225.52)   (444.28) (648.57) (605.05) 
   -235.35 -477.19 -843.48 Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children 
      (225.08) (386.24) (458.83)* 
-3.31  152.53 110.19   Special Programs FT (relative Participation Index) (2.38)   (32.53)*** (37.35)***     
30.91  -665.44 -616.58   Competitors' Special Programs FT (relative 
Participation Index) (177.87)   (805.43) (1512.12)     
 35.48 -5.41 -31.37   In Survey – Finanztest 
  (9.14)*** (1.47)*** (24.43)     
    4.97  Special Programs DMEuro (rel. Participation Index) 
        (2.27)**   
    -114.46  Competitors' Special Programs DMEuro (relative 
Participation Index) 
        (218.74)   
    -5.23  In Survey – DMEuro 
        (2.2)**   
     4.15 Special Programs BKV (rel. Participation Index) 
          (1.69)** 
     -202.77 Competitors' Special Programs BKV (relative 
Participation Index) 
          (164.95) 
     -3.77 In Survey – BKV 
          (2.03)* 
340.17 168.74 182.41 167.55 -228.47 -267.66 Constant (746.79) (439.15) (312.04) (594.55) (773.97) (774.66) 
Observations 83 93 115 109 109 109 
R-squared 0.493 0.672 0.462 0.52 0.432 0.432 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
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Table 18 cont.: Full Specification - OLS – RAMS  
 
Survey All All All All All 
Year Pooled 1996 1997 2001 2002 
4.13 3.78 4.35 5.57 2.67 Contribution Rate 
(0.43)*** (0.856)*** (1.08)*** (1.6)*** (1.16)** 
-9.48 -1.67 -44.19 -34.22 62.05 Average competitors' contribution rate 
(4.1)** (5.2) (27.82) (23.99) (54.78) 
3.24    4.58 Access on Saturdays 
(2.3)    (3.56) 
-5.03    -3.59 Access on Sundays 
(2.62)*    (3.96) 
0.0586    -0.259 Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits 
(0.0312)*    (0.261) 
1.19    dropped Web Presence 
(1.48)      
-6.84    -9.47 Homesick Care Entitlement 
(1.45)***    (2.74)*** 
0.0395    0.102 Homesick Care Max. Weeks (0.0224)*    (0.048)** 
-3.5    -0.246 Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children 
(3.91)    (5.38) 
4.56    1.91 Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children 
(2.67)*    (3.28) 
4.41    30.3 Competitors' Access on Saturdays 
(72.14)    (214.57) 
-6.25    578.64 Competitors' Access on Sundays 
(68.82)    (431.75) 
-0.0986    -14.73 Competitors' Percentage Coverage 
Mother Spa Visits (0.436)    (10.34) 
37.33    dropped Competitors' Web Presence 
(27.77)      
90.08    525.33 Competitors' Homesick Care Entitlement 
(45.79)**    (361.98) 
-0.137    5.14 Competitors' Homesick Care Max. 
Weeks (0.457)    (3.82) 
45.38    1885.51 Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement 
w/ Children (150.69)    (904.48)** 
-100.7    -1208.8 Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement 
w/o Children (110.02)    (482.5)** 
-0.52    89.16 Special Programs FT (relative 
Participation Index) (3.63)    (30.48)*** 
3.43    2840.64 Competitors' Special Programs FT 
(relative Participation Index) (114.98)    (1655.96)* 
1.54    -30.14 In Survey - Finanztest (1.96)    (27.26) 
4.57    8.4 Special Programs DMEuro (relative 
Participation Index) (2.51)*    (2.71)*** 
-107.46    1238.19 Competitors' Special Programs DMEuro 
(relative Participation Index) (214.18)    (597.23)** 
-4.14    -6.98 In Survey - DMEuro (2.21)*    (2.56)*** 
0.324    -3.45 Special Programs BKV (relative 
Participation Index) (1.23)    (1.77)* 
49.51    -1018.9 Competitors' Special Programs BKV 
(relative Participation Index) (148.48)    (464.58)** 
1.4    2.12 In Survey - BKV (1.97)       (2.14) 
71.91 -24.62 505.48 371.3 -721.63 Constant (51.05) (64.66) (343.02) (293.7) (721.67) 
Observations 631 49 74 108 109 
R-squared 0.28 0.337 0.304 0.164 0.634 
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Table 19: Summary of Different Dependent Variables138 
Total Membership 
Survey FinanzTest FinanzTest FinanzTest FinanzTest DMEuro BKV 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2002 2002 2002 
307672 228871 201229 98302.9 165815 136141 
Contribution Rate (110356)*** (94988.8)** (75164.1)*** (50336.6)* (61878.8)*** (58617.8)** 
R-squared 0.384 0.329 0.276 0.411 0.346 0.393 
Total Membership 
Survey ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Year ALL 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 
218206 268219 257998 201229 193581 96883.5 
Contribution Rate (27912.3)*** (73301.6)*** (76663)*** (75164.1)*** (58491.7)*** (53632.6)* 
R-squared 0.163 0.089 0.086 0.276 0.151 0.517 
DAMS 
Survey FinanzTest FinanzTest FinanzTest FinanzTest DMEuro BKV 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2002 2002 2002 
0.0618 0.0524 0.0461 0.0245 0.0403 0.0364 
Contribution Rate (0.0247)** (0.0148)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0106)** (0.0141)*** (0.0128)*** 
R-squared 0.504 0.697 0.458 0.510 0.438 0.434 
DAMS 
Survey ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Year ALL 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 
0.0624 0.106 0.086 0.0461 0.0548 0.0269 
Contribution Rate (0.00612)*** (0.0247)*** (0.0219)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0148)*** (0.0107)** 
R-squared 0.325 0.387 0.317 0.458 0.164 0.623 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
jtjJtjtJtjtjt XXPPM ετβββββ ++++++= 43210     (28) 
 
 
Mergers potentially pose a problem when estimating random or fixed effects models, 
because a merger that does not result in the foundation of a new fund (and thus a new identifier 
for that fund) can cause a major shift of the unobserved non-price attributes of a fund.139 Thus 
the estimation allows for two different fixed effects for a fund that was joined by other funds. 
Another problem is that a merger lifts the membership of the fund to a higher membership level. 
In this specification past membership is assumed to have no impact on current fund membership 
and thus this problem is assumed not to exist.  
The fixed effects model is the only specification found that returned the expected (and 
significant) signs on both the own price and cross price effects as can be seen for the RAMS as 
                                                 
138
 For years for which non-price attributes are available. 
139
 For example in the density of the branch network.  
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dependent variable in Table 20. For total membership and DAMS as dependent variables the 
estimated parameters on own price and for total membership and for DAMS on also on the cross 
price were opposite of the expected again (see Appendix C). The own- and cross non-rate 
attributes again have often the unexpected sign. Estimating both the fixed and random effects 
model without any non-rate attributes again results in the significant parameter estimates with 
the expected signs for the fixed, but not the random effects model. Surprisingly, for the fixed 
effect models (with and without non-price attributes) the cross price effect is substantially larger 
than the own price effect, which defies standard economic theory.  
The Hausman specification test rejects the random effects model as a viable alternative 
for all three possible dependent variables. However the rank of the differenced variance matrix 
did not equal the number of tested variables. Careful search for the variables that need to be 
rescaled to fix that problem failed to identify all variables that need to be rescaled and thus the 
Hausman test statistic might find a local and not the global maximum.140 For the reduced 
specification with only the own and cross- contribution rates the Hausman test soundly rejects 
the random effects model for all dependent variables. 
Another more subjective criterion to decide between the fixed and random effects 
approach is based on the underlying assumptions of either approach. The random effect model 
assumes no correlation between the random effects and the explanatory variables, while the fixed 
effects specification does not have this restriction. Since it is very likely that the unobserved and 
the observed fund characteristics are correlated with each other, the fixed effects model should 
be the preferred specification.  
                                                 
140
 The results in Table 20 are shown for the variables before the rescaling was done, because several variables relate 
to each other (e.g. own and cross effects) and thus the parameters are easier to compare without selective rescaling. 
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Albeit being theoretically equally qualified as dependent variable RAMS appears to offer 
the better fit than DAMS and to reduce the number of permutations, the following analysis is 
carried out with only RAMS as the dependent variable. 
 
7.1.5 Change of Membership as Dependent Variable 
Unfortunately the non-price attribute surveys were not conducted every year. Therefore 
including the non-price attributes into the fixed effects model results in “0” values for most 
years.141 Thus as an alternative approach the differences between each pair of years in which 
comparable surveys is tested.  
jtJtjtJtjtjt XXPPM εββββ ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ 4321      (29) 
 
The year pairs that can be constructed are 1999/1998 and 2002/1999. The model program 
coverage is excluded, because the different surveys (even by the same publisher) asked for quite 
different programs with greatly differing participation rates in the different surveys and thus the 
condensed variable loses it’s meaning when it is differentiated. 
The results for RAMS as dependent variable show a negative own price effect in the 
2002/1999 sample, but also a negative cross price effect (see Table 21). In the 1999/1998 sample 
both parameters on contribution rates have unexpected signs. The parameters on own and cross 
non-price attributes are only significant in one case per sample and the parameters have the 
expected sign only about half the time. The R2 is surprisingly high, but the small sample size and 
the large number of explanatory variables likely cause that. Because of perfect collinearity three 
explanatory variables were dropped in the 1999/1998. 
                                                 
141
 As mentioned before, there is a dummy variable included that captured the average effect of non-participation in 
the survey. 
   
  98  
 Table 20: Fixed and Random Effects – RAMS 
Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 
-0.794 0.626 -0.62 0.358 Contribution Rate 
(0.456)* (0.313)** (0.333)* (0.304) 
7.64 4.35 4.17 2.87 Average competitors' contribution rate 
(2.47)*** (1.98)** (0.729)*** (0.719)*** 
-0.771 0.66 
    Access on Saturdays 
(11.62) (11.92) 
    
0.798 0.448 
    Access on Sundays 
(1.21) (1.38) 
    
-1.68 -0.427 
    Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits 
(0.802)** (0.777) 
    
-2.44 10.28 
    Web Presence 
(34.34) (37.84) 
    
-0.72 -1.27 
    Homesick Care Entitlement 
(0.596) (0.679)* 
    
-1.32 -0.962 
    Homesick Care Max. Weeks 
(0.572)** (0.826) 
    
2.46 1.48 
    Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children 
(1.03)** (1.21) 
    
-0.75 -0.123 
    Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children 
(0.736) (0.906) 
    
9.66 4.88 
    Competitors' Access on Saturdays 
(31.1) (40.4) 
    
-7.7 -8.09 
    Competitors' Access on Sundays 
(32.22) (38.49) 
    
29.78 17.76 
    Competitors' Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits 
(22.15) (16.34) 
    
18.35 15.96 
    Competitors' Web Presence 
(9.99)* (13.42) 
    
0.62 5.41 
    Competitors' Homesick Care Entitlement 
(17.65) (18.44) 
    
-0.215 -0.16 
    Competitors' Homesick Care Max. Weeks 
(0.172) (0.214) 
    
-11.05 13.97 
    Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children 
(67.44) (73.31) 
    
-21.36 -36.75 
    Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children 
(50.93) (61.91) 
    
-0.954 -0.715 
    Special Programs FT (rel. Participation Index) 
(1.57) (1.7) 
    
23.18 25.04 
    
Competitors' Special Programs FT (rel. Participation 
Index) (42.12) (55.88) 
    
0.62 0.474 
    In Survey – Finanztest 
(0.92) (1.11) 
    
3.17 2.83 
    Special Programs DMEuro (rel. Participation Index) 
(1.35)** (1.56)* 
    
20.66 -27.86 
    
Competitors' Special Programs DMEuro (rel. 
Participation Index) (93.41) (126.58) 
    
-1.62 -1.64 
    In Survey – DMEuro 
(0.907)* (1.01) 
    
-15.62 -3.52 
    Special Programs BKV (rel. Participation Index) 
(32.27) (43.31) 
    
-63.7 -19.11 
    
Competitors' Special Programs BKV (rel. Participation 
Index) (73.18) (91.23) 
    
0.606 0.798 
    In Survey – BKV 
(0.624) (0.708) 
    
-83.68 -61.03 -42.06 -39.1 Constant 
(28.61)*** (24.31)** (8.27)*** (8.38)*** 
Observations 631 631 647 647 
Number of Different Funds 190 190 190 190 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
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Table 21: Change in RAMS – OLS – Full Specification for Select Year Pairs 
Year 1999/1998 2002/1999 
0.698 -1.39 Change of own CR (0.27)*** (0.81)* 
-5.85 4.61 Change of avg. competitors' average CR (23.33) (13.62) 
0.0314 -0.785 Change of Access on Saturdays (0.785) (1.28) 
-0.0421 2.22 Change of Access on Sundays (0.799) (1.44) 
-0.015 -0.0368 Change in Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits (0.0245) (0.0181)** 
-0.0158 0.186 Change of Homesick Care Entitlement (0.398) (0.785) 
0.00791 -0.0446 Change of Homesick Care Max. Weeks (0.00455)* (0.0118)*** 
dropped 4.23 Change of Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children 
  (1.91)** 
dropped -1.38 Change of Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children 
  (0.865) 
-60.21 -37.64 Competitors' Change of Access on Saturdays (50.89) (90.75) 
47.45 116.25 Competitors' Change of Access on Sundays (56.49) (120.26) 
0.749 -0.275 Competitors' Change in Percentage Coverage 
Mother Spa Visits (0.471) (0.904) 
1.3 -13.77 Competitors' Change of Homesick Care Entitlement (15.38) (36.12) 
0.0847 -0.241 Competitors' Change of Homesick Care Max. 
Weeks (0.11) (0.428) 
-62.11 93.14 Competitors' Change of Domestic Help Entitlement 
w/ Children (40.62) (148.66) 
dropped -26.3 Competitors' Change of Domestic Help Entitlement 
w/o Children 
  (110.74) 
Observations 38 64 
R-Squared 0.669 0.628 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
7.1.6 Endogeneity 
In the product heterogeneity scenario, all the explanatory variables are potentially subject 
to endogeneity bias and need to be instrumented using the instruments discussed in Chapter 6.8. 
The 1996 membership level is excluded from the set of instruments, because it is clearly the 
instrument of choice for the lagged membership that is not included as an explanatory variable 
here and there is no reason to assume that a fund’s generosity depends on its size. The full 
specification results for the fixed effects specification and OLS, both with and without 
instrumental variables and RAMS as the dependent variable are shown in Table 25 and for the 
individual years in Table 26. In both tables the reported parameter estimates differ from Table 
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20, because the sample used here is smaller to match the one used for the instrumental variable 
estimations.142 
Also for this sample the fixed effects method is the only one that yields the expected (but 
not significant) sign on the own price parameter estimates. For the cross price variable parameter 
estimates both the fixed effects and random effects model yield the expected sign, but only the 
fixed effects approach yields the expected, albeit not significant sign also when instruments are 
used. For an unknown reason four of the non-price attributes are dropped in the instrumental 
variables-fixed effects approach. For the chosen sample these variables are neither constants nor 
perfectly correlated with any other explanatory variable. Regardless of the estimation method, all 
parameter estimates for the non-rate attributes are not significant.  
The results for the reduced specification with only the price variables are found in Table 
22 and Table 23. Again the fixed effects model is the only one that yields the expected sign on 
both the own and the competitor’s contribution rate. Unlike in the non-IV approach the 
parameter estimates are both significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Table 22: IV for Different Estimation Methods – Only Contribution Rates – RAMS 
Method FE RE OLS FE-IV RE-IV IV 
-0.237 0.585 4.61 -2.19 3.02 6.57 Contribution Rate (0.433) (0.35)* (0.474)*** (1.02)** (0.879)*** (0.539)*** 
3.52 2.36 -5.06 10.12 3.54 -5.49 Average competitors' contribution rate (1.03)*** (0.979)** (1.78)*** (1.74)*** (1.64)** (2.67)** 
-38.56 -35.48 8.47 -97.91 -82.31 -11.78 Constant (11.01)*** (11.58)*** (22.2) (14.5)*** (14.99)*** (33.22) 
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 517 
Number of Funds 147 147  147 147  
R-squared 0.058   0.190     0.154 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142
 The 1996 instruments are only available for 517 of the originally 631 observations. 
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Table 23: IV and OLS – Only Contribution Rates for RAMS and by Year 
Method IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS 
Year 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999 
Contribution Rate 4.82 4.06 5.99 4.91 8.5 6.51 
  (0.941)*** (0.996)*** (1.19)*** (1.26)*** (1.55)*** (1.58)*** 
Average competitors' contribution rate -36.19 -31.55 -47.46 -35.95 -87.59 -73.58 
  (23.02) (23.79) (22.42)** (25.83) (30.83)*** (39.45)* 
Constant 397.95 349.1 534.78 401.05 1014.76 861.26 
  (285.01) (294.06) (279.04)* (321.4) (383.21)*** (491.1)* 
Observations 66 66 69 69 76 76 
R-squared 0.271 0.281 0.25 0.262 0.233 0.26 
  
Method IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS 
Year 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 
Contribution Rate 8.62 6.21 6.72 6.91 8.51 4.88 
  (1.54)*** (1.7)*** (1.66)*** (2.03)*** (1.81)*** (1.75)*** 
Average competitors' contribution rate -61.35 -49.7 -48.29 -49.62 -35.96 -25.23 
  (19.94)*** (30.74) (19.86)** (29.77)* (19.39)* (22.49) 
Constant 679.39 561.08 536.76 551.39 366.35 272.88 
  (247.31)*** (378.99) (247.54)** (363.19) (251.79) (281.75) 
Observations 89 89 83 83 85 85 
R-squared 0.207 0.242 0.244 0.244 0.074 0.161 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
7.1.6.1 Test for Endogeneity 
The Hausman test for endogeneity is performed on the full as well as the price-only 
specification for the OLS and the fixed effects model (see Table 24). For the price-specification 
the null hypothesis of exogenous contribution rates is soundly rejected. For the full specification 
there is some indication of endogeneity for the fixed effects model, but none for the OLS 
approach. This indicates that while the contribution rates are endogenous, the non-rate attributes 
are potentially not. 
Table 24: Test for Endogeneity – Product Differentiation 
 Method Fixed Effects IV Fixed Effects IV 
 Specification Full Full Only Rates Only Rates 
 Chi-sq (22 or 2) 26.88 2.82 26.89 64.06 
 p-value 0.060 1.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 25: IV for Different Estimation Methods – Full Specification - RAMS 
Model FE RE OLS FE-IV RE-IV IV 
-0.517 0.942 4.26 -4.85 3.95 3.40 Contribution Rate (0.46) (0.326)*** (0.461)*** (7.71) (5.56) (3.94) 
5.95 2.67 -8.01 24.73 -8.04 -29.58 Average competitors' contribution rate (2.32)** (1.83) (3.96)** (34.71) (67.18) (54.25) 
0.0191 0.288 4.20 -6.25 -14.34 44.46 Access on Saturdays (1.17) (1.22) (2.26)* (26.48) (128.83) (50.07) 
0.609 0.0582 -6.57 12.77 3.44 -73.51 Access on Sundays (1.22) (1.39) (2.45)*** (29.66) (127) (53.21) 
-0.00905 0.000129 0.0546 -0.159 -0.13 -0.591 Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits (0.0108) (0.0125) (0.0406) (0.948) (1.2) (1.39) 
-0.0411 0.247 1.78 30.01 37.00 14.11 Web Presence (0.328) (0.393) (1.52) (60.22) (158.82) (70.81) 
-0.594 -1.30 -7.04 1.28 -2.18 -2.21 Homesick Care Entitlement (0.657) (0.689)* (1.37)*** (20.71) (67.86) (25.73) 
-0.00986 -0.00573 0.0357 -0.0619 0.224 0.479 Homesick Care Max. Weeks (0.00594)* (0.00868) (0.0233) (0.403) (1.17) (0.621) 
0.961 -0.0215 -5.79 10.39 42.27 1.53 Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children (1.24) (1.43) (4.61) (121.11) (288.5) (205.81) 
-0.449 0.558 7.12 1.12 -4.93 73.89 Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children (0.813) (0.926) (2.61)*** (46.16) (169.78) (118.24) 
-3.54 -13.78 -77.5 -93.21 81.5 289.66 Competitors' Access on Saturdays (31.95) (42.14) (69.61) (316.3) (2871.15) (1265.96) 
7.32 8.25 18.89 dropped 270.14 38.46 Competitors' Access on Sundays (34.6) (42.28) (65.74)  (2246.04) (1299.32) 
0.319 0.199 -0.0494 0.132 -6.65 3.5 Competitors' Percentage Coverage Mother Spa 
Visits (0.232) (0.194) (0.443) (8.6) (21.43) (9.46) 
16.39 12.80 32.67 -28.24 -284.24 435.79 Competitors' Web Presence (10.49) (14.32) (29.67) (375.64) (1255.96) (899.42) 
3.52 7.37 48.61 86.05 650.5 369.59 Competitors' Homesick Care Entitlement (19.06) (19.14) (41.5) (366.62) (2349.88) (813.82) 
-0.177 -0.0965 -0.1 1.01 7.26 -4.39 Competitors' Homesick Care Max. Weeks (0.173) (0.222) (0.471) (5.03) (21.63) (18.88) 
-5.95 24.20 198.56 dropped -968.3 -286.46 Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/ 
Children (71.13) (88.48) (154.66)  (6939.52) (3548.93) 
-30.09 -49.08 -216.59 -49.6 1051.3 -412.84 Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/o 
Children (58.76) (77.5) (125.7)* (711.84) (6148.11) (3250.79) 
-0.21 -0.0583 2.62 -18.25 -41.54 68.26 Special Programs FT  
(Relative Participation Index) (1.9) (2.16) (4.42) (109.18) (258.38) (95.87) 
11.97 1.55 -94.98 dropped -1405.39 -1295.77 Competitors' Special Programs FT  
(Relative Participation Index) (49.06) (61.17) (113.52)  (4938.16) (4110.57) 
0.000969 0.0138 1.34 9.28 25.05 22.98 In Survey – Finanztest (0.983) (1.22) (2.11) (18.03) (61.95) (50.07) 
2.69 2.28 2.52 8.14 10.31 7.38 Special Programs DMEuro  
(Relative Participation Index) (1.25)** (1.34)* (1.83) (48.75) (122.57) (95.46) 
39.66 9.8 35.5 dropped 953.23 2421.57 Competitors' Special Programs DMEuro  
(Relative Participation Index) (103.56) (136.96) (198.89)  (4901.84) (3803.02) 
-1.82 -1.54 -3.69 -1.39 -8.79 -9.46 In Survey – DMEuro (0.854)** (1.01) (3.08) (47.4) (90.36) (67.15) 
-0.11 -0.0487 0.0758 6.04 -10.02 -12.28 Special Programs BKV  
(Relative Participation Index) (0.424) (0.467) (1.15) (46.56) (105.07) (92.45) 
-66.97 -29.33 -23.79 dropped -113.31 -1778.72 Competitors' Special Programs BKV  
(Relative Participation Index) (77.95) (100.79) (155.31)  (2916) (2255.24) 
1.25 0.951 1.27 -4.03 0.342 1.84 In Survey – BKV (0.886) (1.18) (3.26) (41.17) (85.12) (53.63) 
-65.43 -43.54 51.31 -254.19 37.85 319.44 Constant (27.25)** (23.29)* (49.63) (368.08) (866.47) (712.47) 
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 517 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
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Table 26: IV and OLS – Full Specification for RAMS and by Year 
Method IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS 
Year 1998 1998 1999 1999 2002 2002 
3.97 2.49 5.44 3.13 2.72 3.80 Contribution Rate (1.59)** (0.999)** (2.71)** (1.03)*** (3.24) (1.62)** 
14.26 28.84 -35.75 -28.58 -93.56 34.41 Average competitors' contribution rate (44.04) (32.87) (62.37) (31.82) (216.58) (57.72) 
0.463 -0.358 7.31 8.68 13.76 3.97 Access on Saturdays (6.05) (3.61) (7.13) (3.47)** (14.17) (4.22) 
-6.54 -6.1 -14.57 -11.04 -7.71 -4.01 Access on Sundays (7.17) (4.22) (8.00)* (3.3)*** (14.28) (4.79) 
-0.057 0.0465 0.347 0.383 0.586 -0.299 Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits (0.121) (0.0785) (0.345) (0.109)*** (1.17) (0.346) 
  -0.607 2.54   Web Presence 
    (4.55) (1.66)     
-4.29 -7.72 -4.02 -3.2 -1.42 -9.73 Homesick Care Entitlement (4.92) (2.95)*** (6.69) (1.27)** (13.68) (3.62)*** 
-0.251 -0.101 0.047 0.0848 0.018 0.119 Homesick Care Max. Weeks (0.31) (0.107) (0.0686) (0.0307)*** (0.254) (0.0669)* 
  -17.12 1.31 -14.93 -4.17 Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children 
    (26.18) (3.57) (42.35) (8.89) 
    9.27 5.61 Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children 
        (24.00) (4.49) 
-39.81 -135.1 32.66 -381.51 552.47 -90.59 Competitors' Access on Saturdays (230.41) (120.6) (395.93) (176.29)** (916.75) (219.48) 
-92.05 -35.66 -71.73 287.47 -2.86 219.74 Competitors' Access on Sundays (205.78) (100.67) (365.75) (182.76) (835.22) (326.57) 
-0.951 -0.966 -1.15 3.26 -12.37 -7.08 Competitors' Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits (1.27) (0.786) (6.26) (3.05) (17.96) (8.36) 
  -65.7 -128.6   Competitors' Web Presence 
    (149.16) (94.28)     
16.94 -13.74 186.71 6.51 295.49 160.44 Competitors' Homesick Care Entitlement (135.84) (94.09) (277.42) (146.63) (623.14) (227.6) 
10.42 11.19 1.73 0.438 14.24 6.47 Competitors' Homesick Care Max. Weeks (10.64) (5.51)** (1.85) (0.734) (12.19) (4.24) 
19.24 29.94 13.73 -171.19 1495 1396.78 Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children (141.41) (85.09) (455.18) (229.58) (2025.9) (900.05) 
    -1014.03 -1241.63 Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children 
        (1030.37) (589.93)** 
10.87 -2.55   77.25 75.5 Special Programs Finanztest (Relative Participation Index) (11.03) (2.54)     (63.73) (37.68)** 
-164.36 -106.11   2008.01 3193.33 Competitors' Special Programs Finanztest (Relative 
Participation Index) (158.57) (118.98)     (4068) (2281.43) 
    1.01 6.54 Special Programs DMEuro (Relative Participation Index) 
        (9.42) (2.79)** 
    1288.22 905.1 Competitors' Special Programs DMEuro (Relative Participation 
Index) 
        (1102.8) (570.95) 
    6.82 -3.79 Special Programs bkv.de (Relative Participation Index) 
        (8.88) (2.05)* 
    -1087.26 -777.42 Competitors' Special Programs bkv.de (Relative Participation 
Index) 
        (754.19) (447.49)* 
-13.83 -6.83 11.62 38.36 51.2 -36.67 In Survey - Finanztest (12.05) (7.65) (41.45) (8.93)*** (107.71) (36.61) 
    -0.818 -7.2 In Survey - DMEuro 
        (10.7) (4.48) 
    -0.249 1.81 In Survey – bkv.de 
        (10.82) (4.56) 
-205.58 -369.2 366.99 258.4 1198.73 -279.51 Constant (537.95) (385.73) (796.4) (398.02) (2612.37) (724.51) 
69 69 76 76 85 85 Observations 
0.452 0.605 0.564 0.69 0.283 0.633 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval.  
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7.1.6.2 Validity of the Instruments 
The ability of the instruments to explain the instrumented variables has been established 
in Chapter 6.8.3. If the excluded instruments143 have little explanatory power (are “weak”), the 
bias in the IV coefficients is expected to increase.144 Stock and Yogo (2004) propose to use the 
Cragg-Donald F statistic to test for weak instruments. The test statistics for a number of 
specifications are shown in Table 27. For all tested specifications the null-hypothesis of the 
instruments being weak cannot be rejected if a 5% relative bias was tolerable. The full 
specification fixed effects-IV model could not be estimated with the stata command xtivreg2 that 
yields these test statistics, because of presumed collinearity in some instruments and resulting 
underidentification of the model. The command xtivreg, however executes the same method and 
specification without problem, but does not provide the test statistics. For the price-only 
specification the Anderson Canonical test rejects the null hypothesis of underidentification, while 
it fails for the full specifications.145 The Sargan-Hansen overidentification tests the joint null 
hypothesis that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and thus correctly 
excluded from the set of explanatory variables. However, the Sargan-Hansen test is known to be 
troublesome if a large set of instruments in used and the test statistic has to be interpreted with 
care.146 For the price-only specifications the null hypothesis has to be rejected, while only for the 
full specification IV approach the instruments appear valid. Regressing the estimation errors of 
the full specification fixed effects results against the full set of instruments yields an R2 of 0.43, 
which indicates that here the set of instruments is not valid either.  
                                                 
143
 Excluded instruments are those that are not included as exogenous regressors in the main equation. 
144
 Hahn and Hausman (2002)  
145
 Ideally one would want to reject the null for the Anderson canonical test and the null of the Cragg-Donald weak 
instrument test while one would want to fail to reject the null of the Sargan-Hansen overidenification test. 
146
 Roodman (2006) 
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Table 27: Validity Tests for Instruments – Product Differentiation 
Method FE-IV IV FE-IV IV 
Specification Full Full Prices Prices 
Year All All All All 
Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument Test 
Critical Value (max. 5% Bias)  -   20.86 20.41 20.41 
Test Statistic  -  0.01 2.91 15.28 
Anderson Canonical Underidentification Test 
Chi-sq(4, 18 and 29)  -  0.37 54.14 343.54 
P-value  -  0.985 0.000 0.000 
Sargan-Hansen Overidentification Test 
Chi-sq(3, 17 and 28)  -  0.006 51.02 104.46 
P-value  -  0.999 0.000 0.000 
 
7.1.7 Conclusion for Product Heterogeneity 
The fact that for all specifications, sub-samples and choices of dependent variables (other 
than the fixed effects model with RAMS as dependent variable) the own price effect is showing 
the unexpected sign and the low significance of the parameters on non-price attributes strongly 
suggests that the problem with this approach is not as much the correct choice of estimation 
technique, but that product differentiation is definitely not the single source of contribution rate 
setting power and it is likely that inertia exists in this market. Since the models that assume 
product heterogeneity as the only source of price setting power are wrongly specified, all tests 
for endogeneity and validity of the set of instruments have to be interpreted with care and a final 
conclusion can not be drawn until the model for sickness fund membership is correctly specified. 
 
7.2 Search Costs as the Source of Contribution Rate Setting 
Power 
If search costs are the dominant source of contribution rate setting power, every person 
will switch to the fund with the lowest contribution rate that is available and known to him and 
remain only in his current fund if no lower rate fund is known to be available. Therefore the 
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transition process between two years can be split into two steps: First, each fund member decides 
whether and how much to search and second, each person makes his switching decision based on 
his individual “aware set”, which is the set of funds of that he knows the contribution rate. 
Searching can be induced by a variety of factors. While individual searching behavior is 
beyond the scope of the data set, a contribution rate increase147 could increase a fund’s members’ 
average likelihood of searching and a decrease in the contribution rate could decrease the 
average likelihood of searching. 
The aware set always includes the members’ current funds and the overall completeness 
of the aware set depends on the search effort and the easiness of obtaining contribution rate 
information. The distribution of the degree of completeness across the members is not known, 
but certain characteristics could make it more or less likely for a given fund to be included in a 
searcher’s aware set. These characteristics are those that tend to make a fund better known 
through more media coverage or word-of-mouth recommendation, namely the market share (or 
size) of the fund, that the fund changed its contribution rate or that it was part of a merger.  
 
7.2.1 Construction of the Explanatory Variables 
Because searchers are switching to the lowest rate fund in their aware sets, the fund’s 
relative contribution rate ranking among all competing funds is relevant in this scenario and not 
the contribution rate difference. A simple ranking variable has the major shortcoming of failing 
to reflect the greatly differing number of open funds and thus choices in each market. Thus a 
                                                 
147
 Another potential variable is the (positive only) growth of the fund in the previous period or periods. Fund 
growth in the last periods could indicate that at least some of the members have searched in the past and thus have 
lower search cost than the average population and are thus more inclined to search again in the future. This variable, 
however, poses also an identification problem that is not possible to overcome. If there are other sources of 
contribution rate setting power, especially product heterogeneity, the lagged membership growth could indicate that 
the fund is having time invariant treats that are valued and cause repeated growth.  
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relative ranking index (RRIji) for fund j with contribution rate rank k in a market n with J known 
open funds’ contribution rates is constructed.148 
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The aggregated RRIj (ARRIj) across all markets in which a fund is open is created for each fund 
as the weighted average RRIj across all open markets, with the size of the markets (TMn) as the 
weights. With Ijn being a dummy variable indicating whether a fund is open in market n  
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If members are aware of some subset of all legally available funds, the likelihood of a given fund 
being the lowest rate fund in this subset should be positively correlated with the fund’s ARRI. 
One problem is that the sum of all RRI in a market is increasing with the number of open 
funds. Therefore the relative weight of the RRI is inversely related to the number of open funds 
and the RRI in one market can have a quite different impact from the same RRI in another 
market. In a market of J funds, the share of the fund j’s RRI of the sum of all RRIs  ( adjjRRI ) is  
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Thus the number-of-competitors adjusted ARRI (ARRIadj), defined as the individual market size 
weighted average of all RRIadj shares, should be a better measure for a fund’s relative position 
across all markets and is constructed as  
                                                 
148
 Because most, but not all funds’ contribution rates are known, Jn is better described as the number of open funds 
with known contribution rate in a market even though this is a potential source for some bias as the lower rate funds 
are more likely to be included in the data set. RRI is constructed such that it takes the value 1 for the lowest rate fund 
and 0 for the highest rate fund. 
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The variable On is the number of open funds in market n. Ideally On equals Jn, but due to 
the incompleteness of the data set, the RRI is computed with the open funds with known 
contribution rates and On is the number of funds in each market that are known to be open. There 
are likely systematic reporting biases between states149, as some states’ BKK head organizations 
provided comprehensive contribution rate data, while in other states all data stems from 
contacting funds individually. Using On instead of the number of funds for which the rate is 
known Jn therefore removes any bias due to systematic differences in the share of open funds 
with known contribution rates.  
If some transformation f(RRIj), for example the average squared RRI, is used, the 
transformed adjusted ARRI (TARRIadj) has to be computed as 
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These transformations of the ARRIadj are used, because there is a priori no information 
about the comprehensiveness of the aware set. Given that funds other than the rate leaders in any 
market gain members and under the assumption of search costs being the only source of 
                                                 
149
 On average J is 87% of O with a range of 75.4% to 100% and increasing over time. The spread between states 
within a year is between 0 (all rates are known for open funds in 2002) and 15 percentage points in 1997 and 8 
percentage points on average. 
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contribution rate setting power, the aware sets cannot be complete. However the degree of 
completeness determines the likelihood of any fund to the lowest rate fund in a person’s aware 
set. Thus squaring the ARRI would increase the weight of the lower rate funds. As an extreme 
case, if all aware sets were complete, the fund with the lowest rate in a market would have to 
receive a transformed RRI of 1 and all other funds have a transformed RRI of 0. 
The ARRIadj determines only a weight that a fund is assigned in its competition for 
switchers. Thus this weight has to be related to the fund’s total market size (its source of 
potential switchers). However under the assumption of search costs, only fund members that pay 
a higher contribution rate are potential switchers and thus the number of members in other funds 
that pay a higher rate is the pool from which a fund could receive new members. While the total 
market size for each fund is included in the data set, the data set is not sufficiently complete to 
compute a useful number for the other funds’ members that pay a higher contribution rate.  
Fortunately, the official statistic provides data for the number of members aggregated by 
contribution rate for three years in the new and one year in the old states.150 Figure 1 shows the 
cumulative distribution of members by funds. For all four samples, roughly 80% of the lowest 
rate funds insure about 20% of the members.151 Thus, assuming that the market share of higher- 
rate members is approximately equal to the funds’ relative contribution rate ranking is not 
feasible. Figure 1 also indicates that the cumulative share of members of the lower rate funds 
tended to increase over time.  
                                                 
150
 Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung (1997, 1999, 2000) 
151
 That is likely due to the fact that the EKs and AOKs are among the most expensive and largest funds.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative Membership Share 
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To construct the share of the market that charges a lower contribution rate for each fund, 
the official data is used to estimate this share from the RRI, the region and the year. The needed 
parameters for estimating the share for the data set were obtained from regressing the cumulative 
share of total members that pay a higher contribution rate (as shown on the vertical axis) against 
the cumulative share of funds (to the power of one to six), the interaction of all powers with the 
year152 and with a region dummy. The reason why six is chosen as the highest power is that the 
explanatory power of the model did not increase anymore and that some regressors were dropped 
when using higher powers. The regression results are shown in Table 28. 
                                                 
152
 Year dummies would be preferred, but the use of dummies for the three years in the official data would not allow 
for a prediction in the remaining four years in the data.  
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Table 28: Cumulative Market Share – OLS 
 N = 155 R2 = 0.983 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Fundshare -1.57 1.35 
Fundshare2 17.26 15.54 
Fundshare3 -70.66 65.72 
Fundshare4 125.97 127.06 
Fundshare5 -100.25 114.03 
Fundshare6 28.16 38.55 
Fundshare * Year 0.0100 0.29 
Fundshare2 * Year -0.440 3.38 
Fundshare3 * Year 0.00203 14.40 
Fundshare4 * Year 4.75 27.93 
Fundshare5 * Year -8.27 25.14 
Fundshare6 * Year 3.95 8.52 
Fundshare * Region 0.0370 0.752 
Fundshare2 * Region 0.47 8.99 
Fundshare3 * Region -5.45 38.72 
Fundshare3 * Region 20.09 75.43 
Fundshare5 * Region -27.48 67.85 
Fundshare6 * Region 12.37 22.93 
Constant 1.02 0.0150 
 
The parameters from the above estimation are then used to predict the share of members 
paying a higher rate for the new and the old states. The share-of-the-market-times-ARRIadj 153is 
then computed as the market size weighted average between the old and new states of the 
product of the ARRIadj and the share of market members paying a higher contribution rate and 
denoted as SARRIadj. The SARRIadj also needs to be interacted with a dummy for a contribution 
rate decrease (or change), a merger and the size of the fund, because, as discussed above, these 
factors are positively related to receiving media attention and could therefore increase the 
likelihood of a fund being in someone’s aware set. Also it should be distinguished between a 
fund’s market (TMjt) and the size of a potentially newly entered market (NMjt). Being a newly 
open fund should decrease the likelihood of being known or being included in comprehensive 
rate overviews. Thus the baseline equation for search costs as the only source of contribution rate 
setting power is:  
                                                 
153
 Unless a clear distinction is necessary, ARRIadj is used synonymously for both ARRI and TARRI. 
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The coefficient β1 measures the baseline retention rate, β2 and β3 measure the adjustment 
if fund j either increased or decreased its contribution rate with DRDjt (DRIjt) denoting a dummy 
that indicates a decrease (increase) in the contribution rate. The coefficients β4 and β5 measure 
the baseline allocation of switchers that pay a higher rate with respect to the size of the total 
market and new market. The interactions in β6 to β9 (DMjt being a dummy indicating a merger 
and MSjt-1 denoting the market share in the previous period) are only carried out with the total 
market, because any new competitor is unlikely to receive as much media attention and word-of-
mouth propaganda as incumbent funds. 
 
7.2.2 Estimation of the Search Costs Model 
The results of the full specification are presented in Table 29. Robust standard errors are 
used to control for heterogeneity.154 Because of the inclusion of the lagged membership, the R2 is 
1 for all years. The baseline retention rate is below and close to 100%155, but needs to be adjusted 
for the impact of rate changes (coefficients 2ˆβ and 3ˆβ ) on search behavior. These parameters 
show the expected sign (negative for 2ˆβ  and positive for 3ˆβ ) in three of the 14 cases, even though 
they are significant in eight of 14 cases. In 1998, 3ˆβ  is abnormally large, which is attributable to 
                                                 
154
 Stata does not allow for the Breusch-Pagan test if the constant is excluded. However for the full specification and 
all years the correlation between the size of the fund and the magnitude of the error term is 0.63, which indicates 
heterogeneity. 
155
 The parameter on lagged membership can be interpreted as the retention rate for a fund that neither increased nor 
decreased its contribution rate and had no change in membership the previous year. 
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there being only six observations with a non-zero observation, three of which grew rapidly that 
year.  
The parameter 4ˆβ , the estimated coefficient on the interaction of SARRIadj and the total 
market size, is displaying the expected sign in all years and is significant in three of the seven 
years. The coefficient 5ˆβ , the equivalent for the newly entered market is displaying the expected 
negative sign in six and is significant in four of the seven years.156 The estimated coefficient 9ˆβ  
on the interaction of the lagged membership share is highly significant and displays the expected 
positive sign in all years. The remaining estimated coefficients strongly suggest the rate changes 
and mergers have no consistent and significant impact on the likelihood that a fund is in 
someone’s aware set.  
Table 29: Search Costs – Full Specification 
 
 
                                                 
156
 The sign is expected to be negative, because the newly entered market is also included in the total market size 
( 4ˆβ ). Thus the difference between 4ˆβ and 5ˆβ can be interpreted as the net effect of entering a new market. 
Year Pooled 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
94.36 92.49 95.34 94.83 92.62 94.74 96.08 B1 – Lagged AKV (in 100) (0.713)*** (0.501)*** (0.994)*** (0.611)*** (2.47)*** (1.05)*** (0.795)*** 
1.81 4.94 0.35 1.95 1.90 3.00 1.78 B2 – Lagged AKV if Rate increased (in 100) (0.822)** (1.08)*** (1.04) (2.67) (2.06) (1.03)*** (0.762)** 
-1.18 -2.74 20.44 0.55 -1.15 -3.37 -1.08 B3 – Lagged AKV if Rate decreased (in 100) (0.591)** (0.614)*** (20.04) (1.28) (3.19) (0.466)*** (0.636)* 
36.46 159.54 13.69 41.94 17.68 72.55 14.43 B4 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market (in 
1000) (7.92)*** (272.15) (9.52) (12.86)*** (30.84) (30.94)** (12.76) 
-36.38 -46.50 89.89 -102.45 -9.81 -59.07 -26.84 B5 - Adj. ARRI * Share * New Market (in 
1000) (11.33)*** (20.36)** (101.77) (54.5)* (46.38) (29.81)** (17.07) 
-1.93 -131.65 13.94 -100.41 -80.50 -43.24 12.36 B6 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market if Rate 
decreased (in 1000) (12.96) (272.61) (12.25) (98.89) (91.41) (31.81) (20.05) 
-5.89 -178.87 18.26 181.73 -19.41 -101.13 9.09 B7 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market if Rate 
increased (in 1000) (19.18) (272.51) (15.29) (62.41)*** (24.73) (96.51) (20.13) 
-18.53 131.82 -205.08 53.83 -1323.69 184.38 -34.28 B8 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market if 
Merger happened (in 1000) (14.47) (257.29) (109.65)* (47.57) (1516.22) (433.84) (34.59) 
3997.78 5563.90 3688.69 3671.89 9186.02 3353.56 2697.85 B9 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market * 
Lagged Market Share (436.8)*** (438.43)*** (1275.24)*** (600.53)*** (3922.47)** (770.08)*** (501.27)*** 
Observations 521 55 70 86 104 104 102 
R-Squared 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
R-Squared (Change in Membership) 0.719 0.799 0.820 0.899 0.686 0.659 0.636 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
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When the change of total membership is used as the dependent variable, the estimated 
coefficients on lagged membership is reduced by 1 compared to the specification with 
membership as the dependent variable and should be interpreted as the average share of last 
year’s members that do not search. The estimated coefficients on the other explanatory variables 
do not change, but the R2 is now a better measure of the fit of the estimation. The R2 for the 
specification with the change of membership as the dependent variable is always reported in the 
bottom of the applicable tables. In the full specification the R2 is above 0.63 for all years. 
Because there is no compelling economic reason for a constant in this setting, it is omitted in all 
specifications.157 
As explained in Chapter 7.2.1 it is possible that the ARRI will not have a linear effect if 
the switchers predominantly switch towards the funds with the very lowest rates. Therefore a 
“reduced” specification that only includes the variables with significant parameter estimates in 
the full specification is estimated for both the original ARRI and the squared transformation of it.   
The results are presented in Table 30. The overall fit of the model is comparable, but the 
estimated coefficient 4ˆβ  is insignificant for four years and displays the unexpected negative sign 
in two of the years, while 9ˆβ  is again highly significant with the expected sign in two of the 
years. Therefore the original adjusted ARRI is used as the preferred variable throughout the 
remainder of this research. 
 
 
 
                                                 
157
 Inclusion of the constant showed that it is in fact not significant. 
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Table 30: Search Costs – Reduced Specification with ARRI2 
ARRI 
Year Pooled 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
95.31 94.73 95.62 94.81 92.78 96.12 97.85 B1 - Lagged AKV (in 100) (0.624)*** (0.999)*** (0.795)*** (0.643)*** (2.44)*** (1.01)*** (0.544)*** 
33.3 10.23 21.01 51.27 5.49 60.36 21.83 B4 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total 
Market (in 1000) (6.62)*** (7.12) (7.83)*** (20.48)** (26.43) (21.28)*** (12.18)* 
3287.03 3310.9 3738.14 3773.15 8638.53 2266.07 2324.2 B9 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total 
Market * Lagged Market Share (420.54)*** (577.72)*** (1377.25)*** (296.78)*** (3922.97)** (747.98)*** (672.32)*** 
Observations 521 55 70 86 104 104 102 
R-Squared 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 
R-Squared (Change in 
Membership) 0.6657 0.6176 0.8135 0.880 0.6796 0.5431 0.544 
ARRI-SQUARED 
Year Pooled 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
96.2 95.62 96.34 95.83 94.89 96.42 98.73 B1 - Lagged AKV (in 100) (0.529)*** (0.697)*** (0.503)*** (0.605)*** (1.75)*** (0.76)*** (0.868)*** 
2838.82 -1897.1 -158.86 8719.67 56.71 9671 3975.98 B4 - Adj. ARRI2 * Share * Total 
Market (in 1000) (1386.49)** (1774.78) (2357.73) (4185.75)** (5377.86) (3870)** (5004.06) 
1166320 1108990 1805620 1294570 2854980 1280000 839850 B9 - Adj. ARRI2 * Share * Total 
Market * Lagged Market Share (148198)*** (148322)*** (702260)** (104914)*** (1113580)** (334600)*** (478430)* 
Observations 521 55 70 86 104 104 102 
R-Squared 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 
R-Squared (Change in 
Membership) 0.638 0.600 0.789 0.878 0.656 0.601 0.328 
 
7.2.3 Instrumental Variables  
 
All variables that are included in the estimation are suspected to be endogenous, because 
they include either the own contribution rate or the lagged membership (see Chapter 4.2). 
Therefore the full specification is estimated using the full set of instrumental variables as 
described in Chapter 6.8 on the entire set of dependent variables. The ARRI interaction with 
merger ( 8ˆβ ) has to be dropped, because for none of the merged fund the 1996 instruments are 
available for all predecessor funds. Exogeneity can only be rejected for the pooled sample (see 
Table 31). 
The Anderson Canonical test fails to reject the null hypothesis of underidentification for all 
samples and with the exception of 1998 the Sargan-Hansen test of no correlation between 
the instruments and the error term, which could be caused by the large number of 
instruments as discussed above. No critical values are reported for the weak instrument 
test, but it can be safely assumed that they are higher than the reported test statistic. At 
first glance these tests appear devastating for the chosen instruments, but some 
explanations are possible. The set of potentially endogenous variables is highly constructed 
and includes components that are unlikely to be endogenous. Thus to the degree that the 
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endogenous variables (contribution rate, competitors’ contribution rate, lagged 
membership) are only playing a minor role in these explanatory variables, the less likely 
the instruments will do a good job explaining them.  
Table 32 indicates that those variables with the least significant parameter estimates are 
also those that the instruments are least able to explain. 
Table 31: Search Costs – Endogeneity and Validity Tests – Full Specification 
Year Pooled 1997158 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Hausman Endogeneity Test 
Chi-sq(7) 42.31 3.71 2.47 4.77 5.73 7.07 6.66 
p-value 0.000 0.592 0.872 0.688 0.572 0.422 0.353 
Weak Instrument Test 
Critical Value (max. 5% Bias) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Test Statistic 0.353 0.339 0.329 0.232 0.176 0.453 0.218 
Anderson Canonical  Underidentification Test 
Chi-sq(24) 11.95 23.45 23.885 18.025 11.742 25.316 12.748 
p-value 0.981 0.607 0.526 0.802 0.983 0.389 0.970 
Sargan-Hansen Overidentification Test 
Chi-sq(23) 21.186 29.546 36.431 24.417 35.465 22.583 20.849 
p-value 0.570 0.242 0.050 0.381 0.467 0.485 0.590 
 
Table 32: Search Costs – First Stage Regressions 
Variable R2 F(31, 278) P-value 
Lagged AKV 0.998 2917.92 0.0000 
Lagged AKV if Rate increased 0.355 6.59 0.0000 
Lagged AKV if Rate decreased 0.211 2.65 0.0000 
Adjusted ARRI * Share * Total Market 0.708 14.74 0.0000 
Adjusted ARRI * Share * New Market 0.200 2.30 0.0002 
Adjusted ARRI * Share * Total Market if Rate decreased 0.245 3.16 0.0000 
Adjusted ARRI * Share * Total Market if Rate increased 0.338 4.71 0.0000 
Adjusted ARRI * Share * Total Market * Lagged Market Share 0.535 11.7 0.0000 
 
Therefore a reduced specification is estimated which only includes the variables that are 
usually significant and display the expected sign in Table 29. The test results for endogeneity and 
the validity of the instruments in Table 33 show that in four years the null hypothesis under the 
Anderson canonical test can be rejected and the null of the Sargan-Hansen test fails to be rejected 
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 The lagged membership and its interaction with contribution rate changes are treated as exogenous in 1997 and 
the degrees of freedom are adjusted accordingly. 
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in five of the samples. The Cragg-Donald test indicates for all years that the instruments are 
weak. 
Table 33: Search Costs – Endogeneity and Instrument Validity Tests – Reduced 
Specification 
 Year Pooled 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Hausman Endogeneity Test 
Chi-sq (2) 8.03 5.5 3.3 1.91 2.87 1.57 1.94 
p-value 0.018 0.064 0.192 0.386 0.239 0.457 0.370 
Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument Test 
Critical Value (max. 5% Bias) 20.31 11.05 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.31 
Test Statistic 0.928 0.474 1.512 1.017 1.773 1.154 0.908 
Anderson Canonical Underidentification Test 
Chi-sq(29) 30.431 27.94 65.181 52.064 66.38 50.191 41.054 
p-value 0.393 0.521 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.068 
Sargan-Hansen Overidentification Test 
Chi-sq(28) 64.332 22.695 35.32 33.13 42.455 38.233 34.846 
p-value 0.000 0.748 0.161 0.231 0.039 0.094 0.174 
 
The result for the pooled sample of the Sargan-Hansen test suggests that the instruments 
are not orthogonal to the error term. Thus the partial correlation coefficient between the error 
term and all instruments is computed and tested whether or not it is significantly different from 
0. Twelve instruments for which the null hypothesis of no correlation with the error term is 
rejected at the 90% confidence level are excluded. The test statistics of the following estimation 
with the full sample and the reduced set of instruments again indicates orthogonality. Thus the 
same procedure was repeated and an additional five instruments excluded. The final estimation 
showed no further indication of endogenous instruments, but the Anderson canonical test 
continued to suggest underidentification and the instruments remain weak. This is somewhat 
surprising, because the F-statistics for regressing the endogenous variables on the instruments are 
all high and each instrument is highly significant in at least one of the three regressions. 
 
   
  118  
7.2.4 Fixed Effects and Autocorrelation   
There can be systematic fund specific differences, which cause some funds to be better 
known than others that are not captured in the data set. Funds might also differ systematically in 
their ability to influence their members’ desire to search, which suggests estimating the model as 
fixed effects. Furthermore including the lagged membership without properly accounting for 
autocorrelation causes a dynamic panel bias and applying fixed effects only removes the fixed 
part of it. Therefore the one-step system GMM is also performed. While OLS tends to cause an 
upward bias of the estimated coefficient for the lagged variable, the opposite is true for the fixed 
effects, so that the two parameter estimates are roughly defining the range in which the true 
parameter should be.159 
Table 34: Search Costs – Full Specification – All Methods 
Method OLS OLS-IV FE FE-IV GMM GMM-IV 
94.36 93.42 93.57 85.32 93.99 94.34 B1 – Lagged AKV (in 100) (0.779)*** (0.943)*** (6.17)*** (31.82)*** (0.108)*** (0.111)*** 
1.80 3.39 1.21 -2.49 2.00 1.63 B2 – Lagged AKV if Rate increased (in 100) (0.806)** (2.28) (0.48)** (14.48) (0.129)*** (0.138)*** 
-0.998 -1.36 -2.57 -6.29 -1.15 -1.20 B3 – Lagged AKV if Rate decreased (in 100) (0.597)* (4.17) (0.834)*** (13.03) (0.232)*** (0.262)*** 
36.26 354.21 -22.66 343.15 33.64 41.94 B4 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market (in 1000) (9.82)*** (169.31)** (26.16) (1578.11) (10.43)*** (11.08)*** 
-37.72 -120.33 -12.5 270.9 -30.73 -29.6 B5 - Adj. ARRI * Share * New Market (in 1000) (11.69)*** (246.82) (10.77) (1155.08) (22.76) (20.7) 
-2.21 -344.84 9.5 40.44 -4.74 -19.98 B6 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market if Rate 
decreased (in 1000) (13.24) (267.46) (12.2) (1646.49) (20.68) (20.07) 
-6.17 -529.74 -3.18 -1766.67 -5.5 -10.06 B7 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market if Rate 
increased (in 1000) (19.48) (303.86)* (16.33) (4860.22) (18.95) (19.26) 
3998.71 4518.27 4194.02 4312.92 4264.62 3991.02 B9 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market * Lagged 
Market Share (466.75)*** (1493.91)*** (576.73)*** (11410) (115.77)*** (144.99)*** 
Observations 521 309 480 293 521 428 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
The estimation results for the full specification (without the merger-ARRI interaction) for 
OLS, fixed effects (FE) and one-step system GMM (GMM) with and without instruments are 
presented in Table 34. The chosen instruments are those that were proven to be orthogonal for 
the pooled cross-section specification above. The Hausman test rejects endogeneity for OLS and 
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 Roodman (2006)  
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GMM, but not for the fixed effects model. In the GMM model this test is to be understood for 
the outside instruments and not the lags so it is not properly a test for endogeneity. The Arellano-
Bond test for first order autocorrelation rejects the null of no autocorrelation for both the GMM 
and the GMM-IV method (z = -5.33 and –7.59), but the test for second order autocorrelation fails 
to reject the null only for the non-IV method (z = 1.27 and 2.12). 
With the exception of the FE-IV approach, the parameter estimates for lagged 
membership are in a very narrow bandwidth. As expected the GMM parameter estimate is in 
between the FE and OLS ones.160 The estimate suggests that on average about 5% to 6% of a 
funds members search each year. The fixed effects method shows a rare unexpected negative 
sign on the 4ˆβ  and a very large and statistically insignificant one when instruments are used. 
Because it appears to be a good compromise between the biased OLS and FE estimators, the 
focus is on the GMM methods. 
For either GMM approach, the estimated parameters 2ˆβ and 3ˆβ  are consistently of the 
unexpected sign, even though they are significant in all non-IV and the GMM-IV approach. The 
estimation parameter on the main contribution rate related variable ( 4ˆβ ) is highly significant 
and, as expected, positive. The corresponding parameter 5ˆβ  is, as expected, negative and smaller 
in magnitude than 4ˆβ , which indicates a small positive effect in newly entered markets. Changes 
of the contribution rate have no clear or significant effect ( 6ˆβ ). The size of the fund has a large 
and significant positive effect on being in someone’s aware set ( 7ˆβ ). 
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 The estimated parameter and standard error for the GMM model has to be rescaled by the factor 100 to be 
comparable to the other estimation methods. 
   
  120  
Table 35: Search Costs – Reduced Specification – All Methods 
Method OLS IV FE FE-IV GMM GMM-IV 
95.31 93.79 95.31 80.7 94.71 94.9 
B1 - Lagged AKV (in 100) 
(0.724)*** (1.03)*** (8.98)*** (5.61)*** (0.0947)*** (0.0862)*** 
33.3 39.65 -15.79 -102.69 43.24 49.89 B4 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market 
(in 1000) (7.64)*** (20.69)* (18.13) (69.11) (9.54)*** (8.29)*** 
3287.03 5547.95 2690.17 4491.02 3435.49 3305.72 B9 - Adj. ARRI * Share * Total Market 
* Lagged Market Share (478.22)*** (1838.09)*** (345.47)*** (1685.24)*** (100.06)*** (102.33)*** 
Observations 521 309 480 293 521 428 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
7.2.5 Conclusion for Search Costs 
Estimating the reduced specification that only included the variables with significant 
parameter estimates from the full specification results in a similar result pattern as the full 
specification  (results are shown in Table 35). For the GMM methods, the retention rate is 
slightly higher and while the 4ˆβ  increased, the 7ˆβ  decreased in magnitude. 
The above analysis supports the hypothesis that search costs are a source of contribution 
rate setting power. There is no compelling indication that rate changes (in either direction) have a 
systematic impact on the member’s search likelihood to search or a searchers likelihood to find a 
fund. The only interaction with the ARRI-share-market size variable that yield consistently 
significant parameter estimates is the lagged market share, which indicates that larger funds are 
more likely in a searcher’s aware set. There is little evidence that the ARRI has a non-linear 
impact on demand, which would indicate that the average search effort yields relatively 
comprehensive information. There is only limited indication of endogeneity in the contribution 
rates. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity exist and are corrected for, but the dynamic panel 
bias proves to be relatively small. 
Of the three variables that have a significant impact on fund membership only the impact 
on lagged membership is easy to interpret: On average slightly more than 5% of a fund’s 
members search annually. The other two variables are highly constructed and thus too many 
   
  121  
assumptions have to be made to compute an average effect. However, at the maximum (average) 
value that these variables take the additional membership is 18,254 (2,120) for the ARRI-
membership interaction and 292,998 (5,461) for the ARRI-membership-lagged market-share 
variable.161 
 
7.3 Switching Costs as the Single Source of Contribution Rate 
Setting Power 
If switching costs are the single source of contribution rate setting power, switching takes 
place whenever the expected financial gain from switching to a lower rate fund exceed the 
monetary and non-monetary costs of switching. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.2, 
switching costs likely differ across the destination funds and the insured, are on average 
declining over time and homogenous across funds of origin. Also, the ranking of funds by 
switching costs does not have to be the same across individuals and/or across time. Therefore not 
all switchers are necessarily joining the lowest rate fund in a market. Theoretically all funds that 
offer a lower contribution rate than a switcher’s current fund are potential switching destinations, 
but the contribution rate and the likelihood of being chosen should be negatively correlated.162 
Initially (in 1997), the flow of members should be determined by the contribution rate 
differences between funds. In all subsequent years, however, the change in the difference of the 
contribution rates should also determine switching. A constant contribution rate difference can 
only induce additional switching if the switching costs change, while changes in the contribution 
rate difference can induce additional switching even if the switching costs remain constant. 
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 Using the parameter estimates of the reduced specification GMM-IV method. 
162
 Assuming no negative correlation between the fund-of-destination specific switching cost and the contribution 
rate, for which there would be no apparent reason. 
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Since under the assumption of switching costs as the lone source of rate setting power a 
member’s preference towards his current fund does not depend on the size of the fund, any 
potential loss of members should be proportional to the fund’s size. Thus, if the dependent 
variable is total membership, two differently sized but otherwise equal funds should retain (or 
lose) the same percentage of their current members. This percentage should depend on the fund’s 
contribution rate in relation to the rates of all other funds. Likewise, the gain of members should 
depend on the market size from which a fund can draw new members, which is the share of the 
residual market that charges a higher rate than the fund in question, and similarly on the fund’s 
contribution rate relative to the one of its competitors.163 
In the years after 1997, to the degree that the average switching costs are declining and 
that a fund is entering new markets the absolute difference matters. Otherwise only changes in 
the difference of the contribution rate should determine the inflow of new members in later 
years. Therefore the membership for a fund j in period t can be modeled as  
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RCR indicates a contribution rate measure that takes the own and competitor’s contribution rate 
and the number of competitors into account. There are four different types of this measure, 
denoted by superscripts A to D, which are explained in detail in the following. The variable 
PTHM measure the size of the markets that pays a higher rate than fund j in period t and NTHM 
is the corresponding size of any newly entered market. 
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 Note that in the search costs case the searchers could be retained and thus the inflow of members depended on the 
share of the residual market that pays a higher rate plus the own size, while here only the share of the residual 
market that pays a higher rate matters. 
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7.3.1 Construction of the Explanatory Variables 
The first four parameters measure retention (or loss) components of current members. 
The parameter β1 can be interpreted as the share of last year members that switch due to the 
difference in relative contribution rates to funds that have been competing with the fund in 
question in the previous period as well. Since no fund was open before January 1996, all funds 
that are open in a market in January 1997 are assumed to be repeat competitors. Thus with time-
invariant switching costs this parameter should be different from zero (and is expected to be 
negative) only in 1997. The degree to which switching costs are time variant, the parameter 
could be different from zero in the following years as well.164 Two types of RCRA are 
computed165, the difference of the fund’s rate to the average of its lowest rate competitor in all 
open markets and one more inclusive type. The more inclusive measure should simultaneously 
measure the contribution rate difference to the lower rate competitors as well as their number, 
because the larger the number of lower rate competitors is the greater the chance that one of 
them has a sufficiently low fund-of-destination specific switching rate to induce switching. It is, 
however, unlikely that the likelihood of switching increases proportionally to the number of 
potential destination. More likely is a less than proportional increase. The first type (RCRA) is 
computed as 
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 Even though in 1996 all competitors are “new”, in 1996 all open competitors are treated as old competitors. 
165
 Without further mentioning it is understood that the market size weighted average is taken across all open 
markets is taken for each used RCR.  
   
  124  
with lownCR
 denoting the lowest rate fund in market n. The total size of each individual market 
(TMn) serves as weight when averaging the differences across open markets. Let kn= 1,2,3,…, 
mn, jn, … Kn be all funds that are open in market n in the previous period ordered by contribution 
rate in ascending order. Then mn is the number of continuous competitors that charges a 
contribution rate that is lower than fund j’s. 2AjRCR is computed as 
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The fraction with the inner summation sign as the numerator is the average difference between 
fund j’s and its lower rate competitors’ contribution rate in each of the 17 markets. The function 
f(mn) represents the impact factor of the number of competitors with lower rates. Three different 
functional forms for f(mn) are computed: f(mn) = mn (proportional impact),  f(mn) = mn0.5 (less 
than proportional impact) and  f(mn) = 1 (no impact). 
The parameter β2 should be non-zero and negative only in the years following 1997 and 
is expected to be negative, because it measures the membership loss that is due to changes in the 
relative contribution rate. The AjRCR∆ can also be constructed as the change in relation to the 
lowest rate fund or the same measure used in the construction of 2AjRCR . Thus  
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or in relation to the lower rate competitors’ average contribution rate change 
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The parameter β3 can be interpreted as the effect of new competitors on the loss of 
members and is expected to be negative. For the first year of a new competitors’ entry only the 
difference between the incumbent funds and the new entrant’s contribution rate should determine 
the degree of switching. In the following year the entrant becomes an incumbent and the 
relationship between the two funds falls into the realm of β2. For the first year (1997) the effect 
of new competitors is captured in β2.  The BjRCR is computed in the same fashion as 
2A
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Here newjnm is the number of new competitors in market n that charge a lower contribution rate 
than fund j and newinCR is the contribution rate of these funds. 
The parameter β4 picks up any effects that the size of the fund has, which could be for 
example lower fund-of destination switching costs for larger funds. If the size of the fund itself 
does not matter in determining the chance of that fund being chosen, β4 should be equal to one. 
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Larger β4 indicate that the size and fund-of-destination specific switching costs are negatively 
correlated. Smaller coefficients would have no clear interpretation.166 
The remaining three parameters measure the degree to which a fund can attract switchers. 
The parameter β5 corresponds to β1 in the sense that it is a measures for the distribution of the 
switchers that switch because of contribution rate differences in the first period and, as discussed 
above, those switchers in later years that switch due to time-variant switching costs. It includes 
only markets for which fund j did not become open in that period. By construction of the 
variables, β5 is expected to be positive. The magnitude of the switching depends on the size of 
the market that charges a higher contribution rate than fund j (PTHMj) and the relative 
contribution rate (RCRC). PTHMj is computed almost the same way as the market that charges a 
higher rate in the previous chapter for search costs. The only difference is that the own fund size 
is not included here.167 The likelihood of someone (who is paying a higher contribution rate and 
who is legally entitled to do so) to switch to fund j depends on two things. First the switching 
costs must be lower than the savings from switching and second fund j must be the best choice 
among all potential switching destinations. Therefore two separate RCRCs are computed that can 
be merged to one variable as well. ChighjRCR  relates the fund to those funds that charge a higher 
rate. Let ln= 1,2,3,…, jn,, … Kn be all funds that are open in market n, ordered by contribution 
rate in ascending order. Then Kn - jn is the number of competitors that charges a contribution rate 
that is higher than fund j’s. With Gjn denoting an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if fund j 
is newly open in market n and 0 otherwise, ChighjRCR is computed as 
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 They could, however, indicate a general decline in total market size - just as a parameter larger than one could 
indicate an increase in total market size.   
167
 The reason for the exclusion is that in the search cost case the competitors and the own members are potentially 
searching before coming to the conclusion that this fund is the lowest rate alternative. Here where everyone is fully 
informed about all alternatives those who switch don’t remain in their current fund by definition of switching. 
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The function f(Kn-jn) again defines the relative importance of the number of competitors. 
The comparison with the lower rate competitors for the switchers ( ClowjRCR ) is  
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and the joined variable ( ClowjRCR ) is 
Chigh
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which takes values between 0 (for the fund that charges the highest rate in all markets of 
operation) and 1 (for the fund that charges the lowest rate in all markets of operation). The 
advantage of this variable is that it manages to condense a lot of information into one meaningful 
number. The disadvantage is that at the extreme high end it does not control for the magnitude of 
the price advantage. Two funds that operate in different subsets of the whole market and are both 
offering the cheapest contribution rate in their respective market might differ with respect to the 
magnitude of their price leadership but both receive a value of one. However, for the majority of 
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funds that are not the (near) price leader this variable should offer a good indicator of their 
respective position in their market. 
The parameter β6 corresponds to β2 because it captures those who switch in the years 
following 1997 by reacting to the change of the contribution rate gap to a lower rate fund.168 The 
C
jRCR∆ is computed in the same fashion as 
C
jRCR . Measuring the ratio of the weighted average 
sum of relative contribution rate changes toward the higher rate funds as a share of the changes 
towards all funds. Thus they are  
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Computing a joint variable in the above fashion does not make sense, because either component 
could be negative or positive and the above ratio could take values close to positive or negative 
infinity of the sum of the two variables is close to 0. 
The parameter β7 which is also expected to be positive, measures the amount of switchers 
that a fund is able to attract in the first year of entering a new market and thus depends on the 
contribution rate difference to the higher rate funds in the newly entered market (RCRD) and the 
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 This can also happen if the contribution rate gap narrows if the switching cost decline faster than the gap. The 
only binding condition is that the fund of destination keeps charging a lower rate. 
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size of the newly entered market that charges a higher contribution rate than fund j (NTHMj) 
which is computed in accordance with PTHMj. DjRCR can be computed as 
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and  
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j
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jD
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RCR
RCR
+
=        (49) 
Table 36 shows the summary statistics for the constructed RCR variables. Note that the 
last four variables are already interacted with the applicable market size variables, because they 
are computed separately for the old and new states before being merged. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  130  
Table 36: Switching Costs – Summary Statistics for RCR Variables 
Variable  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RCRA - lowest old competitors (1) 1360 1.714 0.932 0 4.910 
Change RCRA - lowest old competitors)(2)  919 -0.044 0.569 -2.633 2.912 
RCRA - avg. - proportional competitor weight 
(1) 1360 30.822 34.009 0 197.300 
RCRA - avg. – square root competitor weight 
(1) 1360 4.486 3.775 0 20.537 
RCRA - avg. - no competitor weight (1) 1360 0.734 0.418 0 2.423 
Change RCRA - avg. - proportional competitor 
weight (2)  1063 3.901 16.855 -73.890 233.707 
Change RCRA - avg. - square root competitor 
weight (2)  1063 0.623 2.370 -7.864 24.350 
Change RCRA - avg. - no competitor weight 
(2)  1063 0.118 0.452 -1.653 3.100 
RCRB - avg. - proportional competitor weight 
(3) 1360 5.448 6.157 0 37.520 
RCRB - avg. – square root competitor weight 
(3) 1360 1.844 1.791 0 10.675 
RCRB - avg. - no competitor weight (3) 1360 0.670 0.549 0 3.058 
RCRC * higher rate market (old markets) (5)  1541 4,742,769 6,271,907 0 28,400,000 
Change RCRC * lower rate market (old 
markets) (6) 1062 1,056,117 5,389,509 -43,600,000 47,300,000 
Change RCRC * higher rate market (old 
markets) (6) 1062 1,261,983 5,516,283 -37,900,000 51,700,000 
RCRD * higher rate market (new markets) (7)  1541 884,595.3 3,248,508 0 23,300,000 
 
 
7.3.2 Estimation of the Switching Costs model 
Because the structure of the model is identical, the same methods are used here as for the 
search costs case. By construction 1ˆβ , 2ˆβ and 3ˆβ are expected to be negative, 5ˆβ , 6ˆβ and 7ˆβ  are 
expected to be positive and 4ˆβ  should be close to 1.  
First, membership for the pooled sample as well as the individual years is estimated using 
robust OLS. The results for using all variations of the RCR-variables jointly is shown in Table 
37. Collinearity between the different variations of each RCR causes many of the parameter 
estimates in the first column to have an unexpected sign and to be not significant. Using the 
change in membership instead of the lagged membership yields high R2 above 0.81 in all 
samples and usually well above 0.90. 
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Table 37: Switching Costs – OLS – all RCR Variations and Samples 
Year Pooled 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
-27.55 503.28 -75.63 25.30 -66.16 212.11 51.25 B1 - RCRA - Lowest * Lagged AKV (old 
competitors) (22.57) (173.52)*** (40.87)* (42.53) (201.46) (47.49)*** (18.83)*** 
5.34 100.28 -12.19 29.93 -41.30 40.86 -1.08 B1 - RCRA - Avg. - Proportional * Lagged AKV 
(old competitors) (1.5)*** (17.31)*** (19.06) (24.51) (29.78) (8.90)*** (6.38) 
-85.36 -1231.12 179.01 -358.31 644.75 -707.10 15.45 B1 - RCRA - Avg. - Square Root * Lagged AKV 
(old competitors) (24.4)*** (217.49)*** (255.13) (298.00) (465.6) (152.62)*** (114.27) 
238.95 3374.48 -814.41 758.82 -2606.52 2470.96 -61.05 B1 - RCRA - Avg. - No Funds * Lagged AKV 
(old competitors) (93.73)** (613.55)*** (835.16) (895.46) (1923.83) (602.97)*** (470.06) 
33.64 -293.22 22.38 -127.24 -41.18 -117.26 -96.82 B2 - Change RCRA - Lowest * Lagged AKV (old 
competitors) (7.31)*** (132.01)** (31.18) (99.04) (87.95) (38.63)*** (37.26)*** 
2.09 -98.94 -108.28 15.16 -108.47 -10.72 3.26 B2 - Change RCRA - Avg. - Proportional * 
Lagged AKV (old competitors) (3.21) (47.54)** (101.03) (22.06) (146.39) (9.37) (15.17) 
-17.26 975.7 1212.15 -204.51 1343.59 187.6 -62.17 B2 - Change RCRA - Avg. - Square Root * 
Lagged AKV (old competitors) (45.58) (443.20)** (1167.71) (276.48) (1873.05) (127.91) (202.53) 
12.37 -2013.69 -3356.33 799.43 -4038.26 -764.63 426.34 B2 - Change RCRA - Avg. - No Funds * Lagged 
AKV (old competitors) (160.01) (1085.31)* (3328.35) (840.25) (5886.18) (454.68)* (611.63) 
5.29 -245.62 30.40 -67.23 19.17 -15.37 -7.10 B3 - RCRB - Avg. - prop * Lagged AKV (new 
competitors) (9.07) (30.72)*** (17.22)* (28.76)** (59.92) (21.74) (12.42) 
-36.93 1813.13 -220.55 346.92 -118.50 87.98 55.49 B3 - RCRB - Avg. - Square Root * Lagged AKV 
(new competitors) (58.56) (217.37)*** (107.51)** (212.11) (550.66) (123.33) (75.68) 
70.18 -3577.83 516.93 -336.97 210.61 69.45 -159.91 B3 - RCRB - Avg. – No Funds * Lagged AKV 
(new competitors) (85.45) (483.54)*** (190.9)*** (298.72) (1282.95) (173.48) (136.9) 
113.63 9.80 121.50 117.47 120.75 91.76 100.04 
B4 – Lagged AKV  
(2.42)*** (32.54) (3.84)*** (2.22)*** (34.73)*** (4.18)*** (2.75)*** 
0.433 -2.66 0.177 0.021 0.541 1.40 -0.0960 
B5 - RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old markets)  
(0.133)*** (1.94) (0.0940)* (0.152) (0.330) (0.466)*** (0.259) 
-0.589 4.87 0.370 2.16 -0.612 -2.61 0.201 B6 - Change RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old 
markets) (0.298)** (3.55) (0.362) (0.954)** (1.69) (0.98)*** (0.374) 
-0.556 4.74 0.190 1.40 -0.140 -2.92 0.223 B6 - Change RCRC * Lower Rate Market (old 
markets) (0.33)* (3.5) (0.307) (1.17) (1.63) (1.01)*** (0.388) 
-0.253 dropped 0.268 dropped -1.29 -1.47 0.00788 
B7 - RCRD * Higher Rate Market (new markets) 
(0.311)   (0.0649)***   (0.859) (0.601)** (0.309) 
Observations 437 38 58 74 82 94 91 
R-squared 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
R-squared (Change in Membership) 0.818 0.979 0.987 0.971 0.866 0.913 0.918 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
In Table 38 the results are shown if only the lowest rate competitor’s contribution rate is 
relevant.169 The estimated parameter on the contribution rate difference to the lowest rate fund 
displays the expected sign and is highly significant in all years. Somewhat surprisingly the effect 
of the change of the contribution rate difference to the lowest rate fund appears to be positive in 
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 Due to a lack of observations this variable is not computed for the market entrance of new price leaders and the 
one with proportional impact of the number of competitors is used. 
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all but one year and significant only in two other years, one of which is 1997 for which the 
change in differences should not have any impact. The contribution rate difference to new 
competitors with a lower rate appears to have no consistent influence. The estimated parameter 
on lagged membership is above 100% in all samples and highly significant. Due to the positive 
dynamic panel bias, a discussion of this parameter should be postponed until after 
autocorrelation is accounted for. 
 Table 38: Switching Costs – OLS – Lowest Rate Competitor and all Samples 
Year Pooled 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
-47.83 -91.85 -52.36 -52.60 -134.00 -68.62 -32.37 B1- RCRA - Lowest * Lagged AKV (old 
competitors) (20.99)** (16.05)*** (15.49)*** (11.10)*** (33.61)*** (40.09)* (23.26) 
0.846 47.74 5.10 -19.77 25.95 63.71 22.64 B2 - Change RCRA - Lowest * Lagged AKV 
(old competitors) (7.73) (19.02)** (6.68) (25.60) (28.84) (21.78)*** (14.76) 
-0.188 -2.06 0.876 -3.22 2.42 1.34 0.123 B3 - RCRB – Avg. - prop * Lagged AKV (new 
competitors) (1.27) (1.91) (2.03) (0.733)*** (1.25)* (3.18) (2.86) 
109.55 129.64 108.44 114.47 125.71 112.7 107.49 
B4 - Lagged AKV  
(4.02)*** (3.80)*** (2.66)*** (2.38)*** (8.22)*** (6.29)*** (2.24)*** 
0.629 -1.10 0.163 0.0267 0.355 2.62 -0.262 
B5 - RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old markets) 
(0.205)*** (2.10) (0.136) (0.161) (0.282) (1.22)** (0.257) 
-0.745 2.70 0.451 3.46 -0.646 -5.28 0.544 B6 - Change RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old 
markets) (0.484) (3.93) (0.507) (1.13)*** (1.51) (2.54)** (0.353) 
-0.649 2.85 0.344 2.93 -0.371 -5.00 0.429 B6 - Change RCRC * Lower Rate Market (old 
markets)  (0.525) (3.95) (0.467) (1.39)** (1.48) (2.57)* (0.332) 
-0.523 dropped 0.308 dropped -0.776 -2.88 0.0297 B7 - RCRD * Higher Rate Market (new 
markets) (0.42)   (0.0559)***   (0.599) (1.54)* (0.129) 
Observations 437 38 58 74 82 94 91 
R-squared 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 
R-squared (Change in Membership) 0.614 0.842 0.947 0.893 0.821 0.700 0.699 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval.  
 
The parameters estimates on the last four variables that are all indicating how the funds 
are gaining members are showing an inconsistent pattern of signs and significance. It is possible 
that they are poorly specified and thus the estimated coefficient on lagged membership is above 
100% to capture the average gross gain of members. The two variables relating to 6ˆβ  are 
negatively correlated (correlation coefficient = -0.826), but excluding one or the other did not 
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yield significant and expected parameter coefficients. The fit of the model is remarkably good 
with the R2 above 0.61 for all samples. 
When the weight of the number of competitors is assumed proportional and thus f(m) = 
m, the first two explanatory variables change compared to the above specification. The 
“contribution rate difference to lower rate competitors” variable still has a consistently negative, 
but now less significant impact on fund membership (see Table 39). Again the change in the 
contribution rate difference yields ambiguous parameter estimates and so do all other 
explanatory variables except for lagged membership, which is again indicating a lagged effect of 
over 100%, but smaller in magnitude than in the specification above. The R2 remains high, but is 
also smaller than in the above specification. 
Table 39: Switching Costs – OLS – Proportional Impact of Number of Competitors  
Year Pooled 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
-0.267 -3.48 -1.13 -2.08 -3.41 -0.913 -0.337 B1 - RCRA – Avg. - Proportional * Lagged 
AKV (old competitors) (0.165) (1.49)** (0.562)** (0.406)*** (0.684)*** (0.633) (0.158)** 
0.33 1.08 0.117 -1.32 0.202 1.50 0.453 B2 - Change RCRA - avg. - Proportional * 
Lagged AKV (old competitors) (0.379) (0.986) (0.298) (0.460)*** (0.560) (0.343)*** (0.179)** 
-2.10 0.609 1.88 1.08 5.86 0.882 -0.24 B3 - RCRB – Avg. - prop * Lagged AKV (new 
competitors) (0.891)** (3.96) (2.69) (1.44) (1.15)*** (4.22) (1.95) 
102.00 106.72 100.45 108.04 110.59 103.49 103.29 
Lagged AKV (4) 
(1.77)*** (4.01)*** (2.02)*** (1.12)*** (3.35)*** (1.41)*** (1.10)*** 
0.594 -0.187 0.0674 0.0593 0.326 2.62 -0.145 
B4 - Lagged AKV  
(0.179)*** (0.738) (0.139) (0.146) (0.245) (1.31)** (0.206) 
-0.581 1.18 0.774 3.18 -0.639 -5.21 0.391 
B5 - RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old markets) 
(0.457) (1.69) (0.512) (1.11)*** (1.47) (2.7)* (0.287) 
-0.346 1.37 0.69 2.26 -0.475 -5.05 0.293 B6 - Change RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old 
markets) (0.448) (1.73) (0.481) (1.25)* (1.4) (2.76)* (0.257) 
-0.161 0.256 0.223 0.112 -0.157 -0.362 -0.0339 B6 - Change RCRC * Lower Rate Market (old 
markets)  (0.122) (0.359) (0.215) (0.121) (0.147) (0.399) (0.0452) 
Observations 517 54 69 86 103 104 101 
R-squared 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 
R-squared (Change in Membership) 0.540 0.787 0.913 0.921 0.838 0.737 0.696 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
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The pattern of the results found if a less than proportional impact of the number of funds 
(f(m) = m1/2, results in Table 40) or if no impact of the number of funds (f(m) = 1, results in  
Table 41) is assumed for the variables associated with 1ˆβ , 2ˆβ and 3ˆβ  is very similar to 
those found with proportional impact.  
These preliminary results suggest that switching costs appear to be fairly homogenous 
across funds of destination, because the lowest rate fund’s price appears to have a stronger effect 
on membership than some weighted average of all lower rate competitors. This would also 
explain why the chosen variables for the gain of switchers appear weak as they are all a measure 
of the fund’s relative position to all funds. 
Table 40: Switching Costs – OLS – Less than Proportional Impact of Number of 
Competitors  
Year Pooled 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
-3.92 -3.18 -10.98 -15.69 -30.08 -4.35 -3.52 B1 - RCRA – Avg. - Square Root * Lagged 
AKV (old competitors) (2.03)* (13.96) (6.05)* (3.63)*** (5.95)*** (8.34) (2.89) 
2.05 9.09 1.19 -8.18 -0.568 12.02 4.06 B2 - Change RCRA - avg. - Square Root * 
Lagged AKV (old competitors) (2.46) (5.12)* (1.51) (2.76)*** (4.59) (2.38)*** (1.47)*** 
-7.92 -27.92 2.86 1.09 23.00 -9.94 -2.20 B3 - RCRB – Avg. - Square Root * Lagged 
AKV (new competitors)  (3.14)** (20.16) (13.72) (6.00) (6.54)*** (21.72) (8.87) 
103.78 113.69 104.41 109.74 112.86 103.6 104.31 
B4 - Lagged AKV  
(2.21)*** (3.74)*** (2.24)*** (1.29)*** (3.71)*** (2.01)*** (1.13)*** 
0.545 -0.123 0.125 0.0456 0.324 2.63 -0.254 
B5 - RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old markets) 
(0.189)*** (0.687) (0.121) (0.146) (0.241) (1.29)** (0.233) 
-0.508 0.885 0.517 3.32 -0.602 -5.28 0.512 B6 - Change RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old 
markets) (0.476) (1.61) (0.443) (1.07)*** (1.48) (2.68)** (0.325) 
-0.314 1.04 0.426 2.47 -0.513 -5.06 0.433 B6 - Change RCRC * Lower Rate Market (old 
markets)  (0.48) (1.66) (0.408) (1.21)** (1.38) (2.74)* (0.302) 
-0.150 0.114 0.0859 0.117 -0.156 -0.366 -0.0219 B7 - RCRD * Higher Rate Market (new 
markets) (0.117) (0.312) (0.256) (0.119) (0.145) (0.401) (0.0347) 
Observations 517 54 69 86 103 104 101 
R-squared 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 
R-squared (Change in Membership) 0.579 0.829 0.935 0.928 0.840 0.747 0.725 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval.  
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Table 41: Switching Costs – OLS – Less than Proportional Impact of Number of 
Competitors and all Samples 
Year ALL 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
-85.81 111.08 -112.51 -125.00 -237.31 23.39 -41.51 B1 - RCRA – Avg. - No Funds * Lagged AKV 
(old competitors) (22.39)*** (70.56) (38)*** (40.17)*** (59.29)*** (46.60) (71.32) 
13.53 75.2 6.37 -64.65 -12.94 96.53 36.21 B2 - Change RCRA - avg. - No Funds * 
Lagged AKV (old competitors) (12.64) (26.23)*** (4.75) (23.00)*** (39.98) (18.94)*** (10.67)*** 
-2.17 -210.82 22.44 9.82 65.05 -99.38 -8.55 B3 - RCRB – Avg. - No Funds * Lagged AKV 
(new competitors)  (17.70) (55.96)*** (38.27) (32.55) (48.57) (36.59)*** (50.48) 
107.14 116.67 107.82 110.79 115.26 102.84 105.67 
B4 - Lagged AKV  
(2.36)*** (1.81)*** (1.97)*** (1.95)*** (4.38)*** (1.91)*** (0.384)*** 
0.540 -0.395 0.124 0.0260 0.348 2.70 -0.397 
B5 - RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old markets) 
(0.188)*** (0.666) (0.118) (0.156) (0.242) (1.28)** (0.271) 
-0.604 1.39 0.518 3.88 -0.693 -5.45 0.675 B6 - Change RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old 
markets) (0.464) (1.56) (0.427) (1.09)*** (1.51) (2.66)** (0.383)* 
-0.478 1.49 0.422 3.20 -0.598 -5.16 0.621 B6 - Change RCRC * Lower Rate Market (old 
markets)  (0.481) (1.62) (0.393) (1.24)** (1.37) (2.71)* (0.372)* 
-0.151 0.0977 0.0469 0.145 -0.149 -0.377 -0.00656 B7 - RCRD * Higher Rate Market (new 
markets) (0.114) (0.311) (0.256) (0.143) (0.144) (0.409) (0.0293) 
Observations 517 54 69 86 103 104 101 
R-squared 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 
R-squared (Change in Membership) 0.662 0.890 0.963 0.917 0.836 0.761 0.760 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
7.3.3 Endogeneity and Autocorrelation 
 
Because the RCRs that relate to the lowest rate competitors appear to be superior 
predictors of fund membership, they are chosen as explanatory variables for the dynamic panel 
analysis and the entire set of available instruments is used to control for endogeneity.  
The results for the robust OLS, FE and one-step system GMM methods for the full 
specification are reported in Table 42. The Hausman test for endogeneity strongly indicates 
endogeneity for both the robust OLS and the fixed effects approach. For the one-step system 
GMM the Hausman test fails to produce a test statistic. The Arellano-Bond test rejects the null of 
no first order autocorrelation (z = -3.87) and fails to reject the null of no second order 
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autocorrelation (z = 1.43) if the outside instruments are excluded.170 If these instruments are 
included the test results are the opposite. The instruments show the same type of weakness as in 
the search costs case. 
For both fixed effects methods the parameter estimate for lagged membership is below 
100%.171 As explained above, the fixed effects method usually results in downward biased 
estimates on lagged explanatory variables. The FE-IV method is the only one with a positive 
price effect and both fixed effects method yield insignificant 1ˆβ . The estimated parameters on 5ˆβ , 
are the only ones of the last four rows that are significant for more than half the methods and that 
always display the expected sign. Thus in the reduced specification the last three variables are 
dropped and so are the ones associated with 2ˆβ  and 3ˆβ . 
Table 42: Full Specification – Different Panel Methods 
Method OLS IV FE FE-IV BB BB-IV 
-47.83 -96.99 -18.59 36.08 -48.90 -35.31 B1 - RCRA - Lowest * Lagged AKV  
(old competitors)  (21.12)** (21.23)*** (11.90) (43.04) (3.21)*** (3.23)*** 
0.846 18.38 -10.92 -43.37 1.47 -5.39 B2 - Change RCRA - Lowest * Lagged AKV  
(old competitors) (8.11) (22.52) (7.43) (25.12)* (1.49) (1.49)*** 
-0.188 2.26 -0.822 -1.03 -0.131 -0.446 B3 - RCRB – Avg. - prop * Lagged AKV 
 (new competitors) (1.23) (2.13) (1.18) (3.15) (0.213) (0.214)** 
109.55 118.31 97.19 52.67 109.73 106.52 B4 - Lagged AKV  (4.06)*** (3.66)*** (11.37)*** (23.53)** (0.621)*** (0.687)*** 
0.629 0.299 0.868 1.23 0.736 0.861 B5 - RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old markets) (0.215)*** (0.896) (0.478)* (1.99) (0.129)*** (0.190)*** 
-0.745 0.219 -0.532 0.0571 -0.908 -1.33 B6 - Change RCRC * Higher Rate Market  
(old markets)  (0.469) (1.94) (0.476) (2.72) (0.286)*** (0.411)*** 
-0.649 0.946 -0.679 -0.052 -0.856 -1.39 B6 - Change RCRC * Lower Rate Market  
(old markets)  (0.503) (2.01) (0.482) (2.26) (0.294)*** (0.412)*** 
-0.523 25.77 -1.51 -5.63 -0.452 -0.118 B7 - RCRD * Higher Rate Market (new 
markets) (0.428) (22.88) (0.553)*** (6.01) (1.24) (2.71) 
Observations 437 265 404 252 437 265 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
The sample size varies greatly across methods, but restricting the sample size to the 
smallest denominator does not change any of the Hausman test results and since the one-step 
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 Outside instruments are those that are not past members or contribution rates.  
171
 The parameter estimates and standard errors for the lagged membership are rescaled to be comparable to the 
results in the earlier estimations. 
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system GMM without outside instruments appears to be the preferred specification the sample 
size is kept as large as possible. 
The results for the reduced specification are found in Table 43. Overall the estimated 
parameters are more significant and the previous outliers for the lagged dependent variable in the 
fixed effects methods are more in line with the parameter estimates of the other methods. The 
Hausman test for endogeneity still rejects the null of no endogeneity for the robust OLS method, 
but now fails to reject the null for the fixed effects model and again fails to produce a test 
statistic for the one-step system GMM method. The tests for autocorrelation show the same 
rejection pattern as for the full specification. 
Table 43: Reduced Specification – Different Panel Methods 
Method OLS IV FE FE-IV GMM GMM-IV 
-51.21 -68.25 -33.59 -34.28 -49.9 -43.43 B1 – RCRA - Lowest * Lagged AKV  
(old competitors) (16.35)*** (14.16)*** (13.59)** (20.69)* (2.02)*** (2.15)*** 
110.16 114.22 105.51 112.71 109.35 107.96 
B4 - Lagged AKV 
(3.82)*** (3.46)*** (11.86)*** (13.08)*** (0.511)*** (0.549)*** 
0.326 0.495 0.464 2.27 0.572 0.424 B5 - RCRC * Higher Rate Market  
(old markets) (0.073)*** (0.166)*** (0.304) (1.24)* (0.0939)*** (0.102)*** 
Observations 521 309 480 293 521 309 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval.  
 
7.3.4 Conclusion for Switching Costs 
The results of the switching costs only approach can explain the switching dynamics in 
the sickness fund sector. The fact that the driving force of switching are contribution rates 
difference levels even after the initial year of switching defies some of the initial ideas of how 
the switching costs are structured. One possible explanation is that switching costs are 
continuously declining at a rate that allows the contribution rate differences to be the major 
determinant of switching. Alternatively a mixed approach of search and switching costs is 
possible. If a person’s propensity to search is uncorrelated across time thus a pool of previous 
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non-searchers is searching every period, the contribution rate difference could matter if these 
people, once they found a lower rate alternative, face the decision of whether switching to this 
alternative fund is worthwhile given their individual switching costs.  
The fact that the contribution rate difference to the lowest rate fund dominates the more 
inclusive measures superficially suggests that switching is taking place only between a fund and 
the lowest rate fund. However, it is possible that the alternatively tested variables are too 
inclusive towards middle-of-the-pack funds and a measure that is more biased towards a number 
of the lowest rate funds would be most appropriate. 
Using the one-step system GMM parameter estimates as a reference, the 1ˆβ  suggests that 
a 1 percentage point difference between a fund’s contribution rate and the lowest rate fund 
translates into a 4.99% reduction in expected membership. Interpreting 5ˆβ  is more complex as 
one has to make assumptions about market size, share of members, the average number of 
competitors and the sum of contribution rate differences. However, the range of the membership 
impact can easily be computed. The estimated maximum increase in membership is 16,229 and 
the minimum is 0. The 16,629 is much smaller than the maximum membership change found in 
the data set (281,081). Thus it might be preferable to construct an alternative measure of the 
price advantage that is more biased towards lower rate funds. However, some of the difference 
between the highest predicted and observed value is captured by the parameter estimate on the 
lagged membership, which is significantly larger than one. One interpretation is that the fund-of-
destination specific switching costs are negatively correlated with the size of the fund. An 
alternative explanation is the exogenous growth of the entire market, but this is certainly not able 
   
  139  
to explain the entire difference, because the fund membership growth in Germany was much 
smaller than the difference between the estimated parameter and 100%.172 
 
7.4 Joint Sources of Contribution Rate Setting Power 
The previous analysis has shown strong support for both switching and search costs as 
sources of contribution rate setting power, but no support for product heterogeneity as the only 
source. It cannot be ruled out, however, that non-price fund attributes have an impact on fund 
choice even in the presence of inertia in the market. Thus in a first step the non-rate attributes are 
combined separately with both switching costs and the search costs models. In a second step the 
search and switching costs models are combined to test whether one of the two sources has a 
dominating effect over the other. 
 
7.4.1 Joint Effects of Non-Rate Attributes and Models allowing for 
Inertia 
One major problem arises from the fact that the non-rate attributes are available only for 
some years and thus a dynamic panel analysis produces meaningless results. Therefore, for the 
four years for which the surveys were conducted, the robust OLS model of the reduced 
specification is estimated for both combinations: switching costs with non-rate attributes and 
search costs with non-rate attributed. 
                                                 
172
 One crucial question is how the new market members enter the market. Most of the new members are former 
dependents (children) of members that likely switched their membership status within their fund. Thus this effect 
would apply to all funds roughly proportionally (assuming symmetry of the member/children ratio) and would be 
included in the 4ˆβ . 
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In all four years and both switching and search costs the parameter estimate of only one 
non-rate attribute was significantly different from zero in one year, but this one displays a 
negative sign suggesting that being open on Saturdays has a negative impact on fund 
membership (results are not shown). All other estimated parameters on the non-rate attributes are 
insignificant and the pattern of the displayed signs appears random.   
To control for potential collinearity among the non-rate attributes a single variable for the 
fund’s non-rate attributes is constructed for the 1998 survey. The variable is the sum of all non-
rate attributes, each divided by the respective sample means to ensure that each non-rate attribute 
has equal weight.173 Included in both, the robust OLS model for the reduced search costs and 
switching costs specifications, the parameter estimate is highly insignificant and in the search 
costs case even negative. 
Thus it is safe to conclude that at least the observed fund specific non-rate attributes have 
no measurable impact on fund membership. One interesting variable that could be of particular 
interest, the number of branches (or the density of the branch network), is unfortunately not 
available.174  
 
7.4.2 Switching Costs or Search Costs? 
To identify whether one source dominates the other, the reduced specifications for both 
sources are combined and estimated jointly, using robust OLS, fixed effects and the one-step 
system GMM models, all three with and without instrumental variables. The reduced 
specification is chosen, because it includes enough meaningful variables to allow for the major 
                                                 
173
 The model project participation is the only non-rate attribute can take values less than zero. Since the mean value 
is negative this variable could not be divided by its mean and is therefore simply added without an assigned weight. 
174
  This variable would be interesting to observe, because it is likely correlated with switching and potentially also 
with search costs. 
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effects of each source, but individually has sufficiently few variables to exclude most within-
source collinearity. The results for the joint estimation are shown in Table 44. 
Table 44: Joint Estimation – Different Panel Methods 
Method OLS IV FE FE-IV GMM GMM-IV 
1.00 1.11 0.98 0.79 1.00 1.00 
B1 - Lagged  Membership  
(0.0426)*** (0.103)*** (0.0966)*** (0.084)*** (0.00724)*** (0.00695)*** 
-16.01 -58.78 -8.03 6.85 -17.28 -15.35 B2 - RCRA - Lowest * Lagged 
Membership (old competitors) (16.24) (32.43)* (7.08) (14.08) (2.6)*** (2.5)*** 
0.09 0.79 -0.10 -0.67 0.23 0.10 B3 - RCRC * Higher Rate Market (old 
markets) (0.125) (0.642) (0.188) (1.40) (0.149) (0.157) 
22.09 -43.19 -12.03 -139.60 10.74 15.59 B4 - Adjusted ARRI * Share * Total 
Market (in 1000) (15.56) (71.03) (18.71) (103.86) (20.51) (19.27) 
2587.73 800.19 2412.59 6079.22 2772.98 2319.75 B5 - Adjusted ARRI * Share * Total 
Market * Lagged Market Share (647.17)*** (3093.9) (312.52)*** (1719.66)*** (146.24)*** (145.52)*** 
Observations 521 309 480 293 521 309 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence interval. 
 
The lagged membership is used by both switching and search costs. The second and third 
variables originate in the switching costs model and the fourth and firth in the search costs 
model. The parameter estimate for the second variable is expected to be negative and the last 
three parameter estimates are expected to be positive. The focus here is on the GMM model, 
because the Arellano-Bond test for first order autocorrelation (z = -3.44) rejects the null of no 
autocorrelation175 and the Hausman test for endogeneity rejects endogeneity. The parameter 
estimate of one variable from each source is highly significant and displays the expected sign, 
while the other parameter estimate of either source is not.  
The fact that 1ˆβ  is estimated to be exactly 1.00 and that 2ˆβ  is significantly negative 
strongly suggests that the major source of membership loss for a fund is based in the fact that 
there are lower rate alternatives with a contribution rate advantage. Switching costs as the major 
source would require the 1ˆβ  to be less than 1 because a certain share of its members “shop 
                                                 
175
 But barely fails to reject the null for second order autocorrelation (z = 1.96) 
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around” and decide to join the lowest rate alternative or remain in their current fund. Also the 
fact that the most exclusive relative price variable176 and not one that includes an indication of 
the number of lower rate competitors displays the most significant parameter estimate further 
supports the hypothesis of switching costs being the main source. 
The positive and significant parameter estimate on 5ˆβ  indicates that a larger past market 
share makes a fund more likely to be in a searchers’ aware set. An alternative interpretation is 
consistent with switching costs is that average fund-of-destination specific switching costs are 
negatively correlated with fund size, because larger funds usually maintain a larger network of 
branches and are more likely to be present on-line.  
                                                 
176
 The difference to the lowest rate competitor includes only one fund per market 
  
 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
This research has found strong evidence that switching costs are the dominant source of 
contribution rate setting power in the German statutory sickness fund sector. While product 
heterogeneity can be safely ruled out as a possible source, at least as far the data used for this 
research includes non-rate attributes, a secondary impact of search costs cannot be ruled out 
altogether and is even likely. 
This research provides a good answer to why people are switching and the reasons 
indicate that they switch because the financial gains from switching are higher than the costs of 
it. However, the research is not able to identify why people do not switch. For example it is not 
possible to precisely distinguish between someone not switching because his switching costs are 
too high or because of his decision to remain ignorant of his options.  
Typically the estimated models failed to find any impact of secondary factors on 
switching that would refine the broad estimate of the main price variables. This can be caused by 
the relatively small sample size. The lagged market share is the lone exception here and proved 
to have a positive impact of membership, even in the dynamic panel approach.  
Whether endogeneity is a major problem cannot be answered with certainty, because the 
available instruments are not very strong and thus the appropriate tests for endogeneity are to be 
interpreted with care. However, whenever endogeneity appeared to be a problem it was 
addressed and controlled for as well as the existing instruments allowed. 
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If a fund’s objective is to maximize its size, the conclusion that can be drawn from this 
research is that they should devote their resources towards making it as easy as possible for any 
potential member to switch to that fund, rather than offering non-mandated coverage. If the 
policy makers want to increase switching, they need to design policies that further reduce 
switching costs. 
As many questions as this research answers, there are many more questions that should 
be addressed in future research. It would be interesting to look into individual level data to 
identify the primary source of contribution rate setting power. The DIW in Berlin has these data, 
but unfortunately is it not available in the public use version of the SOEP. Using individual level 
data would allow looking into individual switching patterns and would help to answer many 
questions that aggregated data like the one used here cannot answer.  
If it were possible to increase the sample size of the firm level data set, it would not only 
be possible to obtain more precise parameter estimates, but also to include additional variables, 
that are included in the data, but not thoroughly tested like the timing of contribution rate 
changes. Obtaining better instruments would allow a more successful treatment of potential 
endogeneity. Ideally more direct cost data from the individual should be used.   
Finally it would be interesting to apply the presented methodology to data in different, 
albeit similar markets. These could be the health insurance choice in different countries and 
settings or even markets for different goods, in which similar questions arise. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Internet and Print Sources used to create the Data Set 
 
I) On-line sources 
 
1) Billiger Krankenversichert (2001, 2002): http://www.billiger-
krankenversichert.de/abc/bkk.shtml. Accessed at different times 2001/2002 
 
2) BKK Bundesverband (2001, 2002): Addresses, contribution rates and regions of 
operation for all BKKs, www.bkk.de, updated February 2001, June 2001, August 2001, 
March 2002. (http://www.dr-peglow.de/Informationen/Krankenkassen/ liste_bkk.pdf for 
February 2001 list, http://www.bkk.de/ps/tools/download .php?file=/bkk///psfile/ 
downloaddatei/63/BKK_Liste_4145bd9f67e11.pdf&name=BKK_Liste%20November%2
02004.pdf&id=291&nodeid=291 for location of current overview). 
 
3) Bundesministerium für Gesundheit: http://www.bmg.bund.de/cln_041/ nn_600110/ 
DE/Statistiken/statistiken-node,param=.html__nnn=true, last access: January 23rd, 2006. 
 
4) www.die-privatekrankenversicherung (1998): “Die preiswertesten Krankenkassen der 
Bundesländer”, www..die-privatekrankenversicherung.de/gkvbeitr.html, last accessed: 
June 23rd 2004.  
 
5) Eurostat (continuously updated): http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat 
last accessed: January 23rd 2006.  
 
6) Frankfurter Allgemeine, (1996): “Hessen vor der Kassenwahl”, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, August 25th 1996, Page 6 Wirtschaft, accessed through LexisNexis January 20th 
2004. 
 
7) Frankfurter Allgemeine, (1997): “Versicherte vor der Wahl: Teure Kassen Zittern”, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 7th, 1997, Page 6 Anlage und Geld, accessed 
through LexisNexis January 20th 2004. 
 
8) GELDidee (2001): “Regional Krankenkassen”, www.geldidee.de/versicherung/00810/ 
index.shtml?hauptmenue=versicherung, last access: April 30th 2002. 
 
9) GMD – Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik (2000): “APR - Vergütungsstelle – 
Stand 07/2000”, wsv.gmd.de/adminfo/Geskrank_Tab.xls, last access: December 9th 2001. 
 
10) Hentrich (2001): ” Beitragssätze einiger allgemeiner Ortskrankenkassen”, 
members.aol.com/hentrichm/kk3.htm, last access: April 25th 2002. 
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11) Hentrich (2001): ” Beitragssätze von Betriebskrankenkassen”, 
members.aol.com/hentrichm/kk4.htm, last access: April 25th 2002. 
 
12) Hentrich (2001): ”Beitragssätze von Innungskrankenkassen”, 
members.aol.com/hentrichm/kk5.htm, last access: April 25th 2002. 
 
13) Hentrich (2001): ”Beitragssätze von bundesweiten Ersatzkassen”, 
members.aol.com/hentrichm/kk6.htm, last access: April 25th 2002. 
 
14) Himmel, F. (2002): “So optimieren Sie Ihre Kassen- und Leistungsauswahl – Unbekannte 
Leistungen und Modellversuche – Die günstigesten Kassen, die neuen 
Wechselrichtlinien”, www.pnp.de/magazin/ge;d/248.htm, last access: April 26th 2002. 
 
15) Kassenärztliche Vereinigung Thüringen (2002): “ Bundeseinheitliches 
Kassenverzeichnis”, http://www.kzvth.de/open/kzvth/download/ 
bkv/2002_02/aenderungen_02_2002.pdf, last access: November 25th 2004 
 
16) Kastner (2002): “GKV Wechsel”, www.kastner-bgl.de/gkvwechs.html, last access: April 
30th 2002. 
 
17) Kirche Köln (2001): No Title – List of Sickness Funds in the Region of North-Rhine, 
http://www.kirche-koeln.de/_pd/rsv/formulare/krankenkassen.xls, last access: January 
23rd, 2003. 
 
18) Statistisches Bundesamt (continuously updated): 
http://www.destatis.de/themen/d/thm_mikrozen.php, last access: January 23rd, 2006. 
 
19) Verdienstabrechnung (2000): “Übersicht über die Beiträge der gesetzlichen 
Krankenkassen”, www.verdienstabrechnung.de/Texte/KKBeiträge.de, last access: March 
3rd 2003. 
 
20) Wikipedia (continuously updated): http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki, last access: January 23rd, 
2006. 
 
II) Print Sources 
 
1) BKK (2001): Beitragssätze”, BKKBetriebsService-Zack, No. 14-2001, July, 10th, 2001. 
 
2) DMEuro (2002):”Leistung lohnt”, DMEuro, January 2002, Page 110-115 
 
3) Finanztest (1996): “Das richtige Rezept”, Finanztest 1/1996, Page 83-85 
 
4) Finanztest (1998): “Auf der Suche nach dem Knüller”, Finanztest 4/1998, Page 12-20. 
 
5) Finanztest (1999): “Bald fällt die Klappe”, Finanztest 9/1999, Page 78-85. 
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6) Finanztest (2000): “Der Beitrag zählt”, Finanztest 9/2000, Page 12-19. 
 
7) Finanztest (2001-1): “Gesetzliche Krankenkassen: Die günstigsten Beitragssätze für jedes 
Bundesland”, Finanztest 7/2001, Page 82. 
 
8) Finanztest (2001-2): “Gesetzliche Krankenkassen: Die günstigsten Beitragssätze für jedes 
Bundesland”, Finanztest 8/2001, Page 84. 
 
9) Finanztest (2001-3): “Gesetzliche Krankenkassen: Die günstigsten Beitragssätze für jedes 
Bundesland”, Finanztest 9/2001, Page 82. 
 
10) Finanztest (2001-4): “Gesetzliche Krankenkassen: Die günstigsten Beitragssätze für jedes 
Bundesland”, Finanztest 10/2001, Page 82. 
 
11) Finanztest (2001-5): “Gesetzliche Krankenkassen: Die günstigsten Beitragssätze für jedes 
Bundesland”, Finanztest 11/2001, Page 82. 
 
12) Finanztest (2001-6): “Gesetzliche Krankenkassen: Die günstigsten Beitragssätze für jedes 
Bundesland”, Finanztest 12/2001, Page 84. 
 
13) Finanztest (2002-1): “Welche Kasse (zu) mir passt”, Finanztest 1/2002, Page 12-23. 
 
14) Finanztest (2002-2): “Gesetzliche Krankenkassen: Die günstigsten Beitragssätze für jedes 
Bundesland”, Finanztest 1/2002, Page 84. 
 
15) Finanztest (2002-3): “Gesetzliche Krankenkassen: Die günstigsten Beitragssätze für jedes 
Bundesland”, Finanztest 2/2002, Page 84. 
 
16) Focus (2000): “Es geht and Geld”, Focus 38/2000, Page 307-317. 
 
17) Focus (2001): “Politik der Nadelstiche”, Focus 14/2001, Page 288-289 
 
18) Test (1996): “Wechsel ohne Reue”, Test 4/96, Page 20-22. 
 
19) Test (1998): “Kassenschlager”, Test 6/98, Page 14-16. 
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Appendix B: The Questionnaire 
 
Alte Bundeslaender 1.1.1996 1.1.1997 1.1.1998 1.1.1999 1.1.2000 1.1.2001 1.1.2002 
ermaessigter Beitragssatz 
              
normaler Beitragssatz 
              
Erhoehter Beitragssatz 
              
Seit* 
              
Pflichtversicherte 
              
davon Studenten 
              
davon Arbeitslose 
              
freiwillig Versicherte 
              
AKV 
              
Rentner 
              
SUMME MITGLIEDER 
              
Famile 
              
SUMME VERSICHERTE 
              
*Please enter if contribution rate change occurred at a date other than January 1st. 
 
The attachment that was sent to the funds included three tables like the one above, one 
for each the old and new states and one for all of Germany. Also the funds were asked to list all 
past mergers and, if available, to file the above table for the predecessor funds as well. 
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Appendix C: Estimation Results 
Table 45: Fixed and Random Effects – Product Differentiation – Full Specification 
Dependent Variable RAMS RAMS DAMS DAMS Membership Membership 
Model FE RE FE RE FE RE 
-0.794 0.626 0.00746 0.01 8559.08 11110.2 Contribution Rate (0.456)* (0.313)** (0.00223)*** (0.00257)*** (5240.81) (5381.2)** 
7.64 4.35 -0.0376 -0.0428 -86505.3 -91840.6 Average competitors' contribution rate (2.47)*** (1.98)** (0.0245) (0.0242)* (37743.5)** (37541)** 
-0.771 0.66 -0.0539 -0.0538 -176815 -186298 Access on Saturdays (11.62) (11.92) (0.0426) (0.0567) (147862) (167347) 
0.798 0.448 0.00584 0.00556 19151.5 19605.9 Access on Sundays (1.21) (1.38) (0.00464) (0.0058) (13118.5) (14035.1) 
-1.68 -0.427 0.00616 0.008 7652.3 10448.3 Percentage Coverage Mother Spa Visits (0.802)** (0.777) (0.004) (0.00425)* (20797.5) (17554.4) 
-2.44 10.28 -0.0835 -0.0519 -530124 -459456 Web Presence (34.34) (37.84) (0.18) (0.215) (694807) (916297) 
-0.72 -1.27 0.00212 0.00109 14176 13322.9 Homesick Care Entitlement (0.596) (0.679)* (0.00232) (0.00245) (9566.77) (10273.4) 
-1.32 -0.962 0.000793 0.0013 -324.32 -169.21 Homesick Care Max. Weeks (0.572)** (0.826) (0.00261) (0.00336) (10594.2) (9806.54) 
2.46 1.48 -0.00451 -0.00583 8341.29 7934.56 Domestic Help Entitlement w/ Children (1.03)** (1.21) (0.00521) (0.00553) (17785.3) (34307.4) 
-0.75 -0.123 -0.000724 0.000337 -8789.79 -9420.83 Domestic Help Entitlement w/o Children (0.736) (0.906) (0.0031) (0.00371) (9759.19) (30856.1) 
9.66 4.88 -0.17 -0.167 -427100 -412642 Competitors' Access on Saturdays (31.1) (40.4) (0.142) (0.138) (291143) (282340) 
-7.7 -8.09 0.12 0.112 214912 188523 Competitors' Access on Sundays (32.22) (38.49) (0.173) (0.168) (313075) (297753) 
29.78 17.76 -0.17 -0.184 16844.9 -19689.6 Competitors' Percentage Coverage Mother 
Spa Visits (22.15) (16.34) (0.138) (0.165) (250422) (276575) 
18.35 15.96 -0.00834 -0.013 -100496 -106251 Competitors' Web Presence (9.99)* (13.42) (0.0715) (0.0697) (110959) (113952) 
0.62 5.41 -0.0471 -0.0392 -146142 -142688 Competitors' Homesick Care Entitlement (17.65) (18.44) (0.083) (0.0942) (162399) (185208) 
-0.215 -0.16 -0.00034 -0.000241 1213.12 1292.09 Competitors' Homesick Care Max. Weeks (0.172) (0.214) (0.00137) (0.00128) (2114.35) (2090.87) 
-11.05 13.97 0.743 0.765 1030120 1069660 Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/ 
Children (67.44) (73.31) (0.419)* (0.432)* (725763) (740273) 
-21.36 -36.75 -0.515 -0.528 -890465 -894066 Competitors' Domestic Help Entitlement w/o 
Children (50.93) (61.91) (0.343) (0.316)* (591416) (594538) 
-0.954 -0.715 0.00175 0.00146 597.47 794.33 Special Programs FT (rel. Participation Index) (1.57) (1.7) (0.00476) (0.00522) (21456.3) (19794.3) 
23.18 25.04 0.165 0.168 322437 332383 Competitors' Special Programs FT (rel. 
Participation Index) (42.12) (55.88) (0.207) (0.21) (460720) (426465) 
0.62 0.474 0.00236 0.00267 11183.9 11255.6 In Survey - Finanztest (0.92) (1.11) (0.00341) (0.0031) (11452.1) (8767.5) 
3.17 2.83 -0.0024 -0.00184 262.44 -443.99 Special Programs DMEuro (rel. Participation 
Index) (1.35)** (1.56)* (0.00345) (0.00379) (16992.7) (16511) 
20.66 -27.86 -0.224 -0.31 -441743 -512133 Competitors' Special Programs DMEuro (rel. 
Participation Index) (93.41) (126.58) (0.334) (0.268) (893804) (561851) 
-1.62 -1.64 0.0024 0.00171 3342.38 3357.95 In Survey - DMEuro (0.907)* (1.01) (0.00475) (0.00429) (12226.5) (13620.3) 
-15.62 -3.52 -0.0655 -0.0656 -805734 -668776 Special Programs BKV (rel. Participation 
Index) (32.27) (43.31) (0.157) (0.177) (633565) (1862920) 
-63.7 -19.11 0.109 0.189 498016 547665 Competitors' Special Programs BKV (rel. 
Participation Index) (73.18) (91.23) (0.259) (0.184) (737323) (430912) 
0.606 0.798 -0.00527 -0.00485 -7072.06 -7121.23 In Survey - BKV (0.624) (0.708) (0.00532) (0.00414) (10428.1) (12296.8) 
-83.68 -61.03 0.421 0.44 1219460 1211880 Constant (28.61)*** (24.31)** (0.292) (0.286) (450284)*** (460063)*** 
Observations 631 631 631 631 631 631 
Number of Different Funds 190 190 190 190 190 190 
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Table 46: Fixed and Random Effects – Product Differentiation – Only Price Effects 
Dependent Variable RAMS RAMS DAMS DAMS Membership Membership 
Model Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed effects Random Effects 
-0.62 0.358 0.00597 0.00772 6169.72 7973.87 Contribution Rate (0.333)* (0.304) (0.00167)*** (0.00167)*** (5283.5) (5308.1) 
4.17 2.87 -0.0119 -0.0141 -35596.7 -37959.7 Average competitors' 
contribution rate (0.729)*** (0.719)*** (0.00366)*** (0.00371)*** (11573.5)*** (11658.9)*** 
-42.06 -39.1 0.112 0.102 601533 569530 Constant (8.27)*** (8.38)*** (0.0415)*** (0.0428)** (131212)*** (139137)*** 
Observations 647 647 647 647 647 647 
Number of Different 
Funds 190 190 190 190 190 190 
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